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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL AND COUNTERCYCLICAL EFFECTS
OF PUBLIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT
IN TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE
While the long run productivity of federal highway infrastructure spending has been
well researched, their short run effects and effects on income inequality. This disser-
tation explores those under-researched unconventional effects.
In the first chapter, I investigate the effects of federal infrastructure grants on
income inequality. I find that grants reduce inequality in both recipient and neigh-
boring states. The reduction is driven by greater income among the bottom three
income quintiles. I explore two mechanisms using person level data and find that the
reduction in inequality is attributable to higher income for low-skilled workers and
workers working in low-skilled industries.
In the second chapter, I investigate the role of implementation lags in the ARRA.
I find that the employment effects after six months were nearly twice as high in short
lag counties compared to long lag counties. However, these effects quickly fade. I find
no evidence of implementation lags impacting employment after one year.
In the third chapter, I examine the effect of the business cycle on completion
times of federally financed transportation infrastructure projects. I find that projects
that begin construction during periods of economic slack are completed more quickly,
suggesting an alternative mechanism for state dependent fiscal multipliers.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Presidents have called for increased infrastructure investments in nine of the past ten
State of the Union addresses, and every president since George H. Bush have used the
address to discuss the state of the nation’s highways in at least one of their annual
addresses to Congress. With more than $400 billion (about 2.5% of GDP) annually
spent by the public sector on infrastructure projects, it is not only a politically relevant
topic, but an economically relevant one as well.
The empirical literature on the effects of public capital, especially transportation
infrastructure (roads, highways, mass transit, etc.), has conventionally centered on
the extent to which public capital expenditures are productive or not. There remains
a spirited debate on the effects of public capital expenditures on output, but the
literature has generally found a positive effect, particularly in the long run.
Rather than adding to an already enormous literature on the productivity of
public capital investment, this dissertation focuses on other effects of large public
capital projects. Broadly speaking, this dissertation explores two topics relatively
less researched components of public capital investment, particularly in transportation
infrastructure. First, I go beyond the average effects of transportation infrastructure
spending and highlight their distributional effects on personal income. Second, I
examine the shorter run implications of transportation infrastructure spending.
Previous literature has typically found a positive average effect of transportation
infrastructure investment on income, but less focus has been placed on its distri-
butional effects, the focus of the first chapter of this dissertation. I use the Gini
coefficient to record income inequality, as it is the most commonly used single statis-
tic to describe income inequality both in academic and non-academic discussions of
income inequality. I find that federal highway grants to states reduce the growth
rate of state-level Gini coefficients. To estimate this, I use a dynamic spatial Durbin
1
model, which expands on standard dynamic panel data models by explicitly modeling
the spatial relationship between spatial states, thereby allowing for the estimation of
spatial spillover effects. Estimates of these spillover effects reveal that transportation
grants reduce income inequality in spatially nearby states as well as recipient states.
Because the model is dynamic, I am able to show that these effects are larger in the
short run than long run.
Although convenient as a single summary measure, the Gini coefficient is unable
to distinguish between importantly different movements in the income distribution.
For example, a reduction in the Gini coefficient may be the result of a gain in income
for the lowest end of the income distribution, but it could also be the result of a
loss of income for the highest end of the income distribution. While the former
of these possibilities is likely welcome by policymakers, the latter may not be as
palatable. To address this, I use Internal Revenue Service data to estimate the direct
effect of transportation grants for income quintiles within each states. I find that
transportation grants increase income for bottom three quintiles, which correspond
to the lower, lower-middle, and middle classes. I find no evidence that incomes for
the upper end of the income distribution are affected by transportation grants.
I further explore two potential channels by which transportation grants can reduce
income inequality by using person-level data from the Current Population Survey. I
show that the equalizing effect of transportation grants are at least partially at-
tributable to a heterogeneous effect of the grants by skill and industry of work. In
particular, I find that transportation grants increase income for low-skilled workers
and those who work in low-skilled industries (such as retail, manufacturing, etc.).
Conversely, I find no effect of transportation grants on high skilled workers or those
working in high-skilled industries (such as the professional services).
The second and third chapters both examine the effect of timing in the short run
effectiveness of federal transportation grants. The second chapter examines the role of
implementation lags in determining the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus through trans-
2
portation expenditures. I following Wilson (2012) in estimating changes in employ-
ment due to spending from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA). I
track the differential effect of implementation lags – the lag between when the ARRA
was signed into law and when work on projects begin – on the effectiveness of ARRA
spending through transportation infrastructure grants for each month following the
signing of the ARRA.
Although many economists have posited that implementation lags may be so pro-
hibitively large for transportation infrastructure spending so as to make it ineffective
as a countercyclical fiscal policy tool, I do not know of any other study that has
directly and explicitly tested this assertion using granular data below the national
level. My estimates suggest this concern may be overly pessimistic. While I show
that implementation lags reduce the effectiveness of ARRA spending in stimulating
employment growth, the effects last only about a year before mostly disappearing.
Additionally, the overall effect of the grants are positive even for counties with rela-
tively large implementation lags.
The final chapter involves timing of a different nature. I examine the degree to
which the business cycle influences the construction phase of projects. Specifically, I
show that federally financed projects that are approved to start construction during
periods of economic slack are completed more quickly than projects completed during
normal economic times. I am able to do this by using semi-restricted project-level
data on more than 700,000 projects awarded through the Department of Transporta-
tion across 11 business cycles. I estimate an accelerated failure time model using this
data and show a one percentage point increase in the national unemployment rate is
associated with a 2% lower project completion time. By controlling for project ex-
penditures, my results suggest spending occurs more quickly when a project is autho-
rized to begin during higher unemployment periods. This suggests equivalently large
projects can be more stimulative in the short run during these high unemployment
periods because effective government spending is greater. As a result, my estimates
3
suggest a previously unexplored mechanism by which fiscal spending multipliers may
be larger during recessions than expansions.
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Chapter 2 Road to Equality?: Distributional Effects of Federal
Transportation Grants
2.1 Introduction
Income inequality in the United States rose sharply over the past half century. In
1956, the average share of the top 10% of income earners received 32% of total income.
By 2013, they earned nearly 45%. As of 2014, the average person in the top 10%
of the income distribution earned nearly nine times more than the average person in
the bottom 90%, which translates to a 50% increase over the first half of the 20th
century. The maximum state level of inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient)
in 1970 was lower than the minimum state level of inequality in 2010.1 Figures 2.1
and 2.2 show rising inequality occurred in every state of the United States since the
1950’s. There is little indication that the trend is reversing. In 1980, income growth
of the bottom quintile of the income distribution outpaced income growth of the top
1% of the income distribution. However, by 2014, income for the bottom quintile of
the income distribution grew at less than a tenth of the rate of top .0001% of income
earners.2 Even by world standards, income inequality in the US is large; income
inequality in the U.S. ranks 4th out of 34 OECD countries.3
Figure 2.3 illustrates how voters preferences appear to have responded to rising
income inequality. In 1985, voters overwhelmingly expressed a distaste for government
redistribution of income (39% supporting to 61% opposing). By 2016, the majority
1Idaho had the maximum level of inequality in 1970, with a market income (pre-tax pre-transfer)
Gini coefficient of .506 while West Virginia had the minimum level of inequality in 1990, with a
market income Gini coefficient of .543. The Gini coefficient is defined by the area between the
Lorenz curve and an equal (egalitarian) distribution of income. A Gini coefficient of 0 implies an
egalitarian distribution of income and a Gini coefficient of 1 implies absolute income inequality.
2https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/07/opinion/leonhardt-income-inequality.html
3Post-taxes and transfers for 2014. Costa Rica, Mexico and Turkey had the top levels of in-
equality. See https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD for more.
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of voters supported some form of redistribution of income (56% supporting to 44%
opposing). Consequently, a variety of policy proposals aimed at combating inequality
have emerged. Some emphasize access to education, as a direct response to skill-
biased technical change (e.g. Acemoglu (1998); Goldin and Katz (2018)). Meanwhile,
Piketty (2017) suggests that reducing the return on capital or increasing growth is
the only long run way to reduce inequality.4 Others have suggested explicit fiscal
policy responses such as raising capital taxes, a more progressive income tax system,
expanded public access to credit, guaranteed basic income, or raising limits on means-
tested programs.5 While the existing literature has primarily focused on policies that
explicitly aim to reduce income inequality, I explore the effects of a policy that has
no explicitly re-distributive goals: federal infrastructure investment.
This chapter analyzes the effects of federal infrastructure grants on income in-
equality. Using a long panel of US states from 1956 to 2013, I show that federal
infrastructure grants reduce the growth rate of state-level income inequality.6 My
empirical specification captures both spatial spillover effects and temporal dynamics.
I find that federal infrastructure grants reduce the growth rate of income inequality
of the recipient state, and spills into neighboring states.7 I find that these effects are
larger in the short run, but persist into the long run.
Figure 2.4 shows a decomposition of federal physical investment in transporta-
tion and water infrastructure between 1956 and 2014. For each year in this period,
highways represented the bulk of federal infrastructure outlays. As Figure 2.5 shows,
grants play a critical role in federal transportation infrastructure expenses. In 2012,
4Consistent with this idea, (Dollar and Kraay, 2002) found that higher income growth tends to
reduce income inequality and (Apergis et al., 2010; Gupta et al., 2002; Jong-Sung and Khagram,
2005) find reducing corruption can achieve the same ends.
5See Piketty (2014) for a more thorough list of policies that have been considered.
6The decision to estimate the effect on FAHP grants in growth rates instead of levels is due to
the econometric difficulty of estimating my empirical model in levels. Section 2.5 elaborates on the
empirical model.
7Throughout the text I refer to the spillovers occurring in neighboring states. My empirical
model is less restrictive, in that spill over effects can reach higher ordered neighbors (neighbors of
neighbors) - referred to as global spillover effects. I outline the empirical model in Section 2.5.
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85% of all federal highway investment was expended via grants. Consequently, I focus
on federal highway grants to proxy for federal infrastructure investment.
Bradford and Oates (1971b) show that changes in grants do not necessarily imply
changes in total spending because federal transportation infrastructure grants may
crowd-out local investment. Therefore, federal grants could simply shift the final cost
of highways from states to the federal government. In Section 2.4, I find evidence
of a flypaper effect - the phenomenon that donor government grants do not fully
crowd-out recipient government spending. That is, I present evidence that changes
in transportation grants do increase total highway spending.
I focus on federal transportation grants for several reasons. First, federal trans-
portation investment is plausibly large enough to generate a significant change in a
state’s income distribution. In 2014, the federal government devoted just under $100
billion (equivalent to about 3.2% of the federal budget or about .5% of GDP) on
physical infrastructure, much of which was devoted to highways. Additionally, fed-
eral transportation grants are allocated to every state, which allows for a panel data
analysis that can control for state fixed effects and national changes.
Second, federal infrastructure grants are plausibly predetermined. Congress ap-
portions grants to states using formulas.8 Disbursements from these formulas use
three-year lagged data. Consequently, apportionments are not contemporaneously
correlated with key economic factors. As a result, estimates in this analysis are less
prone to concerns about endogeneity than, for example, education spending (e.g.
Klasen, 2002). I elaborate on the institutional details of federal infrastructure expen-
ditures in Section 2.3 and Appendix A.
Finally, policymakers and economists may prefer public infrastructure spending
over alternative approaches to reduce income inequality. Most studies find highway
spending is productive - it increases average income and lowers transportation costs
8Some funds are apportioned using funds while others are allocated via other means. See the
appendix for more information.
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(Aschauer, 1989; Bom and Ligthart, 2014; Leduc and Wilson, 2013a; Redding and
Turner, 2015). Of course, some studies find that highways are not very productive
(Fernald, 1999; Chandra and Thompson, 2000). That said, the debate has focused
around if there is a statistically positive effect of infrastructure on income or not, but
few if any argue the effect is negative. Furthermore, expenditures on highways do not
generate the same kind of labor-supply reducing incentives that welfare expenditures
generate. Thus, policymakers with distributional preferences may view any equalizing
effects of highway expenditures as an additional benefit to its more well established
economic benefits, especially in the presence of limited policy tools.
Following Aschauer (1989), many studies have focused on the average effects of
public physical capital investment, but few have examined its distributional effects.
In Sections 2.6 and 2.7, I show that federal highway grants increase average income,
as found by previous literature. However, this chapter contributes to the literature by
exploring the distributional effects of infrastructure spending. In section 2.6, I show
that the majority of the benefits of federal highway grants are concentrated among
the three lower income quintiles. In Section 2.7, I show that the gains are primarily
captured by low-skilled workers and those working in low-skilled industries.
This study relates to the existing literature on the relationship between public
physical investment and income inequality. Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2012) develop
a model where infrastructure can affect both the growth rate and the distribution of
income. They find that the sign of public investment’s impact on income inequality
is ambiguous, with many financing schemes resulting in short run declines in income
inequality, which are reversed in the long run.9 Meanwhile, the macroeconomics liter-
ature has stressed the importance of the substitutability or complementarity between
private and public capital in determining the sign of the effect of public infrastructure
9My approach largely sidesteps the question of source of financing since I use pre-tax pre-transfer
data. Additionally, federal financing is largely constant across states. In section 2.8, I explicitly
include state measures of implicit federal tax rates.
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on income inequality (Getachew and Turnovsky, 2015).
The empirical literature on the effect of public infrastructure spending on inequal-
ity has focused primarily on studies in developing countries. Among this literature,
the evidence appears mixed. Several studies find no negative (Khandker et al., 2009),
or even positive (Banerjee and Somanathan, 2007) effects of infrastructure programs
on income inequality. However, others find a strong negative relationship between
the two. Studies examining the effect of infrastructure from Latin America (De Fer-
ranti, 2004; Caldero´n and Chong, 2004) to rural China (Shenggen and Zhang, 2004),
and Mexico (Gibson and Rioja, 2017) find that income inequality falls in response
to changes in infrastructure or infrastructure spending. However, less focus has been
given on the effect of infrastructure projects in the United States. There is not a par-
ticularly strong reason to believe the response of income inequality to infrastructure
spending will be the same in a developed country like the United States compared to
developing countries. Whereas the average marginal effect of increased investments
in infrastructure may be larger in developing countries (due to lower initial levels of
infrastructure), their distributional effects may be smaller. Smaller gains in produc-
tivity could increase the importance of the construction aspect of the infrastructure
on income in developed countries compared to developing countries.
Although little explicit attention has been given to the relationship between in-
come inequality and public infrastructure spending in the United States, several stud-
ies have indirectly done so by finding evidence of heterogeneous effects of infrastruc-
ture on industries (Fernald, 1999; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1991; Mamuneas and Nadiri,
1996; Melo et al., 2013). While each of these studies differ in how they analyze the
heterogeneous effects of changes in transportation infrastructure, they all find that
low-skilled industries such as manufacturing, transportation, and construction benefit
relatively more than industries in the service sector. Although these insights highlight
the heterogeneous nature of public capital investment’s impact on output and cost
structures of industries and firms, they do not directly address its effect on the distri-
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bution of income as I do. Therefore, I expand on the current literature by exploring
another dimension of the heterogeneous effects of changes in public infrastructure.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a simple
theoretical framework. Section 2.3 describes the data and Section 2.4 links grants
to spending. Section 2.5 motivates and presents my empirical specification. Section
2.6 presents the main results, and Section 2.7 tests for possible mechanisms driving
the main results. Section 2.8 provides robustness checks, extensions, and falsification
tests. Section 2.9 discusses and concludes.
2.2 Motivating Theory
This section presents a straightforward example of how infrastructure spending can
reduce income inequality. Since the relationship between income inequality and public
infrastructure is not highly researched, the model builds intuition behind the empirical
results.
Single Economy
Drawing from the labor economics literature, which has emphasized the importance
of skill and education in accounting for the rapid increase in income inequality, I
construct a competitive market model in which output (Y) is a function of public
capital (K) and two types of labor - high-skilled (Lh) and low-skilled (Ll). Each type
of worker supplies their labor exogenously and inelastically. Workers are born with
their skills, and cannot switch skill-levels. High-skilled workers are more productive;
yielding a skill premium of A > 1.10 In this basic set-up, labor is perfectly immobile,
but this is relaxed in the next section. The production function is additively separable
10Alternatively, one could model this as a two goods two sector economy. However, this distinction
does not impact the analysis in a meaningful way. Further, such an approach would require specifying
the relative price of goods made by high-skilled workers compared to the price of goods made by
low-skilled workers. In contrast, I implicitly normalize all prices to one in this model.
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such that:
Y = Lαll K
θ + ALαhh (2.1)
Each sector exhibits diminishing returns to labor, αh, αl < 1. Public capital is
exogenously determined, and affects the productivity of the low-skilled sector, but not
the high skilled sector.11 The elasticity of output to public capital for the low-skilled
sector is given by θ. Public capital is a complement in production with low-skilled
labor, θ > 0.12
Since markets are competitive, workers in both sectors earn their marginal pro-
ductivity,
LDl =
∂Y
∂Ll
= αlL
αl−1
l K
θ = wl (2.2)
LDh =
∂Y
∂Lh
= αhAL
αh−1
h = wh (2.3)
Note that equilibrium (sectoral) wages, wl and wh, only depend on public capital
in the low-skilled sector. Markets must clear following an increase in public capital.
Since labor is supplied inelastically (LSsector for sector=l,h) the response
∂LD
∂K
suffi-
ciently describes ∂w
∂K
. Therefore, the response of wages to public capital in each sector
is
∂wl
∂K
= θLαl−1l K
θ−1 > 0
11The assumption that public capital does not affect the high-skilled sector is potentially restric-
tive, and could be relaxed by allowing both sectors to depend on public capital. The results are
robust to this generalization so long as the elasticity of output in the low-skilled sector is sufficiently
higher than the high-skilled sector. This seems plausible, as estimates for the high-skilled sector
are typically small. Some estimates even find negative elasticities (implying public capital is a sub-
stitute in production), which would suggest the results in this model underestimate the effects of
infrastructure investment on income inequality. See Mamuneas and Nadiri (1996) for more.
12Empirical estimates of the elasticity of output to public capital in the low-skilled sectors are
positive and usually large. See Nadiri and Mamuneas (1991); Fernald (1999).
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∂wh
∂K
= 0
Wages increase for low-skilled workers (since θ > 0), but are unchanged for high-
skilled workers. Since there are only two types of workers, inequality can be sum-
marized by the relative wage of high-skilled and low-skilled workers, wr =
wh
wl
, with
higher levels implying greater income inequality.13 Since equilibrium wages in the
high-skilled sector remain the same, while wages in the low-skilled sector increase,
changes in public infrastructure reduces the relative income captured by each sector
(∂wr
∂K
< 0). Since labor is supplied inelastically, this reduction in sectoral income
inequality also translates to a smaller relative wage and lower income inequality.
Elastic Supply and Gini Coefficient
Suppose now that the supply of low skilled labor is not perfectly inelastic. Instead,
let low-skilled labor supply be defined as:
Lsl = w
σ
l (2.4)
where σ defines the response of low-skilled labor to changes in wages. Using (2.2)
and (2.4),
αlL
αl−1
l K
θ = wσl
which implies wages can be expressed as
wl = [αlL
αl−1
l K
θ]1/σ
The response of wages to an increase in capital can then be represented by
∂wl
∂K
=
θ
σ
L
αl−1
σ
l K
θ−1
σ
which is positive so long as σ is not negative (i.e. the labor supply curve is not
backward bending). However, as σ gets larger, the effect gets smaller; as the supply
13Total income inequality measures like the Gini coefficient used later in this chapter will also
depend on the ratio of high to low-skilled labor, but in this model the quantity of labor is constant.
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of labor becomes perfectly elastic (σ → ∞), the response of wages to increased
productivity will approach zero.
Whereas the relative wage is isomorphic to the Gini coefficient when labor is in-
elastically supplied, this is not necessarily the case when supply is elastic. Figure 2.6
shows the two extreme responses of the Gini coefficient to an increase in demand for
low-skilled labor. If labor were to be perfectly inelastic an increase in demand for
low-skilled labor would not change the proportion of low-skilled workers, but would
increase their wages. The resulting change in the Gini coefficient would be unam-
biguously negative. However, if labor were to be perfectly elastic, there would be no
change in equilibrium wages, but an increase in the proportion of low-skilled workers.
In this case, the Gini coefficient would actually increase, due to the income of the
high-skilled labor becoming concentrated among a smaller portion of the population.
With somewhat elastic labor, the change in the Gini coefficient is therefore ambigu-
ous. If the labor supply response is large enough relative to changes in the incomes of
low-skilled workers, the Gini coefficient could increase even though the relative wage
decreases.
Spillovers
In this section I modify the model presented in Section 2.2 to account for spatial
spillover effects. Consider now two neighboring states, i and j, each with identical
production functions like the one above,
Ys = L
αl
slK
θ
s + AL
αh
sh (2.5)
where s = i, j. States i and j differ only in their endowments of public capital and
labor, but have the same elasticity of output to capital (θ) and skill premium (A).
Capital is exogenously given to each state. The demand for labor is similar to the
13
previous section, with
∂Ys
∂Lst.,l
= αlL
αl−1
st,h K
θ
st,l = wst,l (2.6)
∂Ys
∂Lst,h
= αhAL
αh−1
st,h = wst,h (2.7)
for st = i, j, h and l respectively represent the high and low skilled sectors.
For simplicity, labor is mobile but total sectoral-labor is fixed; L¯l = Lil + Ljl and
L¯h = Lih + Ljh. Equilibrium is therefore defined by:
αlL
αl−1
st.,sec.K
θ
il = wil (2.8)
L¯l = Li,sec. + Lj,sec. (2.9)
wi,sec. = wj,sec. (2.10)
(2.8) describes labor demand, (2.9) describes labor supply, and (2.10) describes
the market clearing condition. The subscript sec denotes the sectors.
Substitution and differentiation of (2.8) to (2.10) leads to,
dwil
dKi
=
∂wil
∂Ki
dLil
dKi
+
∂wil
∂Ki
> 0 (2.11)
since
∂wil
∂Ki
= α(α− 1)Lα−2Kθi + [α(α− 1)Kθj (L¯l − Lil)α−2] < 0
dLil
dKi
= −wil(αθKθi )−1 < 0
∂wil
∂Ki
= θαLα−1i K
θ−1
i > 0
Since public capital and low-skilled labor are complements in production, an in-
crease in public capital for state i raises the marginal productivity of labor (MPL)
of state i. Additionally, competitive markets imply this increase results in upward
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pressure on wages in state i. Equilibrium is achieved because via the mobility of
labor. The increase in the MPL in state i induces workers from neighboring state j to
migrate to state i. This migration results in off-setting downward pressure on wages
in state i (since demand is downward sloping). At the same time, migration out of
state j raises the MPL of state j’s low-skilled sector. In equilibrium, just enough
people migrate from state j to state i such that the equilibrium wage condition (2.10)
is met. The net result in the low-skilled sector is an increase in wages, while there is
not effect on wages in the high-skilled sector, since it is not a function of public cap-
ital. Consequently, the relative wage falls in the home state in response to increases
in public capital. Since labor is perfectly mobile (see (2.10)), wages in each sector of
neighboring state i change proportionately with changes in the wage of state i.14 As
a result, increasing public capital in state i reduces the relative wage in state j as
well.
The effect of an increase in public capital on the Gini coefficient is somewhat more
ambiguous. Although labor is inelastic within each state, mobility across states still
allows for an effective response in supply in each state in response to an increase in
public capital. For the recipient state, the share of the labor-force that is low-skilled
increases at the same time that there is upward pressure on wages. As the previous
subsection noted, this results in a theoretically ambiguous sign on the change in
the Gini coefficient for the recipient state since immigration will increase the Gini
coefficient while the increase in wages will reduce it. In the neighboring state, a
reduction in the proportion of low-skilled workers and higher wage pressures resulting
from that result in a theoretically unambiguous reduction in the Gini coefficient. The
14The perfect mobility of labor is convenient, but not necessary. Labor does not have to be
perfectly mobile for the basic result of this section to hold. One could introduce imperfect mobility
by adjusting the model to include convex (in the number of people moving) cost of moving, reflecting
heterogeneous attachment to home. Including such a movement cost would generate wage wedges,
but not change the basic results. Note that perfect mobility does not create a corner solution in this
case because the MPL tends to wards infinity as labor gets arbitrarily close to zero in either state,
due to the diminishing returns on labor (α < 1).
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effect of immigration likely plays a much larger role when looking at state-level Gini
coefficients than national-level coefficients, as there are fewer barriers to immigration
within countries than between countries. Consequently, immigration plays a smaller
role in placing upward pressure on the Gini coefficient of the nation than a state, as
immigration between states would not impact the national-level Gini coefficient.
The extended model highlights several important features that inform the em-
pirical specification presented in Section 2.5. First, it implies low-skilled workers or
workers in the low-skilled sector should see benefits from public capital expenditures.
Second, it suggests there should be limited effect of changes in public capital on the
income of high-skilled workers and workers working in the high-skilled sector.15 Third,
it suggests an important role for spillover effects of public capital investment. Last, it
suggests the direct effect (that is, in the recipient state i) of public capital investment
on income inequality are attenuated by the presence of neighboring states, implying
a non-spatial model may over estimate the effect of public capital investment on the
home state.
2.3 Data
To examine the relationship between public infrastructure and income inequality, I
use annual data spanning the years between 1956 and 2013 for the contiguous 48
United States.16
I use annual state-level Gini coefficients to measure total income inequality. I focus
on the Gini coefficient because of its historical ubiquity (Atkinson, 1975; Sen et al.,
1973; Deininger and Squire, 1996) and contemporary relevance in both policy decisions
and academia (Piketty, 2015). The source of these data is Frank (2014), which uses
15I test, and find empirical support, for each of these implications in section 2.7.
16I exclude Alaska and Hawaii because they share no border with other states. I exclude the
District of Columbia because I am not able to control for political influence using political controls
that will be defined later in this section.
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tabulations from the Statistics of Income (SOI) series that are annually published by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The SOI provides detailed tabulations of pre-
tax, pre-transfer aggregate income captured by income bins within each state. More
information on the SOI series is provided in Appendix A.
As mentioned in Section 2.1, I use federal highway transportation grants to states
as a proxy for public infrastructure investment. Grants are distributed to states via
congressionally-mandated programs. To reduce administrative redundancy Congress
places most programs relating to highways under the Federal-Aid Highway Program
(hereafter FAHP), which is administered by the Federal Highway Administration
(hereafter FHWA).
Data regarding these grants are sourced from the FHWA’s annual Highway Statis-
tics report through its Office of Highway Policy Information.17 The Highway Statistics
series contains detailed statistics on federal spending and grants, including all FAHP
activities. I use total apportionments of FAHP grants across all programs from the
Highway Statistics series to measure federal highway transportation grants.
FAHP apportionments denote the distribution of funds by FAHP to states accord-
ing to statutory formulas. Apportionments are the first step in the process of FAHP
funds being expended, so they better capture the anticipation effects and implemen-
tation lags commonly associated with fiscal policy (see, e.g., Ramey, 2011b).18
Factors underlying the FAHP apportionment formulas vary by program, but they
are all calculated using three-year lagged data.19 Table 2.1 illustrates the factors
underlying the apportionments for several major FAHP programs, and the weight
17Data prior to 1994 were digitized from photocopied manuscripts. The photocopies have very
poor quality (or are simply missing) for years prior for 1954. Thus I start my analysis at 1956 even
though the Highway Statistics report nominally dates back to 1946. I know of no other paper that
has digitized the Highway Statistics data as far back as I have.
18Funds are distributed either by apportionments or allocation. Allocated funds are not subject
to formulas, and therefore more subject to political influence. I exclude all allocated funds from my
sample. See Appendix A for details on each of the stages of FAHP grants.
19This lag exists due to the historical difficulty in obtaining accurate highway usage data in a
timely fashion.
17
assigned to each factor for the period spanning between 2010 and 2012. The formu-
laic nature of FAHP apportionments mitigates the potential endogeneity of FAHP
grants to political manipulation, and the three year lagged formula factors greatly di-
minish the contemporaneous correlation between grants and key economic variables.
Thus, FAHP grants are plausibly predetermined. Appendix A expands on the in-
stitutional details and advantages of FAHP apportionments over other measures of
infrastructure.
To further control for potential political influence, I include three covariates that
capture a state’s congressional power. The first two covariates indicate if the chair-
person of the appropriations committee of either chamber of Congress represent their
state. The third covariate measures each states’ percent of total membership on the
House of Representatives’ Committee on Appropriations. Data for these covariates
are sourced from the Government Publishing Office, Congressional profiles, and var-
ious documents available via the Library of Congress and official websites of each
chamber of Congress (see the Data Glossary for more).20
2.4 From Grants to Spending
A potential drawback of FAHP grants is that changes in grants apportioned to a
program do not necessarily imply a change in total spending on the program since
federal grants could crowd-out state spending. In this section I demonstrate that
increases in FAHP grants do increase total spending on roads and highways.
At least since Bradford and Oates (1971a,b) the public finance literature has
argued that inter-governmental grants may be fungible. If true, recipient (state)
governments should treat FAHP funds from the donor (federal) government as inter-
changeable with its own highway and road expenditures. As a result, theory implies
state funds should be fully crowded out by federal grants, save an income effect gen-
20Appendix A elaborate on why these three controls are the most appropriate measures of con-
gressional power.
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erated by the size of the grant itself.
The phenomenon of recipient governments actually increasing net total spending
on projects earmarked by the donor governments is referred to as the flypaper effect.
Evidence of the presence of flypaper effects are abundant. In fact, most studies
that analyze the effect of grants on recipient spending find evidence of some form
of a flypaper effect. Hines and Thaler (1995), summarize early literature on inter-
governmental grants in the following way:, ”[A]ll studies surveyed report some degree
of flypaper. The variation comes from whether the estimated flypaper effect is simply
large or if it is enormous”. Leduc and Wilson (2013b, 2017) go further. They find
that highway funds actually crowd in state investment. That is, states increase total
spending on highways in response to highway grants.
Though most studies find a flypaper effect, some find the type of crowding out that
theory predicts. Particularly relevant is Knight (2002) since he focuses on highway
grants. The essential insight of his study is that certain federal grants may be endoge-
nous in that politicians from states that value highway spending could fight harder
in the political process to get more funds. Using an instrumental variables approach,
Knight’s estimates are unable to reject a null hypothesis of full crowding out using
several measures or political strength of a state in Congress.21 Knight’s contribu-
tions are a key reason why I use FAHP apportionments instead of FAHP allocations
or expenditures to measure infrastructure, and include the political controls men-
tioned in the previous section in each of my empirical specifications. Additionally,
Knight’s work highlights the advantage of using FAHP apportionments over grant
outlays. Notoriously political projects such as the infamous ”Bridge to Nowhere” are
not distributed according to statutory formulas, and are therefore not included in my
sample.
21Knight’s findings may not be robust, however, due to issues of weak instruments. Stock and
Yogo (2002) find that weak instruments can suffer from severe size distortions and bias. Knight’s
instruments fail to reject the null hypothesis of more than 25% size distortion and 30% (relative to
OLS) bias.
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To determine if there is evidence of either a flypaper effect or crowding out in my
sample, I estimate the relationship between total highway disbursements in a state
and FAHP grants as:
TotalDisbursementsit =
q∑
p=0
βpInfrastructurei,t−p + γXit + αi + αt + uit (2.12)
where the subscripts denote state i in year t. TotalDisbursementsit denotes to-
tal state highway disbursements (expenditures), including those reimbursed by the
federal government.22 Infrastructureit denotes per capita FAHP apportionments.
To control for political influences and the income effect, Xit includes the three polit-
ical variables described in the data section and (the growth rate of) real per capita
state income. αi and αt are sets of state and time dummies, respectively. Follow-
ing Gordon (2004), I include the summation of Infrastructurei,t−p over p=1,...,q
lags of time to allow for the possibility that crowding out (or in) may take several
years to occur.The inclusion of these lags is particularly important in this analysis
because state funded projects data is available only for expenditures (as opposed to
apportionments), thereby generating a timing discrepancy between federal highway
apportionments and state disbursements.
Table 2.2 reports estimates of (2.12).23 It reports estimates for a five period lag
structure (q=5), but adding more lags do not meaningfully change the results.24 Since
the dependent variable measures total disbursements across all forms of government,
22See Tables SF-21 in the Highway Statistics series for more details.
23Studies pertaining to the flypaper effect have historically focused on the effect of grants on
total spending in levels. As a result, both FAHP apportionments (Infrastructureit) and state
highway expenditures (TotalDisbursementsit) are measured in levels in this section for consistency
with that literature. However, since I use the natural logarithm of infrastructure apportionments
and total expenditures throughout the rest of the chapter, I have estimated (2.12) in a log-log
specification report those estimates in Table 5.7 of the Appendix. I find that the log-log estimation
gives qualitatively similar results. Furthermore, the exclusion of the control variables only minimally
impacts the results
24Unfortunately, neither the Akaike or Bayesian information criterion are informative in selecting
the optimal lag order length as neither reach minimum values within 20 years. However, Gordon
(2004) finds education grants take three years to crowd-out. Additional lags were added because of
the long implementation lags associated with highway spending (Leduc and Wilson, 2013a).
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the β coefficients represent the response of total spending to an increase in FAHP
grants. Thus, the sum of the coefficients on infrastructure,
∑q
p=0βp, should equal zero
under the null hypothesis of full crowding out. In contrast, a sum of 1 indicates no
crowding out. Values in between 0 and 1 indicate partial crowding out.
I find strong evidence against complete crowding out. I find that increasing FAHP
grants by $1 leads to a 72.3 cent increase in total disbursements of highways funds.
The third to last row reports the p-value associated with a Wald-test on the null
hypothesis that there is full crowding out; I reject this hypothesis at any meaningful
significance level. The results do suggest there is some crowding out, as the point
estimate is not equal to one. However, as the last row indicates, the null hypothesis
of no crowding out cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level. Thus, FAHP funds
are not fully crowded out, and therefore do increase total highway disbursements.25
Relative to other recent studies, my point estimates are rather conservative. As
mentioned earlier in this section, Leduc and Wilson (2017) find crowding in of state
spending in response to federal grants. However, their findings are likely influenced
by their measure of highway grants (forecast errors in obligations of grants) and the
fact that their analysis primarily focuses on the Great Recession. Still, the estimates
fit into a large body of literature which finds some form of a flypaper effect.
2.5 Empirical Specification
The empirical model includes spatial lags of the independent variables, which implies
that the value of covariates in spatially neighboring states can have an impact on the
income inequality of a state. The literature on fiscal federalism and tax competition
has long shown states do not exist in a vacuum, their actions and outcomes are
25Table 5.6 in the Appendix reports estimates for lags ranging between 0 and 10. Further lags
(six to ten) result in slightly stronger results. The cumulative effect ranges between .723 and .823.
In all those cases I also find that full crowding out can be rejected but no crowding out cannot be
rejected.
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highly interdependent Oates (1999); Wildasin (2003); Oates (2005). FAHP grants in
particular are likely to have an especially large impact in other states. Projects funded
by FAHP grants, such as the Interstate Highway System, reduce transportation costs
Redding and Turner (2015). Geographic distance and transportation costs play a key
role in the size of the spillover effects of models in various literatures, with larger
transportation costs reducing the size of potential spillover effects (Eugster et al.,
2013; Agrawal, 2015; Gallen and Winston, 2017). Therefore, FAHP grants amplify
existing spillover effects. Furthermore, due to the inter-state nature of FAHP grants,
many FAHP projects occur near or at state borders. Therefore, the implementation of
FAHP projects (ie the construction highways) are likely to impact the labor markets
of neighboring states.
My empirical specification includes neighboring values of inequality as well, which
implies that changes in income inequality in one state results in changes in income
inequality in neighboring states.26 This relationship, referred to as spatial autocor-
relation or spatial dependence, allows the model to capture spatial feedback loops
(discussed in Section 2.2) and general equilibrium conditions. For example, consider
three connected states, Texas, New Mexico, and Colorado. An increase in the demand
for low-skilled labor in Texas places upward pressure on wages for low-skilled work
in Texas, which could induce immigration into Texas from New Mexico. As a result
income inequality declines not only in Texas, but in New Mexico as well. However,
emigration from New Mexico into Texas generates a wage gap for low-skilled workers
between Colorado and New Mexico (assuming they were initially at equilibrium). As
a result, emigration from New Mexico to Texas induces emigration from Colorado to
New Mexico, thereby reducing income inequality in Colorado as well. This process
continues until the labor market equalizes again.
It is possible to test for spatial autocorrelation Table 2.3 reports test statistics and
26The spatial literature typically refers to the inclusion of neighboring values of the dependent
variable as either a spatial lag of the dependent variable or a spatially endogenous dependent variable.
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p-values of Moran’s I test, a test of spatial correlation, for both the Gini coefficient
and the growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Under the null hypothesis of Moran’s
I, inequality in a given state is spatially uncorrelated with inequality in neighboring
states. This null hypothesis is rejected, implying spatial dependence in both the level
and growth rate of the Gini coefficient.27 Furthermore, in all statistically-significant
cases the sign of the test statistic is positive, which means income inequality and its
growth rate are spatially clustered; high levels of income inequality in one state are
associated with, on average, high levels of income inequality in neighboring states.
Last, my empirical specification features a lagged dependent variable. The inclu-
sion of a (temporal) autoregressive variable in the DSDM controls for the persistence
of shocks and allows for the separation of short versus long run effects. Doing so helps
account for the fact that the income distribution may be slow to adjust to shocks,
and that there can be potentially long lags between apportionment and completion
of FAHP projects (Leduc and Wilson, 2013b).
Empirical Model
To estimate the effect of federal infrastructure grants on state-level income inequality
I employ a variant of the well-known dynamic spatial Durbin model (DSDM). Spatial
models relax the assumption that units (states) are independent, and explicitly define
the relationship between states by assigning weights to state pairs. Let:
W =

0 ω12 · · · ω1N
ω21 0 · · · ω2N
...
... 0
...
ωN1 ωN2 · · · 0

where W is called the spatial weight matrix, and ωij defines the spatial weight that
27Since Moran’s I is a cross sectional test, these results cannot be attributable national trends,
as the test purely exploits the within variation of the panel data.
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state i assigns to state j (i = 1,...,N; j=1,...,N ). The columns of the spatial weights
matrix describe the impact of a particular state on all other states, while the rows
of the spatial weights matrix describe the impact on a particular state by all other
states.
Throughout this analysis I define W as a first order contiguity matrix. That is,
if states i and j share a common border then ωij takes on a value of one and zero
otherwise. Contiguity matrices are the most commonly used spatial specifications in
economic applications. I discuss the other most commonly used weight matrix, the
inverse distance weights matrix, in Appendix B.
The main diagonal of W is set to zero by construction. Doing so allows the
separation of direct (own state) and indirect (spillover) effects in later estimation.
There is no obvious interpretation of a non-zero element along the main diagonal.
With contiguous state weights matrix, non-zero elements along the main diagonal
would imply some states are their own neighbors, but others are not.
Following common practice in the spatial econometrics literature, I row normalize
W by dividing every of the elements of each row such that the sum of the normalized
weights equals one for each row. That is, ωnormalizedij =
ωij∑N
j=1 ωij
. 28
Having defined the weight matrix, I turn to my main empirical model. The em-
pirical specification is a variant of the dynamic spatial Durbin model:29
28This method of normalization equalizes the impact of each spatial unit by all other units. To
illustrate, consider the difference in contiguous state weights assigned between Texas and Oklahoma.
Texas shares borders with four other states while Oklahoma shares borders with six other states. Pre-
normalization, both states assign a value to one for all its shared border states and zero otherwise,
whereas post-normalization Texas assigns a weight of 14 to each of its shared border states and
Oklahoma assigns a weight of 16 to each of its shared border states.
29Typically DSDMs include a spatio-temporal lagged dependent variable. I exclude this for two
reasons. First, because economically interpreting such a parameter in this context is difficult at
best. Secondly, the full DSDM is controversial because of concerns over weak identification of all its
parameters. The latter of these reasons is also a key reason why I do not include temporal lags of
the independent variables. See Elhorst (2014) for a more thorough discussion.
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Inequalityt = τInequalityt−1 + ρWInequalityt + β1Infrastructuret
+β2Xt + θ1WInfrastructuret + θ2WXt + γT imet + α + ut (2.13)
For notational simplicity, (2.13) stacks all states (i=1...48) for each year t. Inequalityt
denotes an NT×1 vector consisting of the growth rate (in percent) of the Gini coeffi-
cient.30 Infrastructuret denotes an NT×1 vector consisting of the natural logarithm
of real per capita FAHP apportionments. Xt denotes an NT×4 vector of control vari-
ables.31 The (temporal) autoregressive parameter τ captures the effect of temporal
dependence in the dependent variable and the spatial autoregressive parameter ρ
captures contemporaneously endogenous spatial dependence. θ1 and θ2 capture the
effects of neighboring covariates, but cannot be interpreted directly (Elhorst, 2014).
Timet is a second order polynomial of the time in years, α captures spatial (fixed)
effects, and ut is the error term. I estimate (2.13) using quasi-maximum likelihood,
following Yu et al. (2008).
Spillover Effects
The parameters of (2.13) cannot be directly interpreted to ascertain the presence of
spillover effects since the spatially-lagged dependent variable is included as a regressor
30The dependent variable is measured in growth rates because of explosiveness of the model when
measured in levels. Lee and Yu (2010) demonstrate that DSDMs become unstable if τ+ρ>1. Under
these conditions the quasi-maximum likelihood procedure described in Yu et al. (2008) has unknown
asymptotic properties and therefore cannot be used. When estimated in growth rates of the Gini
coefficient, all estimates of (2.13) are stable. Alternative methods have been proposed to account for
the explosiveness of some DSDMs. Instead of temporally differencing, Lee and Yu (2009) propose
transforming the data by spatially differencing all variables. The procedure has the advantage of
being stable for values of τ+ρ not much greater than 1, it is unable to account for the potential
(temporal) unit root in the Gini coefficient.
31From Section 2.3 I include the three political control variables: an indicator variable for the chair
of the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, indicator variable for the chair of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations, and the percent of representation by each state on the House
of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. From Section 2.4 I include state disbursements
on highways and roads to control for crowding out of FAHP funds.
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(LeSage and Pace, 2009). This section derives the direct (recipient state) and indirect
(spillover) effects of changes in a covariate for both the short and long run.
Since the partial effect of a unit change in infrastructure depends only on Inequalityt
and Infrastructuret (2.13) can be rewritten as:
Inequalityt = (I − ρW )−1(β1Infrastructuret + θ1WInfrastructuret) +R (2.14)
where R contains all terms that are not a contemporaneous function of Infrastructuret
or Inequalityt. LeSage and Pace (2009) note that β and θ cannot be interpreted di-
rectly as the effects of a change in Infrastructuret since the change in Inequalityt also
depends on (I − ρW )−1. Instead, they suggest taking the partial derivative of (2.14).
In the short run, for a given t, the partial effect of a one unit change of the kth inde-
pendent variable (Xk=Infrastructuret) on the dependent variable (Y=Inequalityt)
is:
[
∂Y
∂X1k
· · · ∂Y
∂XNk
]
t
= (I − ρW )−1
[
βkIN + θkW
]
(2.15)
As long as there is no temporal unit root (|τ | < 1), the effect of a change in
Infrastructure on Inequality eventually fades. At this point, Inequalityt=Inequalityt−1
since a change in Infrastructure from previous periods no longer has an additional
impact on Inequality. Solving (2.13) for this condition yields:
[
∂Y
∂X1k
· · · ∂Y
∂XNk
]
=
[
(1− τ)I − ρW
]−1 [
βkIN + θkW
]
(2.16)
The diagonal elements o (2.15) and (2.16) show the effect of a unit change in Xk in
state i on the dependent variable of state i. Unlike traditional linear dynamic panel
models, the diagonal elements of both the short and long run effects are not the same
since
(I − ρW )−1 = I + ρW + ρ2W 2 + ρ3W 3... (2.17)
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is not symmetric even though W is. The spatial literature denotes the diagonal
elements of(2.15) as short run direct effects and (2.16) as long run direct effects.
The off diagonal elements of (2.15) and (2.16) show the effect of a unit change
in Xk in state j on the dependent variable of state i. The spatial literature denotes
the off-diagonal elements of (2.15) as short run indirect effects or short run spillover
effects and (2.16) as long run indirect effects or long run spatial spillover effects. As
with the direct effects, the asymmetry of (2.15) and (2.16) imply that spillover effects
vary by state.
(2.17) further implies that spatial spillover effects are not necessarily limited to
neighboring states, so long as ρ 6= 0. To wit, orders of W represent the order of
the neighbors of state i. The weight matrix, W=W 1 contains nonzero elements only
for state i ’s first order (direct) neighbors, while W 2 contains nonzero elements for
state i’s first and second order neighbors (neighbors of neighbors), and so forth. As
the order of W grows, all spatial units are eventually impacted by a change in an
independent variable of state i. Since changes in one state leads to changes in all
states, indirect effects from DSDMs are referred to as global spillover effects.
Furthermore, note that the main diagonal of the higher orders of W is non-zero
since one of the neighbors of a neighboring state to state i is state i itself. This
feedback loop (i → j → i) means that the direct effects of depend on the neighbors
of state i as well.
Since both the direct and indirect effects depend on the spatial relationship of
each spatial unit to one another, there are N direct effects and N*(N-1) indirect
effects, which may all differ (i.e. the model implies the direct and indirect effects of a
change in infrastructure grants will be different for Iowa and Maine). Since describing
the direct, indirect, and total effects of every ij and ji state pairs is cumbersome,
LeSage and Pace (2009) propose using three summary scalar measures. They propose
defining direct effects as the average of the N diagonal elements of (2.15) and (2.16),
indirect effects as the average of the row sum of the off diagonal elements of (2.15)
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and (2.16) and the total effect as the sum of their direct and indirect effects. I use
their proposed measures to report the direct, indirect, and total effects in my results.
2.6 Results
Gini Coefficient Results
The first four rows of Table 2.4 report estimates for parameters that are used in
constructing the partial effects. As previously mentioned, direct interpretation of the
estimated coefficients of the DSDM to test for direct and spillover effects is inappro-
priate, but they do contain useful information. The negatively signed estimate of τ
indicates that short run effects will tend to be larger than the long run effects. The
negatively signed estimate for θ1 implies that the instantaneous local spillover effects
of FAHP grants are negative. This means that without accounting for the feedback
loop generated by the spatial autoregressive term, ρ, increases in FAHP grants reduce
the growth rate of the Gini coefficient. The estimate of ρ indicates that changes in
the growth rate of a state’s Gini coefficient are positively correlated (conditional on
the covariates) with changes in the growth rate of the Gini coefficient of its neighbors,
which is consistent with Moran’s I test. Additionally, the estimates for τ and τ+ρ
are each within the unit circle, implying the results are stationary and non-explosive,
respectively (Lee and Yu, 2010).
The remaining rows of Table 2.4 report estimates for the short run (rows 5-7) and
long run (rows 8-11) effects of FAHP grants. Reported standard errors are constructed
using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations and are clustered at the state level. In Section
2.6 I relate these results to previous estimates of government expenditure programs
on income inequality.
The direct effect of an increase in infrastructure implies that a 100% increase in
FAHP apportionments leads to a .361 percentage point decrease in the growth rate of
the Gini coefficient. For context, the average growth rate of the Gini coefficient of the
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sample is .581, with a within standard deviation of 2.478. Therefore, doubling FAHP
apportionments, without considering spillover effects, would reduce the growth rate
of the Gini coefficient by an eighth of a standard deviation. At the mean Gini across
the sample (.5217), this translates to a .00188 reduction in the Gini coefficient.
The indirect effect of an increase in infrastructure can be interpreted either as
the cumulative effect of an increase in apportionments from every other state j on
state i, or as the cumulative effect on state i of an increase in infrastructure on
every other state. The first interpretation implies that if every state in the sample
except state i received 100% increase in FAHP apportionments, the growth rate of
the Gini coefficient of state i would decline by 1.402 percentage points. The second
interpretation implies that a 100% increase in FAHP apportionments to state i will
decrease the Gini coefficient in all other states by a total of 1.402 percentage points.
Recall that DSDMs exhibit global spillover effects via the feedback loop generated
by the spatial autoregressive term. Therefore, the short run indirect effects (and by
extension the total effects) are spread across all spatial units. However, these effects
do spatially dissipate. Following LeSage and Pace (2009) I expand (2.15) into a
linear combination of powers of W by substituting (2.17) into (2.15). The powers
of W represent the spatial distance of state i to j, with W 0 corresponding to state i
itself, W 1 corresponding to it neighbors, W 2 neighbors of its neighbors, and so forth.
Table 2.5 reports the partition of the short run direct, indirect, and total effects
from Table 2.4, and Figure 2.7 represents the same partition in graphical form. Each
row represents the cumulative effect up to that order of neighbors. For example,
the third row (W 2) represents the cumulative effect of a 100% increase in FAHP
apportionments in state i on state i, its neighbors, and neighbors of its neighbors.
Results in Table 2.5 would eventually converge to estimates reported in Table 2.4 if the
W-order were to go toward infinity. However, as Table 2.5 demonstrates, the bulk of
spillover effects are generated from lower-ordered neighbors. Nearly 95% of the spatial
spillover effects occur within the first two orders of W (neighbors of neighbors). For
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example, nearly 95% of the spillover effects from Texas to its neighbors occur within
eleven states - four first-order neighbors and seven second-order neighbors.
The total effects of FAHP grants are the sum of the short run direct and indirect
effects. Since the direct effect refers to state i and the indirect effect refers to all
other states, it is informative to consider the total effects in terms of the effect of a
change in FAHP grants across all states on the growth rate of the Gini coefficient of
all states. The estimated short run total effects imply that a 100% increase in FAHP
grants to every state would decrease the growth rate of the Gini coefficient of each
state by 1.763 percentage points in the short run. The long run total effects suggest
that doubling FAHP apportionments to every state would decrease the growth rate
of the Gini coefficient in each state by an attenuated 1.302 percentage points in the
long run. The direct, indirect, and total effects remain significant into the long run.
Decomposing The Gini Coefficient
In this section, I decompose the Gini coefficient into quintiles of the income distri-
bution using the SOI series from which the Gini coefficients used in the main results
were constructed. Details on the computation of the income quintiles are provided in
Appendix A. To estimate the direct effect of FAHP grants on each quintile, I estimate
the following system of equations:32
Incomeqit = τ1Incomeqit−1 + βqInfrastructureit + γqXit + αqi + αqt + uqit
Incomeqit is defined as the (log) aggregate income per capita captured by quintile
q (q = 1, ..., 5) for state i at time t. Infrastructureit is defined, as before, by the
natural log of per capita FAHP apportionments. Likewise, Xit contain the same
32Ideally, one would estimate (2.18) as a system of DSDMs in order to better mirror (2.13).
However, that is beyond the scope of this chapter. Furthermore, estimates for the aggregate gross
income captured by the lowest quintile is negative in several years, which prevents me from expressing
the dependent variable as a natural logarithm. Additionally, while there is sufficient variation in the
Gini coefficient to reliably identify the effects of FAHP grants, its decomposition is naturally more
statistically noisy. As Table 2.5 illustrates, the direct effects depend in part on the spillover effects.
Therefore the estimates in this section provide a conservative estimate of the effect of FAHP grants.
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control variables as before. The coefficient βq, therefore, reflects the percent change
in per capita aggregate income captured by quintile q in response to a 100% increase
in FAHP apportionments. (2.18) is estimated using the three step procedure outlined
in Zellner and Theil (1962).33
Table 2.6 reports estimates for (2.18).34 The largest estimated elasticity is asso-
ciated with the bottom quintile - with a point estimate nearly twice as large as the
other quintiles. However, it is not statistically significant at typical levels. The effect
of increasing FAHP apportionments is significant for both the second and third quin-
tiles. Point estimates imply that if FAHP apportionments were to double, aggregate
gross income would increase by 1.6% and 1.7% for the second and third quintiles
respectively. Though positive, there appears to only be a negligible effect of FAHP
grants on aggregate income per capita accruing to the top two quintiles. Thus, the
equalizing effects of FAHP grants appear to come from increasing income at the
lower end of the distribution rather than the higher. Furthermore, even though they
are the relative losers, the upper income quintiles do not lose in an absolute sense.
These results suggest the equalizing effect of FAHP grants are quite different than,
for example, increasing taxes on the very rich.
Highway Grants’ Relative Effectiveness as Redistributive Policy
This chapter adds to literature on the effect of policy changes on income inequality.
Unsurprisingly, I find that the equalizing effect FAHP grants is smaller than many,
though not all, of the explicitly re-distributive policies and tools commonly analyzed.35
I find that the equalizing effect of FAHP grants on income is smaller than the
33These results are robust to estimating (2.18) equation-by-equation using IV/GMM, with the
second lag of the dependent variable, a temporal lag of infrastructure, and a spatial lag of infrastruc-
ture instrumenting for the lag dependent variable and infrastructure respectively. These estimates
are reported in Table 5.8 and are, if anything, stronger than those presented in Table 2.6.
34Note, Table 2.6 includes fewer observations than Table 2.4 because several values of the bottom
quintile were negative, and therefore could not be logged.
35I explore the effects of a non-explicitly re-distributive program, military spending, in Section
2.8
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aggregate effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) annually reports Gini coefficient
estimates for market (pre-tax pre-transfer) income and disposable (post-tax post-
transfer) income. The former of these Gini coefficients reflect the national counterpart
to the state-level series used in my analysis.36 In 2013, OECD estimates of the
difference between the market Gini coefficient (.513) and disposable income Gini
coefficient (.396) in the United States was .117. That is, the net effect of taxes
and transfers on income inequality is a reduction in the Gini coefficient by .117, or
approximately 22%.37 This is a much larger effect than FAHP grants. At the pooled
sample mean Gini coefficient (.5217), the effect of doubling FAHP grants would lead
to a short run .0092 reduction in the Gini coefficient in my sample. This implies
FAHP grants are approximately one twelfth ( .0092
.22
) as effective at equalizing income
as the US tax and transfer system. Of course, the US tax and transfer system is much
wider in its scope and magnitude than the FAHP, which expended approximately $37
billion in 2013. As a comparison of scope, the main results imply that FAHP grants
would need to increase to approximately $450 billion a year to have as equalizing of
an effect on income inequality as the US tax and transfer system.38
Several studies have examined the effect of government policies on income in-
equality. In particular Wu et al. (2006) estimate the elasticity of various government
programs to the Gini coefficient. Programs they examine include the top income tax
rate, the generosity of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), the EITC phase out
rate, the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, and minimum
36The values reported by the OECD and the series used in this chapter are not directly comparable
as the underlying data for the OECD is the Annual Socio-Economic Supplement (ASEC-CPS) to
the Current population Survey whereas this chapter uses the Internal Revenue’s Statistics of Income
series. Both series attempt to measure market income, but each have limitations. See Appendix A
for more details.
37https://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=IDD&lang=en
38Of course, this calculation potentially takes the linearity of the DSDM estimator too seriously.
If the distributional effects of public capital spending are decreasing in the amount of public capital,
as Fernald (1999) and others since have suggested is the case for the average effect of public capital
on income, then the true necessary increase in FAHP grants are likely larger than the results imply.
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wage.39 Specifically, in urban areas Wu et al. (2006) find that increasing top marginal
tax rate by one percentage point, increasing maximum EITC benefits by $1,000, and
increasing generosity of AFDC payments are each approximately five times more ef-
fective at reducing income inequality than the short run effect of FAHP grants. Their
estimated elasticity of the Gini Coefficient to the EITC phase-out rate is about twelve
times larger than estimate for the effect of FAHP grants on the Gini coefficient.40,41
In rural areas, Wu et al. (2006) find that increasing the top marginal tax rate is twice
as effective at equalizing income as FAHP grants. Likewise, they find that increasing
the maximum EITC benefits by $1,000, decreasing the EITC phase out rate, and
increasing generosity of AFDC payments are each at least five times more effective
at reducing income inequality compared to the short run effects of FAHP grants.42
Others studies have focused on the effect of policies on various portions of the
income distribution. DeNavas-Walt and Proctor (2015) find that the EITC is the
most effective anti-poverty tool available to policymakers, with nearly three quarters
of the benefits accruing to the bottom quartile of the income distribution. This
strongly implies that the EITC is more effective at equalizing income than FAHP
grants, as the estimates reported in Table 2.6 imply that the plurality of benefits,
approximately 36%, accrue to the middle (third) quintile, while only approximately
39At the average growth rate of the Gini coefficient across my sample (.5814654%), the implied
elasticity of the Gini coefficient to the short run total effect of an increase in FAHP grants is -
.008205. That is, doubling FAHP grants (to all states) will lead to a .8205 percent decrease in the
Gini coefficient.
40Wu et al. (2006) consider both pre-tax and post-tax income inequality. The comparisons I report
reflect their post-tax inequality estimates. Additionally, despite its growth in recent years, FAHP
apportionments and the EITC were about equally large in the last year (1997) of Wu et al. (2006)’s
sample period (about $20 billion in 1997 dollars), therefore the different estimated elasticities are
not driven by differences in the size of the programs.
41The EITC has undergone large expansions since the end of Wu et al. (2006)’s sample period
(1997). This may result in an overly conservative estimate of the effectiveness of the EITC at
reducing income inequality, and may also explain why the effect of the EITC is not substantially
larger, as one might expect, than the effectiveness of the tax and transfer system at reducing income
inequality mentioned in the previous paragraph.
42Specifically, they find that increasing the maximum EITC benefits, decreasing the EITC phase
out rate, and increasing generosity of AFDC payments are respectively eleven, nineteen, and six
times larger than the short run total effect of doubling FAHP grants.
33
18% accrue to the lowest quintile.43 Similarly, Bollinger et al. (2009) find that the
elasticity of income to the EITC subsidy rate is extremely large (as high as 2.4)
for the lowest two quintiles of the distribution of single-female family heads between
the ages of 16 and 54 with dependent children present under the age of 18. While
the distribution of these women is different than the overall distribution of income,
their elasticities imply far larger equalizing effects of the EITC than FAHP grants,
especially for the very poor.
That said, FAHP grants appear to be more effective at equalizing income than two
commonly mentioned policies. The first policy is increasing the minimum wage. A
multitude of papers find that changes in the minimum wage result in greater household
income inequality, possibly because the minimum wage may generate employment
losses (Burkhauser et al., 2000) or because many minimum wage workers are teenagers
from relatively wealthy families. (Neumark et al., 2005; Wu et al., 2006). Burkhauser
and Sabia (2007) estimate that 87% of workers who would benefit from an increase
in the minimum wage live in non-poor families, and that less than 4% of benefits
would be reaped by poor single mothers. Likewise, FAHP grants appear to be more
effective at equalizing income differences than the Child Tax Credit (CTC). Hoynes
and Rothstein (2016) demonstrate that the CTC is ineffective at reducing income
inequality because it is effectively nonrefundable for the working poor and families
with incomes as high as $170,000 (2016 dollars) are eligible to claim it. In contrast,
my point estimates suggest that more than 70% of the benefits of FAHP grants accrue
to the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution.
43These values were calculated by multiplying the estimated elasticities from Table 2.6 by their
mean values. Though the elasticity for the lowest quintile is substantially larger than the other
categories, it receives relatively little of the absolute benefits because it’s share of aggregate income
is small. Note, the estimated percent of benefits accruing to each quintile have very wide implied
confidence intervals, since several of the point estimates used in this estimate a based on all the
coefficients on Infrastructure in Table 2.6, several of which are very imprecisely estimated. Still,
the average aggregate income captured by the third quintile is approximately four times larger in
my sample than the first quintile. Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude the effect of changes
in FAHP grants on the poorest quintile is not as large as those estimated by DeNavas-Walt and
Proctor (2015)
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2.7 Underlying Mechanisms
In this section, I present evidence in favor of two plausible mechanisms that account
for the re-distributive effect of FAHP grants. I use annual micro-level data from
the March Current Population Survey (hereafter CPS) for the years spanning be-
tween 1977 and 2013.44 I use the CPS to measure the heterogeneous effects of an
increase in FAHP grants on the total income of a person, conditional on individ-
ual characteristics. These characteristics reveal two plausible mechanisms, both of
which disproportionately increase income for the poor and leave the wealthy mostly
unaffected.
First, FAHP grants may disproportionately increase the demand for low-skilled
labor. As a result, income for low-skilled workers increases relative to high-skilled la-
bor, thereby reducing income inequality. Therefore, variation in worker skill levels can
partially account for the heterogeneous effect of FAHP grants on income inequality.45
Second, FAHP grants may have heterogeneous effects on the productivity of in-
dustries. Since certain industries are characterized by lower average wages, this het-
erogeneity can result in a differentially larger increase in income for workers in certain
industries than others. I find that workers working in low-skilled industries benefit
more from FAHP grants than high-skilled industries.
Heterogeneity by Skill Level
I consider a worker low-skilled if he has completed no more than high school or
obtained an equivalent degree. In my base specification a worker is either high or
low-skilled, however in later specifications I disaggregate the high-skilled sector into
medium and high-skilled. In those specifications I consider a worker high-skilled if he
44I include all workers between the ages of 25 and 75 that reported at least $2,000 in real total
income and worked at least 10 hours last week at the time of being surveyed.
45Since this and the next approach both condition on personal characteristics, I cannot use the
spatial panel data approach used in the main results.
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has completed at least 4 years of college. A worker is classified as medium skilled if he
is neither a high nor low-skilled workers. This includes all workers who have attended
college but do not have a college degree and those who have attended vocational
training.46
To test for the heterogeneous effect of infrastructure spending by skill I estimate
the following reduced form income equation:
Incomepit =βXit + ηSkillpit + ζInfrastructureit+
ψ(Infrastructureit × Skillpit) + upit
(2.18)
where Incomepit is defined as the natural log of real total personal income of
person p, who lives in state i at time t. Xit is a vector containing the same set
of control variables that were detailed in Section 2.3. Infrastructureit, as before,
is defined as the natural log of per capita real FAHP apportionments. Skillit is a
vector containing indicator variables that describe the skill level (low, medium, high)
of person p. η controls for the innate differences in average income between each
skill-level. ζ controls for the effects of a change in FAHP apportionments that are
common to all workers, irrespective of skill. The primary parameter of interest is ψ,
which can be interpreted as the differential effect (by skill type) of FAHP grants on
(log) income.
Table 2.7 reports estimates for (2.18). Columns 1-3 report estimates where Skillt
is dichotomously defined between low-skill (1) and high-skill (0). Columns 4-6 in-
clude indicator variables for both low and high-skilled workers, leaving medium-skilled
workers as the base case. For each of these sets of columns, I report estimates for
three types of fixed effects: state fixed effects (columns 1 and 4), state and year fixed
46In 1992 the CPS changed how it reported educational attainment. Prior to 1992 it recorded
number of years of college completed. Since then, it has reported in terms of degrees completed.
Implicitly I assume that anyone who completed at least four years of college prior to 1992 completed
their degree.
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effects (columns 2 and 5), and state fixed effects, year fixed effects, and state-specific
trends (columns 3 and 6).
Estimates of the heterogeneous effects of infrastructure by skill are robust across
specifications. Columns 1-3 report that a 1% change in infrastructure increases income
for low-skilled workers between .086 and .094 percentage points more than their low
and medium skilled counterparts while columns 4-6 report the effect is between .067
and .077 percentage points greater than their medium skilled counter parts. The last
row of columns 4-6 show the effect of increasing infrastructure is statistically different
for high and low-skilled workers.
The coefficients on the indicator variables for skilled (high-skilled and low-skilled)
represent the wage gap between low-skilled workers and their more skilled counter-
parts. These estimates confirm intuition as well as previous studies (e.g. Card and
DiNardo, 2002), which have consistently found low-skilled workers earn less than
high-skilled workers. The estimated wage gap is about 47% for low-skilled workers
compared to medium and high-skilled workers, and 25% compared to medium skilled
workers alone. These estimates are in line with findings on the college wage premium
(see, e.g. Goldin and Katz, 2007).47
Note that the estimate total effect of increasing FAHP grants on income,
∂Incomepit
∂Infrastructureit
can give insight into the total effect of infrastructure spending on average total in-
come. The estimates reported in column 3 of Table 2.7 show that the total effect of an
increase in infrastructure for a high-skilled worker (ζ) is -.016% and not statistically
different from zero, while the total effect for a low-skilled worker (ζ+ψlow) is .078% and
highly significant. Just under half (45%) of the full sample of respondents reported
to be low-skilled, therefore the average effect of doubling FAHP apportionments on
average income implied by my analysis is approximately (.45*.078)+(.55*(-.016))=
47Figure 5.4 in the Appendix shows that the unconditional distribution of income is likewise
heavily shifted, with high-skilled workers far out-earning their low-skilled counterparts.
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2.63%.48 This estimate is consistent with previous literature (e.g Aschauer, 1989;
Leduc and Wilson, 2013a) and my own findings in Section 2.6, in that both demon-
strate infrastructure grants increase average income. However, my work builds upon
this literature by demonstrating that nearly all of the gains accrue to low-skilled
workers.
Heterogeneity by Industry
FAHP grants fund projects that are used to construct roads, bridges, and highways -
each of which may heterogeneously impact industries. In this subsection I show that
changes in infrastructure lead to larger gains in total personal income for industries
with a high proportion of low-skilled workers compared to those with a low proportion
of low-skilled workers.
Table 2.8 ranks industries the by percent of workers that are low-skilled, using
the same definition of skill as before. I denote industries with a highest percent of
low-skilled workers as low-skilled industries, and industries with lowest percent of
low-skilled workers as high-skilled industries.49
To test the heterogeneous effect of FAHP grants on total income by industry of
employment, I augment (2.18) to:
Incomepit =βXit + ηIndustrypit + ζInfrastructureit+
ψ(Infrastructureit × Industrypit) + upit
(2.19)
Instead of interacting infrastructure apportionments with a collection of indica-
tor variables describing person p’s education, (2.19) interacts it with an indicator
variables describing the industry group person p works in.
48The proportion of low-skilled workers has decreased over time. However, the estimated average
effect on income is still positive even for the last year in my sample, 2013.
49Reported industry classifications use the Census’ 1990 concept of industry. Ranking the degree
of skill based on percent of workers with bachelors degrees yields almost identical rankings.
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Ideally (2.19) would be estimated using disaggregated industry-level data. How-
ever, in several industry-state-years the CPS reports either no workers or unreliably
few of them, especially for earlier years of the sample.50 To avoid this issue, I aggre-
gate across industries to form high and low-skilled sectors. I define the low-skilled
sector to be the aggregation of industries that are classified as low-skilled industries
and the high-skilled sector to be the aggregation of industries classified as high-skilled.
In each case the base case of the medium skilled sector is defined by all industries not
classified as either high or low-skilled.
Even though the transportation industry does not qualify as either a high or
low-skilled industry, it is clearly an industry where highway grants should matter.
As a result, I include the transportation industry as its own quasi-sector in each
specification.
Table 2.9 reports estimates for (2.19). Since there is no obvious cutoff for what to
consider a high or low-skilled sector, I report results for various levels of aggregation.
The first column of Table 2.9 reports estimates that includes the three highest and
lowest skilled industries from Table 2.8. Column 2 and Column 3 include the four
and five highest and lowest skilled industries respectively. Each column includes state
and year fixed effects as well as a state specific trend.51
Coefficient estimates on the indicator variables low-skilled and high-skilled are
statistically negative and positive respectively. Total personal income is lower on
average in the low-skilled sector relative to medium skilled industries (controlling for
50The sample size of the CPS has grown over time. The sample used in this chapter contains
72,425 valid observations in 2013 but only 46,069 valid observations in 1977. My analysis in this
subsection requires industry-state-year level data. which means 1977 data contains only an average
of 64 observations per industry-state-year. Of course, not all industries are the same size, so certain
industries in the sample have substantially less. For example, there were 0 respondents in 1997 from
Washington that reported working in the mining industry. The problem is less severe in later years,
but still exists. For example, only one of 492 respondents reported working in the mining industry
in Vermont in 1991.
51Though not reported, exclusion of the state specific trends, year fixed effects, or both do
not substantially affect the results apart from changes in the estimate of the un-interacted effect
infrastructure (ζ).
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other covariates), and vice versa for high-skilled industries.
The coefficients on the interaction terms (Transportation×Infrastructure, low−
skilled×Infrastructure and high−skilled×Infrastructure) indicate the differential
effect of infrastructure (FAHP grants) relative to the medium skilled sector. A 1%
increase in infrastructure grants increases income between .051% and .125% more for
those working in the low-skilled sector than the medium skilled sector. The estimates
are significant in two of the three specifications, while there is no indication that the
effect of increasing infrastructure spending on average income is different for the high-
skilled sector relative to the medium skilled sector. However, as the last row of the
table (p(ψlow = ψhigh)), illustrates, the effect of infrastructure spending on average
income is statistically different for the low-skilled sector compared to the high-skilled
sector. Unsurprisingly, the effect of infrastructure spending leads to a statistically
larger effect on total income for the transportation sector than the medium-skilled
sector.
A potential reason for the heterogeneity is the degree to which industries use
transportation, trucking transportation in particular, as an intermediate good. Table
2.10 shows the requirements for trucking in each of 71 industries reported in the BEAs
2007 version of it’s input-output total requirements tables. The table include all input
costs into production, both direct and indirect.52 The table ranks industries by the
percent of total intermediate costs attributable to the truck transportation industry.
The first three columns report industries use trucking transportation more intensively
as an intermediate good. The last three columns report industries that use trucking
transportation less intensively as an intermediate good. There is substantial variation
in the degree to which industries use truck transportation as an input. For example,
the second-most truck intensive industry (Food and beverage and tobacco products)
uses trucking transportation (as a share of inputs) nearly one hundred times more
52More aggregated measures are available, but they do not distinguish between forms of trans-
portation.
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than the lowest trucking intensive industry (Performing Arts).
There is a clear difference between high and low truck intensity firms. Namely,
almost all the highest truck intensity industries belong to the goods-producing super-
sector (farms, construction, manufacturing, etc.), whereas low sensitivity industries
are almost all in the service sector (legal services, finance, telecommunications, etc).
It is straightforward why goods-producing industries would require higher shares
of truck transport intermediate costs, firms in those industries must move a physical
product. IO codes and the CPS 1990 industry concepts are not directly comparable,
but note that the high truck intensity industries listed in Table 2.10 correspond to the
least educated industries listed in Table 2.8, and vice versa for the low cost industries.
Since high truck intensity firms rely more on transportation infrastructure for pro-
duction, they also benefit most from increased transportation infrastructure (lower
transportation costs). Therefore, gains in productivity from transportation infras-
tructure expansion are concentrated in high truck intensity industries. These same
industries tend to employ more low-skilled workers, therefore low-skilled workers are
disproportionately employed in the industries that gain the most productivity from
transportation infrastructure spending. Greater productivity implies greater demand
for inputs, plausibly causing a decrease in the demand for low-skilled labor (relative
to high-skilled labor), causing wages to increase for low-skilled workers, but not for
high-skilled workers. As a result industry heterogeneity plausibly explains why FAHP
grants result in declining income inequality.
2.8 Robustness Checks
This section provides various robustness and falsification checks to the main estimates
(presented in Table 2.4) and the underlying mechanism (presented in Tables 2.7 and
2.9). The first check shows the main results are robust to different measures of
income inequality. The second check shows the results are robust to the choice of
spatial modeling specification. The third check demonstrates robustness of the main
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results to the inclusion of controls for the progressiveness of the federal tax system.
The fourth check presents a falsification test of the main results by replacing FAHP
grants with another large federal program: defense spending. The falsification test
demonstrates the main results are not purely the result of more federal spending.
Measures of Inequality
In this section I show the results are robust to measuring income inequality differently.
Specifically, the results are robust to using the Theil Entropy Index and the Relative
Mean Deviation instead of the Gini coefficient in the estimation of (2.13). Although
each measure is slightly different, they are each highly correlated.
For ease of comparison, the first column of Table 2.11 replicates Table 2.4, while
the second and third columns report estimates where Inequalityt is measured using
(the growth rate of) the Theil Index and Relative Mean Deviation respectively. Each
measure quantifies income inequality slightly differently, so the coefficients are not
necessarily directly comparable, but the signs and significance levels are. The direct
effect of FAHP grants on the growth rate of inequality, while insignificant, is negative
across the alternative specifications both in the short and the long run. As was the
case for the indirect effects using the Gini coefficient, spatial spillover effects reported
are large and statistically negative using the alternative specifications. Likewise, the
total effect of infrastructure grants is statistically negative in both the short and long
run for each specification.
Spatial Specification
Sections 2.3 and 2.5 outlined the motivation for the preferred spatial specification.
In this section I demonstrate the results are robust to common alternative spatial
specifications.
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Table 2.12 lists some of the most common spatial models which are capable of
generating spatial spillover effects.53 The last column of each row reports limitations,
if any, on the type of spatial spillover effects for that model. Naturally static models
cannot distinguish between the short and long run. The SAR model is only capable
of generating global spillover effects, and therefore the ratio of the direct to indirect
effects is the same for all covariates. By contrast, since the SLX model does not
include the spatially endogenous interaction term, it is only capable of generating
local spillover effects - implying there is no spatial feedback loop.
Table 2.13 reports estimates for most of the models presented in Table 2.12.54 Each
column reports a variation of the main results, except the first column which replicate
the main results for ease of comparison. The second column reports estimates for a
classic DSDM. The third column reports estimates for a static SDM. The fourth
column reports estimates for the DSDM that I use, but one in which the ”Durbin
terms”, WX, are restricted to only include Infrastructure (FAHP grants). The last
two columns report estimates for dynamic and static spatial autoregressive models.
Standard errors for each set of columns clustered at the state level and are constructed
using 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations, following the procedure laid out in LeSage and
Pace (2009).
There are, of course, differences in the size of the estimates for the direct, indirect,
and total effects of changes in infrastructure grants, but the estimates consistently
confirm the primary findings of the chapter: FAHP grants decrease the growth rate
of income inequality both in the recipient state and neighboring states. The results
are statistically significant, and, while the spillover effects vary in size, they remain
53Another broad class of models, known as spatial error models, correct for spatial relationships
in the error term. However, in doing so they rule out the possibility of spatial spillover effects which
can be quantified. Since testing for these spillovers is a key part of this chapter, I do not consider
this class of models.
54Because of practical limitations, I do not report all estimates. For example, the General Spatial
Nesting model is not reported because parameter values would not converge within 1,000 iterations.
For comparison, all other estimates converged within 15 iterations.
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economically large across all specifications.
Taxation
FAHP is nominally financed through the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). The HTF is
funded through various usage taxes, primarily a set of federal taxes on gasoline and
diesel. However, dedicated taxes have been insufficient to keep up with outlays for
several years. As a result, Congress has made numerous authorizations to use general
budget funds to finance the HTF. Since the general budget is largely financed by
a modestly progressive income tax, a concern could be that the progressiveness of
FAHP financing drive my estimates. In this section I argue that the structure of the
data limits this possibility and find that my results are largely robust to controlling
for measures of taxation
First, the state-level Gini coefficient that I use to measure income inequality is
derived from the SOI. The SOI series reports detailed tabulations on adjusted gross
income, which measures taxable income. Hence, the SOI measure pre-tax pre-transfer
income. Therefore, even if FAHP grants are de-facto financed by a progressive income
tax system, my main results are largely insulated from this fact.
Still, since taxes can change incentives, thereby impacting labor-force decisions,
they may indirectly result in changes in income inequality (Bollinger et al., 2009). To
empirically test this relationship, I add measures of progressivism in the controls of
(2.13) using annual data from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER)
TaxSim tool for the years spanning between 1977 and 2013. Specifically, I include
the effective marginal income and capital gains tax rates for very high income earners
to the control variables, Xit. These effective marginal tax rates are defined as the
increase in taxes paid by a household who receives an additional $1,000 on an initial
income of $1,500,000. By adding these two variables to Xit in (2.13) I am able to
capture the tax treatment of the wealthy, and thereby test for omitted variable biased
created by not including these measures in my main results.
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In Table 2.14 I show the results hold when I add the two tax controls. As before,
the total effect of infrastructure spending on the Gini coefficient is negative both in
the short and long run. The loss of 21 panels clearly reduces the precision of the
estimates, but estimated coefficients, especially in the short run, are very close to
those reported in the baseline specification. Therefore, even if the source of financing
has some effect, it does not appear to be a first order concern.
Falsification: Military Spending
How does the effect of investment in public infrastructure on income inequality com-
pare to the effect of other forms of government spending? Would income inequality
drop by the same amount if the same dollar was spent on a different program? To
answer these questions I use military spending as a falsification to my main esti-
mates. In this section I show that increases in military spending actually increase
(the growth rate of) state-level income inequality. I further show that the difference
in the effectiveness of these two programs in reducing income inequality is consistent
with one of the mechanism put forth in Section 2.7.
Military spending is a natural candidate for this falsification test. First, military
spending is plausibly exogenous, with changes in military spending arising primarily
in response to external threats (Romer and Romer, 2010). Additionally, as with
FAHP grants, military spending is a large enough program that it can significantly
impact the income distribution of a state.55
Table 2.15 reports estimates for the effect of military spending on the growth
rate of income inequality. Each column reports estimates for a variation of (2.13), in
which military spending takes the place of infrastructure grants as the independent
55This reduces the possibility of failing to reject a null hypothesis of no statistical relationship
between military spending and income inequality simply because of the imprecise nature of state-
level Gini coefficients.
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variable of interest. The first column reports estimates that use the main measure
of military spending employed by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a). Their measure
covers the years spanning from 1966 to 2006, and records the total value of military
procurement forms for purchases greater than $10,000 before 1983 and greater than
$25,000 thereafter. Their data is sourced from the Department of Defense. The second
column combines military procurement data with military compensation, which is
obtained from the BEA (SA5 and SA5N) for the same period. The last column reports
estimates in which the measure of military spending does not include Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014a)’s military procurement series, but extends the BEA military
compensation series to encompass the period spanning from 1958 to 2013.56
Under the null hypothesis that all government programs affect income inequality
in the same way, changes in military spending should produce similar estimates to
those reported in Table 2.4. However, estimates reported in Table 2.15 tell a different
story. Irrespective of the military spending measure, (the growth rate of) income
inequality rises in response to increases in military expenses.
Therefore, the effect of military spending on income inequality has the opposite
sign as the effect of FAHP grants. These estimates reveal that FAHP grants do not
reduce income inequality simply because they represent an increase in government
spending more generally. Furthermore, since military and highway spending are both
de facto financed similarly, the markedly different estimates for the effect of military
spending versus FAHP grants on income inequality suggest the main results are not
generated by taxes.
56Data obtained from Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a) and data directly obtained from the BEA
contain numerous differences. For the most part I report their measures directly, but I made minor
edits to the military procurement data. For example, their data had several state-year observations
with zero military spending. I required the natural log of military spending to allow for comparability
with my baseline results, so I treated zeros as missing and linearly interpolated over all missing values.
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A Possible Explanation
What can account for the difference in the results? The mechanisms provided in
Section 2.7 provide some insight. Whereas FAHP grants largely increase demand
for low-skilled labor (i.e. construction), defense spending increases the demand for
high-skilled labor.
Table 2.16 reports characteristics of construction workers and military personnel.
Military personnel are substantially more educated, on average, For example, military
officers are more than ten times more likely to have an advanced degree than a
construction worker.57 Additionally, military personnel earn more than construction
workers. Total personal income for enlisted members is approximately fifty percent
greater than the average total personal income of construction workers. Military
officers earn even more, approximately double the income of construction workers, on
average.
This leads to a plausible reason for why military spending increases state-level
income inequality whereas FAHP grants reduces it. Expansions in military spending
result in increased demand for high-skilled labor, whereas increases in FAHP grants
result in increased demand for low-skilled labor.58 Since low-skilled laborers already
earn less on average than high-skilled labor (Figure 5.4), military spending tends to
increase income inequality and FAHP grants tend to decrease it.
2.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyze the effect of public infrastructure investment (proxied for by
federal-aid highway (FAHP) grants) on income inequality. Using a dynamic spatial
Durbin model of the contiguous United States, for the period spanning between 1956
57approximately 20% of military personnel are officers.
58An alternative possibility is that military contractors are better able to rent seek than con-
struction workers, thereby resulting in greater accumulation of income towards owners of these
firms. Though I cannot distinguish between these possible narratives empirically, they both imply
that military spending does in fact behave differently than construction spending.
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and 2013, my results suggest doubling FAHP grants would reduce the growth rate
of state-level Gini coefficients by 1.76 percentage points in the short run, and an
attenuated 1.3 percentage points in the long run. This translates to a .009 decline
in the level of the pre-tax pre-transfer state-level Gini coefficient in the short run
and a .007 decline in the long run. To generate as large of an equalizing effect on
income inequality as the US tax-transfer system, grants would need to increase by
approximately $400 billion in the short run and $600 billion in the long run.
Through various robustness checks, I show these estimates are not sensitive to
specification, data sources, and alternative control variables. Falsification tests pro-
vide further evidence that the reduction in income inequality is not attributable to a
general increase in military spending or the source of financing for highway grants.
I decompose the Gini coefficient into state-level income groups and find that the
average effect of increasing FAHP grants on income is positive, which is consistent
with previous literature (Aschauer, 1989; Leduc and Wilson, 2013b). However, fo-
cusing on the average effect masks the heterogeneous effects of these grants across
the income distribution. I show that the elasticity of income to public infrastructure
investment is positive for all state-income quintiles, but the effect is largest for the
lowest three quintiles. In contrast, income for the top two quintiles appear virtu-
ally unaffected by these grants. In Section 2.7 I present evidence in favor of two
potential sources of these heterogeneous effects. First, I find that low-skilled workers
benefit from infrastructure grants, while high-skilled workers are virtually unaffected.
Second, I find that FAHP grants increase income for workers working in low-skilled
industries, but not for workers in high-skilled industries. Since low-skilled industries
more intensively use trucking transportation, wages in low-skilled industries are plau-
sibly more sensitive to changes in highway investment than wages in the high-skilled
sector.
This chapter expands on the previous literature that has examined the relationship
between income inequality and infrastructure investment by focusing on a developed
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nation, whereas the existing literature has focused on developing countries. Expand-
ing on previous literature on the spillover effects of highway spending (e.g. Chandra
and Thompson, 2000), I show that spatial spillover effects are an important compo-
nent of the distributional effects of infrastructure investment grants.
Relative to other studies that have examined the effects of government policy on
income inequality, the effect of federal highway grants is modest. Implied elasticities
of income to infrastructure investment around a fifth to a tenth as effective as the
EITC and other re-distributive government programs (Wu et al., 2006). However,
even if modest, an equalizing effect of highway grants on income may be increase the
perceived marginal social benefit of highway spending for policymakers, especially
in the presence of limited policy tools (Redding and Turner, 2015). Therefore, my
estimates have important policy implications, since they reveal that highway infras-
tructure grants can serve as an alternative policy tool for equalizing income than
currently employed tools.
2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Formulas for Major FAHP Programs
Program Factor Weight
National Highway System Share of total lane miles 25%
Share of total vehicle miles traveled 35%
Share of diesel fuel used 30%
Share of total lane miles/share of total population 10%
Surface Transportation Share of Federal-aid Highway lane miles 25%
Share of total vehicle miles traveled 40%
Share of contribution to Highway Trust Fund 35%
Interstate Maintenance Share of interstate lane miles 33.3%
Share of interstate vehicle miles traveled 33.3%
Share of contributions Highway Trust Fund attributable
to commercial vehicles 33.3%
Formulas vary by authorization bill. Formulas in this table correspond to those under
SAFETEA-LU, which was in effect between 2010 and 2012. This table excludes some smaller
programs.
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Table 2.2: Flypaper Effect
dependent variable: total per capita highway disbursements
Infrastructurei,t -0.183 (0.141)
Infrastructurei,t−1 0.219∗∗ (0.0823)
Infrastructurei,t−2 0.164∗∗ (0.0775)
Infrastructurei,t−3 0.393∗∗ (0.160)
Infrastructurei,t−4 -0.0279 (0.0568)
Infrastructurei,t−5 0.167∗ (0.0934)
Year FE Yes
State FE Yes
N 2544∑q
p=0 βp 0.732
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 0 0.000
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 1 0.067
Dependent variable is real per capita total disbursements on highways. Infrastructure is real per
capita FAHP apportionments in levels. Control variables are included in estimation, but not reported
for brevity. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and clustered at the state level. ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
Table 2.3: Moran’s I
Year Gini Growth Rate of Gini
Z-Statistic p-value Z-Statistic p-value
1956 2.82 0.002 1.26 0.103
1960 2.95 0.002 0.12 0.45
1965 1.98 0.024 2.24 0.013
1970 3.36 0.000 0.48 0.318
1975 5.42 0.000 1.80 0.036
1980 4.86 0.000 -0.56 0.289
1985 6.10 0.000 2.49 0.006
1990 4.13 0.000 2.87 0.002
1995 2.69 0.004 3.09 0.001
2000 2.53 0.006 0.62 0.269
2005 4.52 0.000 4.04 0.000
2010 2.55 0.005 2.93 0.002
Moran’s I is a test of spatial dependence. Under the null hypothesis, variables are not spatially
dependent. Rejection of the null implies spatial dependence. Statistically positive dependence
implies clustering, meaning high growth rates in one state are associated with high growth rates in
spatially neighboring states.
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Table 2.4: Main Results
dependent variable: growth rate of Gini coefficient (%)
τ (Lag of Inequality) -0.180∗∗∗ (0.03)
β1 (Infrastructure) -0.242 (0.17)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) -0.656
∗∗∗ (0.23)
ρ (W*Inequality) 0.491∗∗∗ (0.03)
Short Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -0.361
∗∗ (0.16)
Short Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -1.402
∗∗∗ (0.32)
Short Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn
-1.763∗∗∗ (0.30)
Long Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Slr(W )) -0.283
∗∗ (0.14)
Long Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Slr(W )) -1.019
∗∗∗ (0.25)
Long Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn
-1.302∗∗∗ (0.22)
N 2736
The dependent variable is the percent growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Infrastructure is the log
of per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Control variables are included in estimation,
but not reported for brevity. The first four rows of output are used in the construction of the
short and long run direct, indirect, and total effects. Ssr(W ) = [I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ] and
Slr(W ) = [(1 − τ)I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ]. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered
at the state level, and computed using 10,000 replications of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
51
Table 2.5: Spatial Partitioning of Effects. dependent variable: growth rate of Gini
coefficient (%)
Cumulative
W-order Direct Indirect Total
W 0 -0.242 -0.656 -0.898
W 1 -0.317 -1.022 -1.339
W 2 -0.341 -1.214 -1.555
W 3 -0.352 -1.309 -1.662
W 4 -0.357 -1.357 -1.714
W 5 -0.359 -1.381 -1.740
W 6 -0.360 -1.393 -1.752
W 7 -0.360 -1.398 -1.758
W 8 -0.360 -1.401 -1.761
W 9 -0.360 -1.403 -1.763
W 10 -0.360 -1.403 -1.763
This table reports the spatial decomposition of the short run (contemporaneous) direct, indirect,
and total effects of Table 2.4. The W-order corresponds to the degrees of spatial separation between
states i and j. W 1 corresponds to neighbors of state i, W 2 corresponds to neighbors of neighbors of
state i, and so on. Reported estimates are cumulative. This table is represented in graphical form
in Figure 2.7.
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Table 2.6: Quintile Estimates
dependent variable: log aggregate income per capita
Bottom Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top Quintile
Incomei,t−1 0.569∗∗∗ 0.739∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗∗ 0.811∗∗∗ 0.813∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Infrastructure 0.034 0.016∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.003 0.002
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 2662
Each column represents an equation within a system of equations. The dependent variable is the log of aggregate gross income (AGI) per capita
within a quintile for a given state-year. Infrastructure is the log of per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Estimation follows the
three-step procedure laid out by Zellner and Theil (1962). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 2.7: Heterogeneity by Skill
dependent variable: log total personal income
High Low High Medium Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Infrastructure 0.017 -0.054∗∗∗ -0.007 0.037∗∗ -0.037∗ 0.000
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Low Skilled × Infrastructure 0.084∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High Skilled × Infrastructure -0.009 -0.006 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Low Skilled -0.477∗∗∗ -0.477∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.252∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
High Skilled 0.408∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
State Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 2171327 2171327 2171327 2171327 2171327 2171327
p(ψlow = ψhigh) 0.010 0.008 0.004
The dependent variable is the natural log of real total personal income. Infrastructure is the natural log of real per capita Federal Aid Highway
apportionments. The sample includes all workers between the ages of 25 and 75 that reported at least $2,000 in total real income (2013 dollars)
and working at least 10 hours last week. Low-skilled is an indicator variable equal to one if the respondent has completed no more than a high
school diploma. High-skilled is an indicator variable equal to one if a the respondent has completed at least four years of college. The interaction
between skill and infrastructure represents the heterogenous effect of Infrastructure by skill level. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 differ in that the former tests
low-skilled workers against a base case of medium and high-skilled workers, while the latter tests low and high-skilled workers against a base case of
medium-skilled workers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.8: Percent Low-Skilled by Industry
Professional Services 26.64%
Government 32.34%
FIRE 32.79%
Communications 36.91%
Business Repair 45.97%
Wholesale 47.98%
Utilities 50.83%
Durables 55.18%
Transportation 56.79%
Retail 58.64%
Mining 59.33%
Nondurables 61.42%
Construction 65.04%
Personal Services 65.50%
Agriculture 66.58%
This table reports the percent of workers working in each industry that that have no more than a
high school education (i.e. are low-skilled). The sample is the pooled average of CPS respondents
from 1977 to 2013 who were between 25 and 75 years old, reported working at least ten hours last
week, and had a total income of at least $2,000 (in 2013 dollars). Census’ 1990 concept of industry
used for classification of industries.
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Table 2.9: Response of Personal Total Income By Industry
dependent variable: log total personal income
Top+Bottom
3 Industries
Top+Bottom
4 Industries
Top+Bottom
5 Industries
Infrastructure 0.040∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.008
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Transportation × Infrastructure 0.054∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Low Skilled × Infrastructure 0.090∗∗∗ 0.051 0.125∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
High Skilled × Infrastructure -0.017 -0.019 0.023
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Transportation 0.124∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Low Skilled -0.213∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.076∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
High Skilled 0.072∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
State FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
State Trends Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2171327 2171327 2171327
p(ψlow = ψhigh) 0.000 0.070 0.017
The dependent variable is the natural log of real total personal income. Infrastructure is the natural
log of real per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. High-skilled and low-skilled are indicator
variables indicating whether a person works in an industry in the low-skilled or high-skilled sector,
irrespective of his own skill level (education). The skill level of an industry is determined by the
percent of low-skilled workers that work in it (see Table 2.8). In order, industries in the high-skilled
sector are: Professional Services, Government, FIRE, Communications, and Business Repair. In
order, industries in the low-skilled sector are: Agriculture, Personal Services, Construction, Non-
durables, Mining. Column 1 includes the top and bottom three industries, column 2 includes the
top and bottom four industries, and column 3 includes the top and bottom five industries. See table
2.8 for remaining industries that compose the base case. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis
and are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table 2.10: Transportation Intensity by Industry
Highest Truck Transport
Intensive Industries
Lowest Truck Transport
Intensive Industries
Industry Name
BEA IO
Code
% of
Intermediate
Input Costs
Industry Name
BEA IO
Code
% of
Intermediate
Input Costs
Truck transportation 484 47.61% Insurance carriers and related activities 524 0.09%
Food and beverage and tobacco products 311FT 1.73% Housing HS 0.11%
Nonmetallic mineral products 327 1.54% Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 525 0.11%
Primary metals 331 1.42% Computer systems design and related services 5415 0.13%
Wood products 321 1.34% Legal services 5411 0.13%
General merchandise stores 452 1.2% Fed. Reserve banks, credit intermediation, etc. 521CI 0.13%
Farms 111CA 1.28% Management of companies and enterprises 55 0.18%
Textile mills and textile product mills 313TT 1.14% Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 523 0.19%
Furniture and related products 337 1.13% Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible assets 532RL 0.19%
Paper products 322 1.12% Motion picture and sound recording industries 512 0.20%
Construction 23 1.04% Oil and gas extraction 211 0.22%
Apparel and leather and allied products 315AL 1.01% Broadcasting and telecommunications 513 0.22%
Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 3361MV 0.99% Other real estate ORE 0.23%
Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335 0.99% Federal general government (nondefense) GFGN 0.24%
Fabricated metal products 332 0.99% Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, etc. 711AS 0.25%
Data is sourced from the 2007 Input-Output Commodity by Industry Total Requirements (After Redistribution), 71 summary industries. Cost rankings report the percent of
trucking transportation costs to total output requirements. BEA IO Code is shorthand for Bureau of Economic Analysis Input Output codes. Codes are map-able to NAICs
codes, but are not directly comparable to 1990 concept of industry that is used in the CPS results. See BEA for details.
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Table 2.11:
Response of Inequality to a 100% Increase in Infrastructure Apportionments
Gini Theil Rel. Mean Dev.
τ (Lag of Inequality) -0.180∗∗∗ -0.069∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
β1 (Infrastructure) -0.242 0.486 -0.148
(0.17) (0.44) (0.19)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) -0.656
∗∗∗ -2.420∗∗∗ -0.517∗∗
(0.23) (0.62) (0.23)
ρ (W*Inequality) 0.491∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Short Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -0.361
∗∗ -0.067 -0.211
(0.16) (0.42) (0.18)
Short Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -1.402
∗∗∗ -5.779∗∗∗ -0.870∗∗∗
(0.32) (1.32) (0.29)
Short Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn
-1.763∗∗∗ -5.846∗∗∗ -1.081∗∗∗
(0.30) (1.38) (0.28)
Long Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Slr(W )) -0.283
∗∗ -0.003 -0.150
(0.14) (0.39) (0.14)
Long Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Slr(W )) -1.019
∗∗∗ -4.836∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗
(0.25) (1.11) (0.21)
Long Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn
-1.302∗∗∗ -4.839∗∗∗ -0.739∗∗∗
(0.22) (1.14) (0.19)
N 2736 2736 2736
The dependent variable varies by column. The first column recreates the main results, using the
percentage growth rate of the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable. The second and third
column report estimates in which the growth rate of the Gini coefficient is replaced with the
growth rate of the Theil entropy index (in percent) and the relative mean deviation (in percent)
respectively. Infrastructure is the log of per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Control
variables are included in estimation, but not reported for brevity. The first four rows of output are
used in the construction of the short and long run direct, indirect, and total effects.
Ssr(W ) = [I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ] and Slr(W ) = [(1− τ)I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ]. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the state level, and computed using 10,000
replications of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 2.12: Common Spatial Specifications
DSDM = Yt = τYt−1 + ρWYt + βXt + θWXt + ut
Model Difference from DSDM Spillovers?
General Spatial Nesting Adds ut=λWut and ηWYt−1 Fully flexible
Classic DSDM Adds ηWYt−1 Fully flexible
Static Spatial Durbin τ=0 Long-run only
Dynamic spatial autoregressive θ=0 Constant ratio
Static spatial autoregressive θ=τ=0
Long run only
and constant spillover ratio
Dynamic Spatial lag of X (SLX) ρ=0 Local only
Static Spatial lag of X (SLX) ρ=τ=0
Long run only
and local spillovers only
Yt = Inequalityt. θ = [θ1 + θ2], β = [β1 = β2]. Fully flexibile means spillover effects can exist in
the short and long run, and be both local and global. Long-run only applies for all static models.
Constant spillover ratio means all spillovers in the model are global. Local only means the model
does not account for spatial feedback loops.
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Table 2.13: Robustness Checks on SDM Model
dependent variable: growth rate of the Gini coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline Lag W Dep Static SDM Restricted Wx Dynamic SAR Static SAR
τ (Lag of Inequality) -0.180∗∗∗ -0.275∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0267) (0.0286) (0.0287)
β1 (Infrastructure) -0.242 -0.225 -0.264 -0.243 -0.507
∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.164) (0.162) (0.175) (0.129) (0.122)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) -0.656
∗∗∗ -0.442∗ -0.441∗∗ -0.525∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.226) (0.208) (0.199)
ρ (W*Inequality) 0.491∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0263) (0.0266) (0.0274) (0.0273) (0.0266)
Short Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -0.361
∗∗ -0.316∗∗ -0.343∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.153) (0.167) (0.138)
Short Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -1.402
∗∗∗ -1.041∗∗∗ -1.171∗∗∗ -0.456∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.333) (0.279) (0.117)
Short Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn
-1.763∗∗∗ -1.357∗∗∗ -1.514∗∗∗ -1.001∗∗∗
(0.302) (0.332) (0.288) (0.250)
Long Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Slr(W )) -0.283
∗∗ -0.280∗∗ -0.343∗∗ -0.271∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.121) (0.154) (0.142) (0.115) (0.130)
Long Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Slr(W )) -1.019
∗∗∗ -1.093∗∗∗ -0.988∗∗∗ -0.846∗∗∗ -0.288∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗
(0.246) (0.322) (0.297) (0.213) (0.0731) (0.104)
Long Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn
-1.302∗∗∗ -1.373∗∗∗ -1.331∗∗∗ -1.117∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.780∗∗∗
(0.223) (0.335) (0.298) (0.211) (0.185) (0.231)
Observations 2736 2736 2784 2736 2736 2784
The dependent variable is the percent growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Infrastructure is the log of
per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Control variables are included in estimation, but
not reported for brevity. Column 1 replicates the baseline results presented in Table 2.4. Column
2 reports estimates of a traditional dynamic spatial Durbin model, with the spatio-temporal lagged
dependent variable (ηW ∗ Inequalityt−1) included. Column 3 reports estimates of a static spatial
Durbin Model (τ=0). Column 4 reports estimates of a DSDM with only Infrastructure spatially
lagged (θ2=0). Column 5 reports estimates of a dynamic spatial autoregressive (SAR) model (θ1 =
θ2 = 0). Column 6 reports estimates of a static SAR model (θ1 = θ2 = τ = 0). The first four
rows of output are used in the construction of the short and long run direct, indirect, and total
effects. Ssr(W ) = [I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ] and Slr(W ) = [(1 − τ)I − (ρ + η)W ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ].
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the state level, and computed using 10,000
replications of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 2.14: TaxSim Top Marginal Tax Rates
dependent variable: growth rate of the Gini coefficient
τ (Lag of Inequality) -0.004
(0.03)
β1 (Infrastructure) -0.126
(0.21)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) -0.438
∗
(0.24)
ρ (W*Inequality) 0.630∗∗∗
(0.03)
Short Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -0.247
(0.22)
Short Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Ssr(W )) -1.279
∗∗
(0.53)
Short Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn
-1.525∗∗
(0.64)
Long Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Slr(W )) -0.245
(0.22)
Long Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Slr(W )) -1.265
∗∗
(0.53)
Long Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn
-1.510∗∗
(0.64)
N 1728
This table reports estimates where measures of progressivity are included as covariates. The de-
pendent variable is the percent growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Infrastructure is the log of
per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Control variables are included in estimation,
but not reported for brevity. The first four rows of output are used in the construction of the
short and long run direct, indirect, and total effects. Ssr(W ) = [I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ] and
Slr(W ) = [(1 − τ)I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ]. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered
at the state level, and computed using 10,000 replications of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure
laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 2.15: Military Spending
dependent variable growth rate of the Gini coefficient
NS2014 NS2014 Broad BEA Compensation
τ (Lag of Military) -0.170∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.177∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.170∗∗∗ (0.03)
β1 (Infrastructure) 0.330
∗∗ (0.14) 0.774∗∗∗ (0.19) 0.231∗∗ (0.10)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) 1.027
∗∗∗ (0.21) 1.097∗∗∗ (0.23) 0.178 (0.15)
ρ (W*Military) 0.510∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.509∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.505∗∗∗ (0.03)
Short Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Ssr(W )) 0.523
∗∗∗ (0.13) 1.013∗∗∗ (0.18) 0.277∗∗∗ (0.10)
Short Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Ssr(W )) 2.252
∗∗∗ (0.34) 2.797∗∗∗ (0.40) 0.550∗∗ (0.25)
Short Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSsr(W )ιn
2.775∗∗∗ (0.33) 3.810∗∗∗ (0.43) 0.827∗∗∗ (0.26)
Long Run Direct Effect
n−1tr(Slr(W )) 0.410
∗∗∗ (0.11) 0.811∗∗∗ (0.16) 0.226∗∗∗ (0.08)
Long Run Indirect Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn − n−1tr(Slr(W )) 1.647
∗∗∗ (0.25) 1.989∗∗∗ (0.29) 0.388∗∗ (0.19)
Long Run Total Effect
n−1ι′nSlr(W )ιn
2.058∗∗∗ (0.24) 2.800∗∗∗ (0.31) 0.614∗∗∗ (0.19)
N 1920 1920 2640
The dependent variable is the percent growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Infrastructure is the log
of per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Control variables are included in estimation,
but not reported for brevity. The first four rows of output are used in the construction of the
short and long run direct, indirect, and total effects. Ssr(W ) = [I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ] and
Slr(W ) = [(1 − τ)I − ρW ]−1[β1IN + θ1W ]. The first column reports estimates that use military
procurement data provided by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a) for the military spending measure.
The second column reports estimates in which military compensation to the first measure. The last
column uses military compensation, taken directly from the BEA, as the military spending measure.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, clustered at the state level, and computed using 10,000
replications of the Monte Carlo simulation procedure laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1,
∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Table 2.16: Comparing Construction Worker Characteristics to Military Personnel
Characteristic Construction
Military
(Enlisted)
Military
(Officer)
Entry level educational requirement None HS degree HS degree
Public educational benefits None G.I. Bill G.I. Bill
Percent with a bachelors degree 14% 19% 42%
Percent with advanced degree 3% 9% 40%
Average income $50,000 $73,000 $114,000
The G.I. Bill refers to the series of bills passed by Congress which provide education subsidies to
military personnel. Construction worker pay is based on 2013 CPS grand mean of state averages
for construction worker income. Military income is the Regular Military Compensation, which
includes ameneties such as the housing allowance and subsistence pay. Values reported for enlisted
members are for single E-6 grade members, serving for 10 years, and stationed at Fort Hood. Officer
pay is calculated for a single O-3 rank member who has served for 10 years and is stationed at
Fort Hood. For further details on how military pay was calculated, visit https://militarypay.
defense.gov/Calculators/RMC-Calculator/. Income averages are rounded ot the nearest $1,000.
HS=Highschool
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Table 2.17: Probability of Construction Occupations Being Computerized
Rank Probability Occupation Title
154 0.069 Construction Managers
199 0.17 First-Line Supervisors of Construction Trades and Extraction Workers
300 0.5 Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers, All Other
350 0.63 Construction and Building Inspectors
352 0.64 Maintenance and Repair Workers, General
390 0.71 Construction and Related Workers, All Other
411 0.75 Painters, Construction and Maintenance
434 0.79 Helpers − Installation, Maintenance, and Repair Workers
499 0.86 Maintenance Workers, Machinery
511 0.87 Highway Maintenance Workers
512 0.88 Construction Laborers
528 0.89 Rail-Track Laying and Maintenance Equipment Operators
617 0.95 Operating Engineers and Other Construction Equipment Operators
Sourced from Frey and Osborne (2017). Selected based on occupations which contained at least one of the following terms:
Construction, Maintenance, Highway.
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Table 2.18: Probability of Transportation Occupations Being Computerised
Rank Probability Occupation Title
105 0.029 First-Line Supervisors of Transportation and Material − Moving Machine and Vehicle Operators
227 0.25 Ambulance Drivers and Attendants, Except Emergency Medical Technicians
279 0.42 First-Line Supervisors of Helpers, Laborers, and Material Movers,
372 0.67 Bus Drivers, Transit and Intercity
380 0.69 Light Truck or Delivery Services Drivers
431 0.79 Heavy and Tractor-Trailer Truck Drivers
483 0.85 Laborers and Freight, Stock, and Material Movers
525 0.89 Bus Drivers, School or Special Client
531 0.89 Taxi Drivers and Chauffeurs
674 0.98 Driver/Sales Workers
Sourced from Frey and Osborne (2017). Selected based on occupations which contained at least one variation of the following terms: Drive, Move.
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2.11 Figures
Figure 2.1
Note: Calculations by author using data provided by Frank (2014).
Figure 2.2: State-Level Gini Coefficients Over Time
Note: Calculations by author using data provided by Frank (2014).
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Figure 2.3: Should Government Reduce Income Differences?
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Note: Sourced from General Social Survey (GSS), various years, with an average response sample
of 1,157. The question reads, ”On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the
government’s responsibility to [r]educe income differences between the rich and poor?” I group
”Definitely should” and ”probably should” together under ”Should”, and ”definitely should not”
and ”probably should not” together under ”Should Not” see GSS question ”equalize” for more.
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Figure 2.4
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Exhibit 9.
Federal Spending on Transportation and Water Infrastructure, by 
Type of Infrastructure, 1956 to 2014
Percent
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Office of Management and Budget and the Census Bureau.
a. Includes water containment systems (dams, levees, reservoirs, and watersheds) and sources of freshwater (lakes and 
rivers).
b. Includes water supply and wastewater treatment facilities.
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Federal spending on transportation and water 
infrastructure is highly concentrated among a 
few types of infrastructure. In 2014, three 
types of transportation infrastructure 
accounted for four-fifths of that spending—
48 percent went to highways; 17 percent, to 
aviation; and 16 percent, to mass transit and 
rail. Water-related infrastructure accounted 
for a considerably smaller share of federal 
infrastructure spending, with water resources 
claiming 10 percent of those outlays and water 
utilities and water transportation claiming 
5 percent and 4 percent, respectively.
Over the past two decades, the allocation of 
federal spending among types of infrastructure 
has remained fairly stable, although mass 
transit and rail’s share has risen slightly and 
aviation’s has fallen. 
Before then, there were a few dramatic shifts in 
the distribution of federal dollars among infra-
structure types. In the late 1950s, the share of 
federal infrastructure funding allotted to 
dams and other water resources dropped sig-
nificantly while funding for highways rose 
substantially as construction of the Interstate 
Highway System began. Another such shift 
occurred after passage of the Clean Water Act 
in 1972, which raised the share of federal 
infrastructure spending devoted to water utili-
ties to between 15 percent and 20 percent for 
roughly a decade. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Office of Management and
Budget and the Census Bureau.
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Figure 2.5
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Exhibit 11.
Physical Capital: Federal Nondefense Investment by Budget Function, 2012
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Office of Management and Budget and the American Public 
Transportation Association. For details, see the appendix.
a. Includes the following budget functions: Commerce and Housing Credit; General Science, Space, and Technology; and 
International Affairs.
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In 2012, the federal government invested 
$126 billion in nondefense physical capital. 
Half of that amount, or $63 billion, was for 
transportation. Of the transportation invest-
ment, 90 percent funded grants to state and 
local governments, mostly for the construction 
and rehabilitation of highways ($44 billion), 
but also for mass transportation ($10 billion) 
and airports ($3 billion). The remaining 
10 percent was invested directly by the 
federal government—above all, for major 
equipment for airports ($3 billion), the Coast 
Guard ($1 billion), and rail transportation 
($1 billion).
The federal government also invested $14 bil-
lion in energy-related nondefense physical cap-
ital. More than one-third of that sum funded 
reimbursements for part of the cost of install-
ing certain equipment (such as solar-energy 
equipment). More than one-quarter funded 
grants to state and local governments for 
energy efficiency and renewable energy 
programs.
Of the $11 billion invested in natural 
resources and the environment, nearly three-
fourths was for the construction and repair of 
pollution control facilities and water resources 
projects. Almost all of the $10 billion invested 
in community and regional development was 
for block grants to state and local governments 
for construction and repair projects. Eighty 
percent of the $9 billion invested in health care 
for veterans was for the construction of health-
care facilities and the purchase of information 
technology. The $8 billion invested in income 
security went to housing assistance, with three-
fourths of that sum provided through grants to 
state and local governments. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, using data provided by
Office of Management and Budget and the American Transportation Association.
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Figure 2.6: Lorenz Curve and Gini Coefficient with Two Income Groups
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Nl represents the proportion of low-skilled workers to the total population. yl represents income
per capita of low-skilled workers. The solid diagonal line represents an egalitarian distribution of
income (line of equality). The Lorenz curve prior to any shifts is represented by solid kinked line.
The dashed kinked line represents the Lorenz curve after an increase in per capita income (yl).
The dot-dashed line represents the Lorenz curve following an increase in Nl. The Gini Coefficient
is the area below the line of equality and above the Lorenz curve. Larger Gini coefficients represent
greater income inequality.
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Figure 2.7: Spatial Decomposition of Main Results
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This figure reports the spatial decomposition of the short run (contemporaneous) direct, indirect,
and total effects of Table 2.4. The order of neighbors corresponds to the degrees of spatial
separation between states i and j, with 1 corresponding to neighbors of state i, 2 corresponds to
neighbors of neighbors of state i, and so on. Reported estimates are cumulative. This figure is
represented in table form in Table 2.5. The horizontal axis is measured as the percentage growth
rate of the Gini coefficient.
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Chapter 3 Hey, What’s The Hold Up?: Implementation Lags in
Infrastructure Spending
3.1 Introduction
Open almost any undergraduate economics textbook and you will read of the detri-
mental effects of implementation lags on fiscal stabilization efforts. In Principles of
Economics Gregory Mankiw writes, ”The primary argument against active monetary
and fiscal policy is that these policies affect the economy with a long lag.” In Public
Finance and Public Policy Jonathan Gruber writes that the role of fiscal stabiliza-
tion has not been the focus of public finance for several decades because ”spending
tools of the government are not well equipped to fight recessions, given the long and
variable lags between when changes are propose an when laws become effective.”
Gruber goes on to write that the debate over fiscal stabilization is carried out in the
macroeconomics literature. However, as Ramey (2011a) notes, prior to the Great Re-
cession, fiscal stimulus was hardly discussed even in the macroeconomics literature.
The culprit, according to Ramey for the ”lack of interest was the belief that lags in
implementing fiscal policy were too long for combating recessions.”
The concern over implementation lags is not entirely unwarranted. Despite being
passed in 2009, less than half of Department of Transportation’s (DoT) expenditures
from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) occurred prior to 2011.
Nearly 20% of funds were not yet expended by the start of 2013.1 As Table 3.1
shows, half of the ARRA funds were obligated (directed towards specific projects)
in the first year. Despite their size and importance, much of the literature on fiscal
foresight and implementation lags have focused on taxes (Steigerwald and Stuart,
1www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49958-ARRA.
pdf
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1997; Yang, 2005, 2007; Romer and Bernstein, 2009). The literature that examines
expenditure policy specifically has relied on aggregate data. Leeper et al. (2009) di-
rectly studies implementation lags in government investment by constructing a DSGE
(dynamic spatial general equilibrium) model calibrated to the US. Likewise, Leduc
and Wilson (2013b) estimate the size of implementation lags using state level annual
aggregates. In contrast to these studies, I use project-level data to examine the ef-
fects of implementation lags. By using more granular data I am able to aggregate to
directly test how implementation lags impact employment responses in ways previous
research has been unable to do.
Leeper et al. (2009) directly studies implementation lags in government invest-
ment. They construct a DSGE (dynamic spatial general equilibrium) model cali-
brated to the US. However, they rely on national aggregates in their calibration and
their primary contribution lies in their theoretical model. One of the few empirical
studies that attempt to dig deeper into implementation lags in federal highway in-
frastructure investment is Leduc and Wilson (2013b). As part of their study, they
estimate the average lag between apportionment (authorization), obligation, and ex-
penditure of highway funds. However, they rely on state-level aggregates, so their
ability to characterize details of implementation lags is limited as well.
In this chapter, I empirically test the short run effects of implementation lags
on employment as the result of economic stimulus. I use the ARRA to explore
these effects. I exploit county-level variation in both spending and implementation
lag lengths of projects funded through the ARRA to estimate the dynamic effect
of implementation lags on job creation. Building upon the methodology of Wilson
(2012), I find that counties with average implementation lag lengths gained 3.8 jobs
per $1 million whereas counties with 90 day longer than average implementation lag
lengths gained only 1.67 jobs per $1 million, less than half as much.
Over the short to medium run, between one and four years after the ARRA was
signed, I find very little evidence of implementation lags impacting the effectiveness
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of ARRA financed spending. Estimated effects are statistically insignificant for every
period after the first year, and estimates of the heterogeneous effect of implementation
lags on employment are 15 times larger three months after the signing of the ARRA
than three years after its signing.2
The longer run implications presented in this chapter are consistent with the
broad class of time-to-build models first proposed by Kydland and Prescott (1982)
and other since. These models suggest implementation lags aught to only impact dy-
namics in the short run, which is consistent with my finding that implementation lags
only impacted employment for the first year after the ARRA was enacted. Broadly
speaking, the results also align in the shorter term with other studies that examine
the effects of fiscal foresight such as Steigerwald and Stuart (1997); Romer and Bern-
stein (2009); Yang (2005) in that spending can have short run effects on employment
and output even prior to actual spending occurring. However, unlike Leeper et al.
(2009), who construct a DSGE model calibrated to the US economy during the Great
Recession, I find spending increases employment in the short run even in the face of
large implementation lags. Thus, my estimates imply strong anticipation effects.
Because so little appears to be known about implementation lags at the micro-
level, I explore project level characteristics of implementation lags in the ARRA.
These characteristics help better understand implementation lags and perhaps provide
insight on how to reduce them in future stimulus packages. For example, I show that
one of the reasons so-called shovel-ready projects in the ARRA were unsuccessful
at providing quick stimulus was because they failed to address the longest phase of
implementation lags. Although these characteristics are limited to projects in the
ARRA, they provide more granular insights into implementation lags that previous
studies have been unable to.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents the empirical
2I focus on the implementation lag of the largest project counties received from the ARRA. See
Section 3.3 for more.
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methodology used in this chapter, Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4 presents
results. Section 3.5 explores characteristics of implementation lags at the project level.
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical Strategy
This section describes my empirical strategy for analyzing the impact of implementa-
tion lags on stabilization policy. My empirical strategy builds on Wilson (2012), who
examines the effect of total ARRA spending on state-level employment by estimating
the cumulative change in employment relative to employment when the ARRA was
enacted. Essentially, his methodology allows computation of the cumulative impulse
response functions of employment to one-time changes in spending across time.
I expand on Wilson’s approach by using more granular data that allows me to
examine the effects of implementation lags in the ARRA. I model the effect of imple-
mentation lags as having a heterogeneous effect on the impact of ARRA spending on
employment changes. In order to correctly estimate these heterogeneous effects, I do
not estimate the model with two stage least squares (2SLS), as Wilson does. Instead,
I use a control function approach. Control functions are commonly used in non-linear
models, as 2SLS provides biased and inconsistent estimates in these models. Although
the model I estimate is linear in parameters, the control function approach can also
reduce bias in models with polynomial or interaction terms (Wooldridge, 2010).3
I estimate the following model:
(∆Employmenti,T ) = α + β1ARRAi + β2Lagi + β3(ARRAi ∗ Lagi)+
ΓXi,0 + vˆ
1
i + vˆ
2
i + vˆ
3
i + i,T (3.1)
3In Appendix E I show these estimates are mostly robust to using a two stage least squares
approach. In Appendix E I show results from a non-parametrically estimated first stage are similar
to those presented below.
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ARRAi = α + Φ
1Xi,0 + ΘZ
1
i,0 + v
1
i (3.2a)
Lagi = α + Φ
2Xi,0 + ΘZ
2
i,0 + v
2
i (3.2b)
ARRAi ∗ Lagi = α + Φ3Xi,0 + ΘZ3i,0 + v3i (3.2c)
(3.2a) through (3.2c) serve as the first stage in the two-stage procedure. The
residuals from each of these equations are used as control variables in the second
stage regression ((3.1)). These control functions account for the potential endogeneity
of ARRA spending, implementation lags, and the interaction between spending and
implementation lags, respectively.
The dependent variable of equation 3.1, (∆Employmenti), is the change in total
county employment per capita for county i from February 2009 (when the ARRA was
passed, t=0) up to an end period (t=T). I estimate this equation for every month
following the enactment of the ARRA from March 2009 (T=1) to February 2013
(T=48) to construct a cumulative impulse response function for each month over this
period.
ARRAi represents the sum of funds obligated to county i through the ARRA,
scaled by estimated county population as of February 2009. I define Lagi as the num-
ber of days between the signing of the ARRA (February 17th, 2009) and the project’s
start date. Xi,0 and Zi,0 are vectors of control variables and excluded instruments
that are described in Section 3.3.
Following Wilson (2012), I define the jobs multiplier as the marginal effect of per
capita stimulus spending on the change in employment per capita from period 0 up
to period T . A key difference contrast from Wilson (2012) is that the job multiplier
depends on the county’s implementation lag length. That is,
d∆Employmenti
dARRAi
=
d((Employmenti,T − Employmenti,0)/Popi,0)
d(ARRAi/Popi)
= β1 + β3 ∗ Lagi
where Popi,0 is the population of county i when the ARRA was passed. By estimating
the model at different cutoff periods (T ), the total jobs multiplier can be found for
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any given time. For example,
∂(Empi,6−Empi,0)
∂ARRAi
=
∂((Empi,6−Empi,0)/Popi,0)
∂ARRAi,6/Popi
gives the total
jobs multiplier of eventual ARRA spending through the DoT six months after the
ARRA was passed (September, 2009). β3 ∗ Lagi represents the heterogeneous effect
implementation las have on the job multiplier. A negative estimated coefficient on β3
would imply the job multiplier is smaller for counties with long implementation lags.
Conversely, a positive estimated coefficient on β3 would imply the job multiplier is
shorter for counties with long implementation lags.
3.3 Data
Dependent and Control Variables
The dependent variable in all specifications is the change in per capita total county
employment since the passage of the ARRA. Data for county employment are collected
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW) survey. Data for county population are sourced from the Census Bureau.4
My empirical specification includes five control variables: per capita employment
growth from December 2007 (the official start of the Great Recession) to February
2009 (when the ARRA was signed), per capita employment as of February 2009,
change in the housing price index in the five-year run-up to the start of the Great
Recession, change in three-year trailing average per capita personal wages from 2005
to 2006, and per capita anticipated tax benefits from the ARRA. The first two of
these controls are constructed at the county level from QCEW. The Housing Price
Index, which is released by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), provide
the data to construct the county-level housing price run-up control variable. The
three-year trailing average of per capita wages series are constructed from QCEW
data.
These control measures are the county level counterparts to the control measures
4Although collected at a quarterly frequency, QCEW reports employment at the monthly level.
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used by Wilson (2012). I use these control variables because of the similarities in
our empirical approach, as highlighted in Section 3.2. Reliable county level estimates
of tax benefits per capita were unavailable, thus I use Wilson’s state level estimates
instead.
Measuring Implementation Lags and Spending and Instruments
Project level data were collected from four sources. Data on the start date of work are
constructed using the weekly updates published by the Federal Highway Administra-
tion (FHWA) until September 2013. The second source comes from FedSpending.org,
which houses the information formerly on Recovery.gov. These data are useful in that
data was released on a quarterly with detailed financial and timing information. The
last data source is the Fiscal Management Information System (FMIS). The FMIS is
the official database used by the Department of Transportation to track project level
financial information. Typically, FMIS is semi-restricted due to the presence of firm
identifying information. However, I obtained a copy of the FMIS following a Free-
dom of Information Act request through the National Archives. This data contains
a snapshot of projects all projects (including those still in progress) funded through
the DoT since the early 1940s, including all ARRA projects, as of the end of 2016.
The last source of data come from the Highway Performance Maintenance System
(HPMS), which is the DoT’s official database for recording physical use of FHWA
structures. HPMS summary statistics are annually released in the Highway Statistics
series; however, data regarding counties are not. Following a request to the FHWA,
I received underlying structure-level HPMS data for most of the years between 1980
and 2016, which I then aggregated to the county level. Table 3.2 describes which
datasets were used to source each of the project level variables used in this paper.
The remainder of this section describes each of those variables in more detail.
I define the implementation lag of a project as the difference between the signing
of the ARRA (the authorizing legislation) and when work begins on the project. I
78
consider this the construction phase of projects the period between work being started
by firms and work being completed.5 In the empirical specification laid out in Section
3.2, I estimate the effect of the ARRA on county level employment outcomes. Conse-
quently, projects must be aggregated to the county level. In the county aggregates, I
record the implementation lag for a county as the implementation lag associated with
the largest project (in terms of eventual federal expenditures) received by the county.
I aggregate in this way because the largest project presumably has the largest effect
on employment.6 Other aggregation methods like the mean of implementation lags
may not accurately reflect this. For example, Marshall County, Alabama had four
projects. The largest project was more than five times larger than the other three
projects combined. Although the implementation lag length for the largest project
was 280 days, the unweighted mean implementation lag was 501.5 days. In most
counties, aggregation is not a particularly large problem, as they received very few
projects. As Figure 3.1 shows, more than 600 counties received only one project.
Approximately half of the counties that received any projects received between one
and three projects. Nearly 90% of all counties received less than 50 projects.
My measure of spending is the sum of all federal FHWA funds that could be
uniquely mapped to a single county.7 The vast majority of these projects were clas-
sified by the FHWA under the Highway Infrastructure Investment Grants (HIIG)
program.
The empirical specification described in Section 3.2 relies on the use of instru-
mental variables. I use an instrumental variable approach because spending may be
endogenous to economic conditions. Although the apportionment of funds to the
5Note, because of the financing structure of most FHWA projects, the completion date by firms
may precede final payment from the federal government by several weeks.
6I have experimented with using a weighted average of implementation lags, weighing by the
federal ARRA spending. Preliminary estimates did not seem substantially different than the results
I present in this paper.
7A small percent of projects had to be dropped because they were statewide or multi-county
projects. See Appendix E for more information on dropped projects.
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states by Congress was accomplished increasing the amount of funds they would have
normally received by an additional 50%, states could have endogenously decided to
approve funds in counties that were hit the hardest by the recession. Likewise, im-
plementation lags could have been endogenous because the hardest hit counties could
have faced budget cuts that left them less able to apply for ARRA funded projects.
Furthermore, states may have felt pressured by their constituents and Congress to
fund projects that they felt could be completed most quickly, and allocated funds to
counties known to have historically short completion times.
I use one set of instruments to instrument for implementation lags and three in-
struments to instrument for ARRA spending. I use the month of the year that projects
were authorized to proceed to begin construction to instrument for implementation
lags. Due to the seasonal nature of the construction, projects that are authorized
to proceed to the construction phase during certain months may not actually begin
work until several months later due to the seasonal nature of construction.
I use three measures to instrument for ARRA spending. The first instrument is
the sum of real expenditures on completed projects financed through the FHWA for
each county between 1956 and 2006. This instrument is valid (meets the exclusion
restriction) as it was predetermined prior to the passage of the ARRA. To receive
funding for an ARRA project, state and local governments had to propose specific
projects, and most of the funding for projects were allocated toward maintenance, up-
grading, and replacing structures. Counties that historically received greater FHWA
funding consequently had more readily identifiable project opportunities for ARRA
funding.
The second and third instruments both measure the physical capital stock and
use of FHWA structures. One is the per capita length of FHWA miles of roads within
the county in 2006 and the other is the per capita average annual daily traffic on
FHWA structures within the county in 2006. These measures are the county level
counterparts to two of the instruments used by Wilson (2012). At the state level,
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these measures are especially effective instruments, as they are explicitly used in the
formulas that determine how much states get in funds. At the county level, they still
serve as strong instruments, as greater stocks of roads and higher intensity of use
increase the need for maintenance. Therefore, states with higher levels of lane-miles
and daily vehicle travel are more likely to qualify for FHWA funding. I use 2006
data instead of 2009 data because it makes it much more likely that these factors are
uncorrelated with county conditions in 2009. Furthermore, federal apportionment of
funds at the state level relies on three year lagged data. Additionally, FHWA was
unable to provide HPMS data on all states for 2009 and 2010.8
As Stock and Yogo (2002) show, weak instruments can lead to serious errors in
inference. The strength of these instruments is summarized in Table 3.3. The columns
of the table correspond to estimates of equations (3.2a) to (3.2c) respectively. Not
all instruments could be included in the second and third columns because of the
number of instruments involved (11 instruments for lags and 33 for the interaction
between the spending and lags). However, the Wald tests at the bottom of each
column reports a test of the hypothesis that the instrument are jointly insignificant.
In each case, the test statistic is larger than 20. Additionally, all three of the reported
instruments for spending are highly significant on their own.
3.4 Results
Estimates for the cumulative change in employment for select months following the
passage of the ARRA are presented in Table 3.4. Each of the columns correspond to
estimates of equation (3.1) at varying times from the passage of the ARRA. The first
column corresponds to cumulative effects three months out (May 2009), the second
8FHWA did not specify exactly why this data was unavailable. Some state data was available for
2009, but I could not rule out that the states with missing data were necessarily missing at random.
For example, states that were hit particularly hard by the Great Recession may have slashed budgets
- leading to improper reporting to the Department of Transportation.
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column corresponds to six months out (August, 2009), and so on.
Estimates for β1 are reported in the first row of Table 3.4. This corresponds to
the job multiplier (the number of jobs created by a $1 million increase in spending)
for a county with the average implementation lag length.9 For simplicity, I refer to
this as the average job multiplier. The average job multiplier is positive after the first
three months, and marginally significant for several months in first year following the
passage of the ARRA. The six-month average job multiplier implies 9.13 jobs were
created by August, 2009. for every $1 million in ARRA funds.
Estimates for β2 are reported in the second row of Table 3.4. This corresponds to
the average effect of a one day increase in implementation lag length on the employ-
ment rate, at mean level of ARRA spending. This estimate captures the effects of
implementation lags that are independent of their effects through ARRA spending.
Although this effect becomes statistically significant after about a year, it is not eco-
nomically significant. The average county employment rate as of February 2009 was
.36 with a standard deviation of about .11, meaning for a county with the average
level of ARRA spending it would take an increase of 30 years in implementation lag
length to reduce the employment rate by just one standard deviation.
Estimates for β3 are reported in the third row of Table 3.4. This estimate cor-
responds to the heterogeneous effect of implementation lags on ARRA spending. It
can also be interpreted as the change in the job multiplier for a one day increase in
implementation lag length. A negative coefficient therefore suggests implementation
lags reduce the job multiplier for ARRA spending. This is the case for each of the
periods reported in Table 3.4. That said, the coefficient estimates vary considerably
with time. The estimated effect of the interaction term is approximately an order of
magnitude larger in the first year following the signing of the ARRA than the two
9Recall, the job multiplier is β1 + β3 ∗ Impi. both spending and implementation lags are de-
meaned, thus β1 corresponds to the job multiplier when demeaned implementation lag length is
equal to 0.
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years that follow. For example, estimates corresponding to 3 months after the ARRA
was signed (-.061) are 15 times larger than estimates corresponding to three years
after the ARRA was signed (-.004).
The last three coefficient estimate reported in Table 3.4 correspond to estimates
of equations (3.2a) to (3.2c). Statistical significance of the spending residuals and
the interaction residuals suggest the control function accounted for some degree of
endogeneity but has little obvious interpretation beyond that. Based on this, it
appears that there is stronger evidence supporting the need to control for the potential
endogeneity of spending and the interaction term than is the case for implementation
lags.
In order to better report the full dynamic effects of implementation lags on the
job multiplier, Figures 3.2 to 3.4 report estimates of β1 to β3 in graphical form for
the four year period following the signing of the ARRA. These estimates show that
the average job multiplier (Figure 3.2) was positive for every month after an initial
three-month period, reaching a peak of about 15 jobs per $1 million after about 3
years. This average job multiplier corresponds to the multiplier for counties with
average implementation lag lengths; thus, despite long average implementation lags,
the average effect of ARRA spending on employment is still positive for most counties
after a few months.
Estimates of the interaction term between spending and lags are reported in Figure
3.4. These effects appear to be statistically significant for several periods in the first
year following the signing of the ARRA. After this initial period, coefficient estimates
become much smaller, and much less precisely estimated.
Coefficient estimates reported in Figure 3.4 can be better put into context by
reporting the total job multiplier, given certain implementation lag values. I de-
fine long implementation lag counties as counties with 90 day longer than average
implementation lag lengths and short implementation lag counties as counties with
90 day shorter than average implementation lag lengths. Estimated job multipliers
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for long and short implementation lag counties are reported in Figures 3.5 and 3.6
respectively. Estimates for long lag counties remain positive for most months, but
it takes longer for estimates to overcome the initial negative period, and far fewer
periods indicate a statistically positive job multiplier. Estimates do not go above 10
jobs per $1 million spent in the first year. In contrast, short lag counties experienced
a relatively sustained jobs multiplier of about 10 jobs per $1 million for a large part
of the first year. Additionally, the initial negative employment effect is essentially
nonexistent for these short lag counties.
In order to show the importance of implementation lags relative to the average job
multiplier, Figure 3.7 overlays multipliers for short, mean, and long implementation
lag counties. Vertical gaps represent the difference in the job multiplier for each type
of county up to any given month. As was reported in Table 3.4, the greatest effects of
implementation lags are prevalent in the first year. After six months, counties with
long implementation lags had estimated job multiplier of 6.3 jobs per $1 million. In
contrast, the job multiplier for counties with short implementation lags was 11.9 jobs
per $1 million, nearly twice as large.
After that, the gap between the short, mean, and long lag county multipliers
shrinks considerably, indicating a smaller effect of implementation lags on employ-
ment.10 Although previous literature predicts the effects of implementation lags to
not continue into the long run, these estimates suggest the effect of implementation
lags are shorter than previously estimated. For example, estimates from Leeper et al.
(2009) suggest implementation lags could suppress positive employment effects by as
much as three years, whereas my estimates indicate they do not last nearly that long.
10Although there appears to be a widening gap in the last year, estimates at this point are
extremely imprecise.
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3.5 Stylized Facts About Implementation Lags
In light of the results presented above, it is important to better understand basic
characteristics of implementation lags. Doing so can both provide context for the
results and be useful to policymakers in the next stimulus effort. This section dis-
aggregates implementation lags to the project level, and describes their characteristics
in more detail.
Table 3.5 describes various identifiable stages in the life-cycle of ARRA projects.
The implementation lag phase of projects is given by the period following the en-
actment up until work begins. At an average of 200 days, the period between the
enactment of the ARRA and the awarding (obligation) of projects to firms constituted
the largest phase of implementation lags. This phase began with federal notification
to states of their apportionments, which was outlined in the ARRA primarily as a
50% increase over usual funding for existing programs. Next, states DoTs compiled
lists of eligible project fund with FHWA funds and proceeded to solicit offers from
companies until funds were secured towards specific projects. After this initial phase,
projects had required preliminary work and inspections, such as environmental as-
sessments. On average, this phase took approximately three months. After receiving
DoT approval to proceed, there was a relatively short delay of about a month and a
half before work actually began. Altogether, average implementation lags were large
– lasting longer than the average construction times of ARRA funded projects.11
Table 3.6 reports the means and various percentiles of each project phase. The
table shows that projects took an average of about 11 months to start; however, there
was considerable heterogeneity both in terms of the overall implementation lag and
delays within each phase. The same is true for the number of days projects stayed
11Not all projects were complete by the time my data sample ended. This may distort the
summary statistics of the construction phase slightly by estimating smaller than true completion
times, however the completion time of a project is not necessary for my empirical analysis of the
effects of implementation lags on employment, presented in Section 3.4.
85
in the construction phase. The coefficient of variation (standard deviation over the
mean) of each of the project phases within the overall implementation lags are quite
large, but largest for the period between work having authorized to proceed and work
starting. This is also reflected in the fact that while the mean of this phase is about
42 days, the median is only 15 days. Even in the overall implementation lag, there is
a large amount of variation. The interquartile range of the overall implementation lag
is nearly as large as its mean and median. This gap, 280 days, is very large, dwarfing
even the anticipation effects often mentioned in the literature (e.g. Ramey, 2011b).
To give a measure of context, the difference in the implementation lag length of the
25th and 75th percentile of ARRA funded projects was about twice as large as the
time between the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the signing of the ARRA, which
took only five months.
The notion that implementation lags can be large was not new when the ARRA
was being debated and implemented. There was a large push by the Obama admin-
istration to fund so-called shovel-ready projects. These projects were meant to be
projects that were ready to begin at a moment’s notice. The term was not used as an
official designation, but rather an idea that certain types of a projects may be able
to cut through the red tape more easily than others. Maintenance work for exam-
ple, requires fewer assessments before being cleared to proceed than new construction
projects. Fundamentally, this approach attempted to reduce implementation lags by
reducing the second and third phase of implementation lags. By prioritizing projects
with fewer assessments, the administration hoped to reduce average length of the
award to proceed phase of project. By emphasizing projects that firms may be able
to readily begin once authorized to do so, the administration hoped to reduce the
proceed to start phase of implementation lags. State officials seemed to suggest this
second phase could be reduced substantially. Governor O’Malley of Maryland stated
in December of 2009 that,”[w]e have identified millions of dollars in ‘shovel-ready’
infrastructure projects that can be started almost immediately once federal funding
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is approved”. Perhaps these shovel-ready projects were started more quickly once
firms were authorized to proceed, but the proceed to start phase paled in comparison
to the law to award phase.
Since shovel-ready was not an official designation, it is difficult to identify so-
called shovel ready projects in the data. However, projects that were suggested as
shovel ready candidates were overwhelmingly pavement improvement projects. These
projects primarily consisted of projects like fixing potholes. One rationale for this
was that pavement improvement projects could not only be authorized more quickly,
but also completed more quickly once started. Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 respectively
show implementation lag lengths and construction times for projects based on their
FHWA improvement type designation. These tables reveal that pavement improve-
ment projects appear to have no shorter implementation lags than other improvement
types such as new construction of even bridge improvements.
Pavement improvement projects were completed more rapidly once begun than
other types of projects. For example, new construction projects took more than twice
as long to be completed on average, and the median construction time for pavement
improvement projects was just a fourth of median pavement widening construction
times. In this sense, shovel-ready projects may have succeeded in their objective. In-
deed, in a Kydland and Prescott (1982) Time-to-Build framework, this would likely
be considered a success. However, this ignores two important features of the data.
First, pavement improvement projects were completed more quickly, but also gener-
ally smaller. Second, this accelerated construction phase only occurred after a nearly
year long implementation lag.
The shift towards pavement improvement relative to other types of projects may
come at a cost. The long run marginal productivity of new construction may outweigh
the long run marginal productivity of improved existing pavement, thereby making
allocation towards pavement improvement inefficient. Trading off shorter implemen-
tation lags at the expense less productive projects being funded may be worthwhile to
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policymakers because estimates from Section 3.4 suggest that smaller implementation
lags increase the short run employment effects of infrastructure spending. However,
project characteristics suggest that so-called shovel-ready projects did not appear to
have shorter implementation lags in the ARRA. This makes the case for emphasizing
these projects on the grounds of countercyclical stabilization more difficult.
Instead of shifting towards projects which can be readily completed once autho-
rized, policymakers would be better off focusing efforts on reducing the overall size
of implementation lags. Since the initial phase of implementation lags appear to be
the largest contributor to overall implementation delays, focusing efforts on expedit-
ing this process during recessions would better accomplish the goal of increasing the
counter-cyclical effectiveness of infrastructure spending. Reducing the time average
time it takes for projects to be awarded in half (a 100 day reduction) would increase
the number of jobs created after the first six months by 3.1 jobs per $1 million, ac-
cording to my results. This would translate to about 33% more jobs per dollar spent
by this stage. In contrast, halving the time it takes firms to begin work once autho-
rized to do so (a three week decrease) would only translate to approximately a 7%
increase in the number of jobs six months out.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the role of implementation lags in the effectiveness of using
transportation infrastructure spending as a countercyclical tool. Using information
from the ARRA, I find that implementation lags may play a large role in reducing
the short run employment effects of infrastructure spending. Estimates suggest that
the gains in employment per $1 million spent were almost twice as large in counties
with short implementation lags compared to counties with long implementation lags.
The negative effects of implementation lags appear to disappear after the first
year. I find no evidence of implementation lags statistically reducing the employment
effects of ARRA spending on transportation infrastructure after the first year.
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Although implementation lags appear to reduce the effectiveness of infrastructure
spending in the short run, the average job multiplier is still positive for counties after
the first three months. This suggests that infrastructure spending appears to stim-
ulate employment in both the short run and long run, despite large implementation
lags on average.
By examining characteristics of implementation lags at the project level, I show
that one reason shovel-ready projects did not achieve their goal of quickening counter-
cyclical spending is that they ineffectively address the main driver of implementation
lags. Policies that reduce the time it takes projects to be awarded would more ef-
fectively reduce implementation lags, and thereby stimulate employment gains, than
funding shovel-ready projects.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: OMB Estimates of ARRA Fiscal Impacts
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sum
2009-2013
Outlays 110.7 197.1 112.7 56.8 35.0 512.4
Obligations 256.3 196.1 41.2 21.8 18.5 533.8
Tax Reductions 69.8 188.7 37.2 -5.4 1.9 292.2
Sum of Outlays and Tax Red. 180.5 385.8 149.9 51.4 37.0 804.6
Note: All numbers in billions of dollars. All years are fiscal years. Source: OMB;
Department of Treasury, Office of Tax Analysis based on FY2013 Mid-Session
Review.
Table 3.2: Data Sources for Spending and Instruments
Data Source Variable Purpose
FMIS Federal Funds Federal spending measure
FHWA-WU Project Start Dates Construct Lags
Obligation Date Construct instrument
FedSpend Per Capita Initial Obligations Instrument
HPMS Per Capita Length of FHWA Roads Instrument
Note: Note:FMIS= Fiscal Management Information System;FHWA-WU= Federal High-
way Administration - Weekly Update; HPMS= Highway Performance Maintenance System.
FedSpend refers to FedSpend.org, which houses data previously on Recovery.gov
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Table 3.3: First Stage Estimates
Spending Lag Interaction
Pre Recession Employment -0.002 -85.815 -0.151
(0.001) (828.298) (0.416)
Initial Employment -0.000 -17.029 0.004
(0.000) (52.014) (0.015)
House Price Index 0.000 41.096 0.005
(0.000) (33.159) (0.009)
Moving Average Wages -0.000 0.033 0.000
(0.000) (0.030) (0.000)
Tax benefits 0.000 0.114∗ -0.000
(0.000) (0.068) (0.000)
Instrument: FAHP Miles 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)
Instrument: AADT 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
Instrument: Spending 1956 to 2006 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
F 25.801 195.694 21.998
p(F) 0.000 0.000 0.000
The first column of this table corresponds to estimates of equation 3.2a, where the dependent
variable is millions of dollars per capita ARRA spending. The second column corresponds to
estimates of equation 3.2a, where the dependent variable is the implementation lag associated with
the county’s largest project. The last column corresponds to estimates of 3.2c, corresponding to
the interaction between spending and implementation lags. Note, estimates for the interaction
effects in the last column are suppressed due to the large number of instruments. F corresponds to
a Wald test that all instruments are jointly insignificant and p(F) corresponds to the p-value
associated with this Wald test.
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Table 3.4: Effects of ARRA Spending for Select Months
dependent variable change in employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
3 Months 6 Months 9 Months 1 Year 2 Years 3 Years
ARRA Spending -1.082 9.131∗∗ 3.830 3.781 8.837 11.259
(4.364) (3.879) (5.804) (4.676) (6.493) (11.983)
Lag 0.00000 0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ARRA Spending × Lag -0.061∗∗ -0.031∗ -0.067∗∗ -0.024 -0.003 -0.004
(0.025) (0.017) (0.027) (0.030) (0.032) (0.045)
Pre Recession Employment -0.162∗∗ -0.074 -0.218∗∗ -0.232∗∗ -0.548∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗
(0.065) (0.082) (0.092) (0.106) (0.192) (0.439)
Initial Employment -0.018∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ -0.026∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
House Price Index 0.00141 0.00057 -0.00126 0.00122 -0.00370∗ -0.00810∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Moving Average Wages -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ -0.00001∗∗ 0.00001 0.00003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tax benefits 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Spending Resid. -2.100 -10.802∗∗∗ -9.353∗ -8.299∗∗ -11.745∗ -14.057
(3.871) (4.062) (5.671) (3.983) (6.460) (12.686)
Lag Resid. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction Resid. 0.049∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.012 -0.011 -0.024
(0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029) (0.045)
Constant -0.002∗ -0.000 -0.002 -0.002∗ -0.001 0.005∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 2034 2034 2034 2034 2034 2034
Columns in this table correspond to parameter estimates of equation (3.1) for different end periods
relative to when the ARRA was signed into law. The first column corresponds to the cumulative
effect 3 months after the ARRA was passed (May 2009). The second column corresponds to the
cumulative effect 6 months after the ARRA was signed into law. The remaining columns report
the cumulative effects 9, 12, 24, and 36 months after tne enactment of the ARRA. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors constructed using 50,000 block residual-bootstrap iterations
at the state level. Initial employment is employment per capita as of February 2009. House Price
Index is the change in county house price index between December 2002 and December 2007.
Moving Average Wages is the change in a counties moving average of total wages between 2005
and 2006. Each of the Resid variables refer to control function residuals (see (3.2a)-(3.2c)).
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Table 3.5: Stages of Grants
Stage Description
Avg. Days Since
Previous Stage
Source
ARRA Signed ARRA signed by the
President, February
17, 2009.
NA
Award Date The date when the
award was signed.
201 FedSpending
Proceed Date The date contractors
were permitted to be-
gin the project.
95 FHWA-WU
Work Start Date The date work began
on the project.
42 FHWA-WU
Work Complete Date The date work was
concluded on the
project.
250 FHWA-WU
This table reports various stages between the enactment of the ARRA and project completion,
along with their sources. FedSpending refers to the repository of information once held on
Recovery.gov. FHWA-WU is short for Federal Highway Administration - Weekly Updates.
Average dates are included only for projects which were kept in the sample.
Table 3.6: Timing of Projects
mean sd p25 p50 p75 N
Law to Award 201.4 136.2 86 177 302 11189
Award to Proceed 95.33 96.04 47 76 118 11189
Proceed to Start 42.26 66.47 0 15 55 11189
Implement Lag 339.0 190.4 178 351 458 11189
Construction 250.3 237.6 77 171 354 10117
All values are in days except for the last column, which denotes the sample size. sd is short for
standard deviation. p25, p50, and p75 denote the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles respectively.
Construction has fewer observations because not all projects were completed by the end of the
sample period.
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Table 3.7: Implementation Lags by Project Improvement Types
mean sd p25 p50 p75 N
New Construction 318.6 174.4 170 279 447 199
Bridge Improvement 285.7 167.6 141 231 416 504
Bridge Replacement 259.2 177.7 121 212 392 587
Pavement Improvement 329.4 180.6 175 342 454 6858
Pavement Widening 331.0 188.9 176 329 458 339
Safety 396.0 196.8 245 391 504 745
Transport Enhacement 435.2 201.1 307 417.5 520 1366
Other 292.6 206.1 163 209 419 591
All values are in days except for the last column, which denotes the sample size. sd is short for
standard deviation. p25, p50, and p75 denote the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles respectively.
Implementation lags are defined as the difference between work starting and the signing of the
ARRA.
Table 3.8: Construction Times by Project Improvement Types
mean sd p25 p50 p75 N
New Construction 583.4 307.8 348 578 792 155
Bridge Improvement 294.0 236.8 114.5 206.5 428 480
Bridge Replacement 338.3 223.7 182 282.5 449 530
Pavement Improvement 207.2 211.1 62 133 280 6413
Pavement Widening 549.7 303.8 330 528 739 233
Safety 296.6 244.1 104 237 437 657
Transport Enhacement 282.7 228.3 113 221 379 1161
Other 290.5 279.3 118.5 174 396 488
All values are in days except for the last column, which denotes the sample size. sd is short for
standard deviation. p25, p50, and p75 denote the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles respectively.
Construction times are defined as the period after work has started and up until work is declared
complete. Some projects are censored, so these summary statistics may under-report construction
completion times.
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3.8 Figures
Figure 3.1
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Note: Authors calculations of sample. Only included valid projects.
Number of Projects by County
This figure shows the number of projects counties received from the ARRA through the DoT. Most
counties received relatively few projects. More than half of all counties in the sample received less
than 2 projects.
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Figure 3.2: Parameter Estimates for β1
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This figure corresponds to estimates of β1. Job multiplier represents the cumulative change in
employment per capita up to that time in response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per
capita, which corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ Lagi from Equation 3.1. Lag is demeaned, therefore this
figure represents the job multiplier at the average level of implementation lags. The solid line
represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands. Confidence
bands constructed through 5,000 block residual bootstrap iterations.
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Figure 3.3: Parameter Estimates for β2
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This figure represents the cumulative change in employment per capita in response to a one day
increase in the implementation lag of a counties’ largest project, at the mean level of spending.
This corresponds to β2 in equation 3.1. The solid line represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed
lines represent 90% confidence bands. Confidence bands constructed through 5,000 block residual
bootstrap iterations.
Figure 3.4: Parameter Estimates for β3
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Figure 3.5: Job Multipliers - Long Lag Counties
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This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for high lag counties. High lag
counties are defined as counties with a 90 greater than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 3.2 and 3.4 report estimates for β1 and β3
respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
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Figure 3.6: Job Multiplier - Short Lag Counties
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This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for low lag counties. High low
counties are defined as counties with a 90 smaller than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 − β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 3.2 and 3.4 report estimates for β1 and β3
respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
99
Figure 3.7: Comparing Job Multipliers
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High Lag County Job Multiplier
Mean Lag Job Multiplier
Low Lag County Job Multiplier
This figure overlays coefficient estimates from Figures 3.2, 3.5, and 3.6. Confidence intervals are
reported in those figures, but not shown here for readability. The solid line corresponds to
estimates reported in Figure 3.2. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 are represented by the dotted and dashed
lines respectively.
Maps
Figure 3.8: Per Capita ARRA Spending
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Figure 3.9: Average Days From ARRA to Project Completion
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Figure 3.10: Implementation Lag Length of Largest Project
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Chapter 4 Quit Slacking Off: Effects of Slack on Completion Times of
Infrastructure Projects
4.1 Introduction
In the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes
argued that the net effect of fiscal policy on output could be larger during periods of
economic slack. Since the Great Recession, there has been renewed interest in fiscal
policy (Ramey, 2011b), with a growing body of literature testing Keynes’ conjecture
about fiscal policy multipliers.
The empirical literature examining fiscal multipliers in good times and bad has
not yet reached a consensus regarding if multipliers vary across the business cycle.
Using a smooth transition vector autoregressive (STVAR) framework, Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012a,b) find larger fiscal multipliers during economic recessions than
expansions in both the US and OECD countries. Similarly, Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014b) find evidence of larger government spending multipliers during periods of
slack using a state level analysis of the US, though their estimates are imprecise.
However, Owyang et al. (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2018) find virtually no
evidence of government spending multipliers differing during times of slack compared
to expansions.
The literature has identified several factors capable of explaining why government
spending multipliers may depend on the state of the economy. The most researched
of these factors examines the effectiveness of fiscal policy at zero lower bound (ZLB).
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models show that
government spending multipliers can be larger when interest rates are stuck at the
zero lower bound (Cogan et al., 2010; Christiano et al., 2011; Coenen et al., 2012),
primarily because the crowd-out effect of government borrowing on private business
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is minimal at the ZLB. Other authors have examined supply side considerations. For
example, Gordon and Krenn (2010) argue that capacity constraints and production
prohibitions during the Second World War and the Korean War substantially limited
the expansionary effects of government spending during those periods. Similarly,
DeLong et al. (2012) argue that fiscal stimulus during periods of slack can stave off
hysteresis - potentially resulting in much larger than normal government spending
multipliers in the long run.
This chapter contributes to the literature by considering an unexplored channel
capable of explaining why government spending multipliers could be larger during
periods of slack. Using data on more than 700,000 federal highway projects, I find
that projects that receive authorization to begin construction during periods of slack
are completed more quickly than they otherwise would have. A difference in the
unemployment rate of 5 percent is associated with a 10.2% drop in project comple-
tion times, which translates to work being completed about 4 months quicker than
otherwise.
Much of the existing literature has focused on estimating the size of fiscal mul-
tipliers in the medium run. For example, (Barro and Redlick, 2011) estimates fiscal
multipliers to be approximately .7 after two years and Romer and Bernstein (2009)
predicted the fiscal multiplier resulting from the ARRA to be 1.57 after two years.
However, to policymakers concerned with short run economic stimulus, this two year
metric may not be particularly relevant. Policymakers may well place greater value
on the first two quarters compared to the subsequent six quarters. To give context
behind the timescale policymakers appeared to be thinking on, the Obama admin-
istration had hoped so-called shovel-ready projects from the ARRA could begin no
later than three months after the enactment of the ARRA. The results of this chapter
show that business cycle fluctuations result in quicker government spending during
periods of slack as expenditures on projects occur more rapidly. Expending these
funds more quickly does not change the eventual government spending or the even-
103
tual government multiplier associated with the spending, but it does matter in the
short run By expending funds more quickly, my results imply that a greater share
of the long run multiplier is realized in the short run, essentially front-loading the
expansionary effects of the spending. This is presumably precisely what lawmakers
would hope for during periods of slack.
By focusing on the speed of government spending, the mechanism I explore is
akin to Kydland and Prescott (1982) in a public-investment context. Their time-to-
build framework show that completion times of investment projects play an important
role in output dynamics, even if total investment is held constant. A key difference
with their framework is that I find empirical evidence of the time-to-build period is
dependent on business cycle fluctuations - not just a determinant of those fluctuations.
Similarly, the focus on the speed of spending sets this study apart from many business
cycle models (e.g. Ramey and Shapiro, 1998) and New Keynesian models (e.g. Smets
and Wouters, 2007) because they on the response of private agents to increases in
government spending (e.g. crowding in or crowding out of private investment, labor
supply responses, savings behaviors, etc.). In contrast, my results suggest holding
spending constant, business cycle fluctuations can speed up or slow down the rate at
which funds are expended.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the
empirical strategy. Section 4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 presents national level
results and Section 4.5 discusses possible explanations behind the results. Section 4.6
estimates the effects of state-level slack. Section 4.7 present robustness checks and
Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
I model the relationship between the time it takes projects to be completed (project
completion times) and the business cycle as an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT)
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model.1 This class of models is related to the more common hazard models. However,
instead of measuring the effect of covariates on the hazard rate, AFT models measure
the effect of covariates on the survival rate. I parameterize the model in a log-linear
form:
ln(CompletionT imeps) = ln(CompleteDate
T
ps − AuthorizationDatet0ps) (4.1)
= α + βUnemploymentt0p(s) + ΓSpendingps + ρTrendt + ups
Where p indexes projects and s indexes the state in which work for project p
occurs. CompletionT imeps is the difference (in days) between the date project
p was completed (CompleteDateTps) and when it was authorized for construction
(AuthorizationDatet0ps). The superscripts t0 and T respectively denote the calen-
der day on which project p was authorized to begin construction and the calender
day on which project p was completed. Spending is a vector containing the federal,
state, and local contribution to the project’s expenditures. trend is a linear time
trend. Unemploymentt0p(s) measures either the national or state unemployment rate
when project p was given authorization to begin work (t0).
Because of the presence of censoring, OLS estimates of (4.1), which would treat
the last observed date as the true completion date of the project, are not consistent.
Instead, (4.1) is estimated using a maximum likelihood approach which explicitly
takes censoring into account. Doing so requires parametric assumptions on distri-
bution of the error term. Four popular ways to model the implied distribution of
CompletionT ime are the Weibull, exponential, log-normal, and generalized gamma
models. Of these, I assume CompletionT ime follows a log-normal distribution.
Figure 4.3 shows a smoothed estimate of the hazard function of CompletionT ime.
There is a clear non-monotonicity in the hazard function, peaking around 1,200 days
1The parameterization I use is also sometimes refereed to as a log expected failure time model
(Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004).
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and declining thereafter. This general shape is inconsistent with the exponential
distribution (which assumes the hazard function is constant) and the Weibull distri-
bution (which assumes the hazard function is monotonic). The log-normal model is
the simplest model capable of recreating this non-monotonicity.2 In Section 4.7, I
show that the results do not appear to be sensitive to the log-normal distributional
assumption.
4.3 Data
Concept of Slack
While there appears to be no consensus in the literature regarding the most appro-
priate measure of slack, I follow much of the existing literature in using the national
unemployment rate to measure slack. Ramey and Zubairy (2018) argue the national
unemployment rate accurately captures the notional concept of slack: a period of un-
derutilized economic resources. They argue that the national unemployment rate is
preferable to the moving average of GDP growth rate used by Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012b) because changes in GDP only capture movement between peak and
trough of the business cycle; GDP often grows for several quarters after a recession,
but slack can still exist because not all resources are yet fully utilized during nascent
recoveries. Other authors have suggested different ways to measure slack, including
output gaps (Baum and Koester, 2011) and capital utilization rates (Fazzari et al.,
2015).
Using the actual unemployment rate differs slightly from the measure constructed
by Ramey and Zubairy (2018).3 Their measure of slack is an indicator variable equal
to one if the national unemployment rate is at least 6.5 percent, and zero otherwise.
2The generalized gamma model is also capable of mimicking this non-monotonicity. However, the
generalized gamma is extremely computationally intensive and has trouble converging in relatively
more complex models.
3Owyang et al. (2013) use a similar approach to Ramey and Zubairy (2018).
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This threshold approach makes sense in their context because their local projection
estimation requires a discrete number of states of the economy in order to be inter-
pretable. However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot easily capture
the intensity of slack.4 Furthermore, threshold crossing models necessarily require
setting a threshold value. Since there is no theoretical justification for any particular
cut-off value, the chosen value inevitably ends up being somewhat arbitrarily decided
(Fazzari et al., 2015). In contrast, measuring unemployment as a continuous variable
in my empirical approach presents no significant problems for estimation or interpre-
tation. Thus, the key advantage of using a continuous measure of unemployment is
that it better captures the effects of intensity of slack, and requires fewer assumptions
about when the economy is experiencing slack.
Quarterly data for the national unemployment rate were obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS). I report estimates for using different measures of slack in
Section 4.7 as robustness checks. These different measures are: NBER recessions,
output gaps, and capacity utilization rates. Data for NBER recessions and output
gaps were both obtained through the Saint Louis Federal Reserve’s Economic Data
(FRED), but originate from NBER and BEA respectively. Data for the capacity
utilization rate are sourced from the Federal Reserve’s G.17 series.5 In Section 4.6
Although most of the existing literature focuses on national measures of slack, local
economic conditions may be more relevant for firms. Consequently, I also estimate
the empirical model using state unemployment rates. Data for state unemployment
were obtained through the BLS.
4Ramey and Zubairy (2018) attempt to capture intensity in their robustness checks by using a
higher cut-off of 8 percent national unemployment
5I use the manufacturing series because data is available as far back as 1948q1.
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Projects
Project level data were obtained from the Fiscal Management Information System
(hereafter FMIS). The FMIS is the Department of Transportation’s (DoT) official
database for recording financial aspects of congressionally financed highway projects.
It is one of the primary underlying data sources for the annually published Highway
Statistics series, which been widely used in transportation infrastructure studies.6
FMIS is partially restricted due to D-U-N-S identifiers.7 However, following a Free-
dom of Information Act request through the National Archives, I obtained a publicly
viewable copy of the FMIS.
The primary advantage of the FMIS over other sources of project level data,
such as USASpending.gov, is that it records projects as far back as the early 1940s.8
Therefore, I am able to exploit project level data spanning across 11 business cycles,
whereas other databases with comparable level of detail only cover one or two business
cycles. Table 4.1 provides information on the units and observation periods for each
of the variables sourced from the FMIS as well as measures of slack and Table 4.2
provides summary statistics for all the variables used in this chapter.
I define a project’s completion time as the difference between the day it was
completed and the day it received authorization to begin construction. The natural
log of this difference is the dependent variable in all the results of this chapter.
I define project starting periods as the day they were authorized by the DoT
to begin the construction phase of the project.9 The authorization date is the first
6(see, e.g. Leduc and Wilson, 2013a).
7D-U-N-S identifiers are nine-digit unique identifiers that identify each physical locations of firms
provided by Dun & Bradford. In the FMIS D-U-N-S identifies the eventual contracted recipient of
the project. I do not have access to these identifiers in the FMIS copy that I received. However,
USASpending.gov contains reports these identifiers for projects since fiscal year 2008.
8There are a handful of projects prior to the 1940s, but I exclude these because 1) there are
extremely few of them, and 2) the data quality for these early projects appears extremely poor.
9Note, projects do not necessarily need a physical construction component to receive construction
authorization. FMIS also records other stages of authorization, but construction authorization is
typically the last authorization that projects receive.
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day firms may begin actual work on projects. Typically, there is a delay between
when the FMIS authorizes construction to begin and when actual work commences.
Thus, using the date the DoT authorizes construction to begin better captures the
notion of the time it takes firms to complete projects than the official start date of
construction.10
Most (92%) of the projects in FMIS have a recorded completion date.11 However,
the remaining observations are right-censored. As Figure 4.1 shows, the majority of
these censored projects occur for projects which were authorized to begin construction
after approximately 2008. For censored projects, I record their last known date as
the latest payment date toward the project, or the last update in FMIS toward the
project if no latest payment information is recorded.12
I use the FMIS data for the three control variables used in the empirical model.
These control variables are projects expenditures at the federal, state, and local
level.13 Combined, these three controls account for approximately 99.66% of all
project expenditures. The federal share of projects averages approximately 75%.
10Firms can somewhat prepare for projects even prior to authorization. For example, they may
hire workers in anticipation of when they expect to receive authorization to being construction.
However, there is no evidence that firms receive any differential guidance across the business from
DoT on when they should expect authorization. At any rate, these anticipation effects would only
be worsened by using the official construction start date instead of the authorization date to record
the starting period of projects.
11FMIS contains information on the final voucher date as well as the completion date. The
distinction between the two is that the completion date is the day all work and inspections were
completed, whereas the final voucher date is the day the final reimbursement of expenditures to
recipients was made by the federal government. Whenever possible I use the completion date. If a
project has a final voucher date but no completion date, I use the final voucher date and consider
the project complete. This applies only to a small portion of projects (about 2%). If a project has
neither a completion date or final voucher date, I consider it incomplete. Counting only projects
with an official completion date did not seem to meaningfully change the results.
12I do not use December 31st, 2016, as the end date for censored projects out of concern over
measurement error. For example, some projects report their last payment date being in 2003. It is
possible that the project has, in fact, been completed but the lack of a completion date in FMIS
simply reflects a clerical error. By using the last known update to the project, I minimize these
risks.
13For each of these monetary variables, I adjust for inflation using the 2009 annual average of the
CPI.
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States bear the brunt of the remaining costs in most cases.14 Controlling for the size
of expenditures allows me to later relate estimates to government spending multipli-
ers.
4.4 Results - National Unemployment
The main results of this chapter are presented in the first column of Table 4.3. The
coefficient estimate for the national unemployment rate is -.0204 and is strongly statis-
tically significant (p<.01). This implies that projects authorized to begin construction
when the national unemployment rate is 1% lower than otherwise, project completion
times are approximately 2% lower than otherwise.
To give a measure of context, the national unemployment rate climbed from 5%
at the start of the Great Recession (December 2007) to a peak of 10% in October
of 2010. Therefore, projects authorized during periods of high unemployment equiv-
alent to those seen at the peak of the Great Recession have a 10% lower expected
completion time than projects authorized to begin construction during periods of low
unemployment equivalent to those seen just prior to the start of the Great Recession.
Given the average completion time of projects in the sample, this corresponds to
projects being completed approximately 113 days more quickly.
The first column of Table 4.3 report estimates where the baseline survival function
(i.e. when all covariates are zero) is assumed to be constant across all projects,
however this needs not be the case. Projects require approval and oversight by their
respective state DoTs. As a result, average project completion times may vary by
states. In the second column of Table 4.3 I report estimates where the baseline
survival function is estimated for each state (i.e. stratified by state). These estimates
are akin to a random effects estimator in panel data models. Estimates differ slightly,
14Most DoT grants are matching and reimbursable, meaning local agencies are often responsible
for providing initial funding even if they are not responsible for their eventual expenditure. It is this
eventual expenditure that is recorded in the FMIS.
110
but they are still statistically significant and the estimated effect of changes in the
unemployment rate are still approximately as large as those reported in the first
column.
Because the estimates control for project expenditures, the decrease in average
completion time implies that apportionments for projects are more quickly outlaid
during periods of slack. This effectively results in stronger short run direct stimulus,
as dollars expended per day are larger than they otherwise would be. That said,
the long run multiplier of the projects may not be any different. Instead, the results
imply that the direct effect of government expenditures on output peaks more quickly
during periods of slack than during expansions, holding private agent decisions and
project characteristics constant.
The speed at which government spending affects output may be critically impor-
tant to policymakers, especially during a period of extreme slack. During recessions,
policymakers may well have such strong preferences toward short run stimulus they
would be willing to forgo some longer run potential gains. This is particularly salient
for highway infrastructure investment projects, as one of the primary criticisms of
using highway funds to achieve countercyclical objectives is that the lag between ap-
portionment and final outlaying of highway funds might be prohibitively long. These
results suggest some of these concerns are alleviated through business cycle fluctua-
tions, as the total delay is shorter during periods of slack.
4.5 Government or Firms?
The reduction in project completion time could be driven by several factors. These
factors can broadly be split into those attributable to private agents (firms) or the
government.15 FMIS does not contain information on firm specific characteristics of
grantee firms, making a direct firm level analysis beyond the scope of this chapter, but
15For example, firms may find it easier to hire workers during periods of slack, therefore work
can begin more quickly following authorization.
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FMIS does give insights into project specific characteristics. These characteristics,
such as the location, size, and nature of the projects are at the discretion of the
government, potentially making them a tool by which the government can reduce
completion time of projects across the business cycle.
Table 4.4 and 4.5 report characteristics of projects during periods of high and low
unemployment, which I define as being above or below the average unemployment
over the sample period (5.78%). The subsamples are approximately evenly split, with
339,032 observations in the low unemployment subsample and 363,031 observations
in the high unemployment subsample. Table 4.4 reveals that projects authorized
during periods of low unemployment are not necessarily more likely to occur in either
a rural setting or be a multi-county project. Because there are some differences in
project expenditures between the high and low unemployment states, I include these
characteristics as controls in (4.1). That said, the standard deviations on the means
reported in Table 4.4 are large, meaning the means are not statistically different across
states of the economy.
An important way in which policymakers could attempt to reduce average project
completion times during periods of high unemployment is to funnel funds towards spe-
cific types of projects. For example, if new construction is slower than maintenance,
policymakers may be inclined to allocate funds towards maintenance projects during
high unemployment spells to attempt to more quickly stimulate economy recovery.
Table 4.5 shows the proportion of projects that fall under several broad categories of
improvement types.16 Some differences do exist, but the overall make-up of projects
are broadly similar. The largest share of projects in both the high and low unem-
ployment state are for project development, with the overwhelming majority of those
projects classified by the FMIS as construction engineering projects. Likewise, in
both the high and low unemployment states, maintenance or replacement of capital
16Table 4.6 reports the types of projects within each category of improvements.
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account for just under 20% of projects. New construction projects do appear to make
up a larger percent of projects during low-unemployment states, but these type of
projects make up a relatively small share of projects, most of which were completed
near the very start of the sample period (see Figure 4.2).17 Standard errors are large
in both states of the economy relative to the means, implying compositional makeup
of projects do not statistically differ across states of the economy. Thus, the project
characteristics reported in Table 4.4 and 4.5 suggest that main findings are not driven
by large differences in the types of projects funded by public agencies.18
The similarly of project characteristics in good times and bad suggest that private
sector responses are the most plausible candidate for explaining the results. Although
data do not allow me to test firm-level responses directly, the results I find are con-
sistent with rational firm behavior.
During periods of slack there are relatively few private sector construction oppor-
tunities available for companies. Firms are left to compete over a limited number of
public sector construction projects. This could induce competition, not just along
prices, but completion times as well; firms could promise to complete projects more
quickly in order to win contracts.
Another reason why firms would more quickly complete projects during periods
of slack is that the labor cost of fulfilling contracts is lower for firms during periods
of slack. Higher unemployment places downward pressure on wages, which directly
lowers costs to firms. Additionally, labor market matching may be easier during
recessions because the number of job seekers are relatively high compared to the
number of job listings. Thus, it is both easier and cheaper to hire more workers
during periods of slack.
17I have estimated the main results without the inclusion of new construction projects, and the
results hold.
18Policymakers may wish to change the composition of projects across the business cycle, but
simply be unable to do so. For example, due to the long implementation lags of highway spending,
apportioned funds during recessions may not be authorized for construction until the end of that
recession.
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A third reason why firms could rationally complete projects more quickly during
recessions is that capital is likely fixed in the short run. Given fewer projects being
available, firms may allocate relatively more capital to each individual project. In the
short run, this will increase production per unit of time. Consequently, it takes less
time for firms to complete the few projects they have available.
Finally, there may be heterogeneity among firm or worker quality. During tight
labor markets inefficient firms and less skilled workers may be able to secure contracts
or work. However, these inefficient firms and workers are the first to be forced out of
the market during downturns. As inefficient firms and workers leave the market, the
more efficient firms capture a greater share of projects and higher quality workers do
a greater share of work. The end result is a reduction in average completion times.
Conversely, as the economy heats up, lower quality firms may be able to enter the
market and firms may be forced to hire lower quality workers, increasing average
completion time.
4.6 Results - State Unemployment
This section estimates the empirical model using state unemployment rates at the
time projects were authorized instead of the national unemployment rate. As the
previous section suggests, it is more plausible that private agents drive the results.
From a firm’s perspective, local labor market conditions may matter much more than
national labor market conditions, as search and moving costs limit the effective pool
of labor from which firms can hire (Diamond, 1982). Using state unemployment rates
better capture the local labor market conditions firm face.
Table 4.7 reports estimates using state unemployment as well as estimates using
national unemployment. Estimates using national unemployment differ from those
reported in Table 4.3 because the sample has been restricted to only include the
sampling period for which state data is available (1976-2016).
The estimates are statistically significant and large; they imply that if a state’s
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unemployment were to increase by 1%, project completion time would drop by an
expected 3%. These effects are larger than the full sample national regression by about
50%, however compared to estimates that are reported in the second column of Table
4.7 (which are estimated only for the period during which both state and national
unemployment statistics were available), the effects seem somewhat modest. At face
value, the smaller state level estimate seems to contradict the notion that local labor
market conditions matter more to terms than national labor market conditions, but
as Ramey (2011a) notes, local and national estimates may not be directly comparable
for a number of reasons, including possible spillover effects at the state level.
4.7 Robustness
Alternative Distributional Assumptions
As was mentioned in Section 4.2, assumptions made on the error term of (4.1) imply
that completion times follow a log-normal distribution. In this subsection I show that
the main results are robust to making different distributional assumptions.
Table 4.9 reports estimates using three different commonly used distributions.
The first column reports the main results. The second column reports estimates for
an exponential regression representation, wherein the error term is assumed to follow
an extreme value distribution. The second column reports estimates for an Weibull
regression representation, which generalizes from the exponential by adding a scale
parameter to the error term. The last column reports estimates for the generalized
gamma regression representation, which is generated if the error term follows a gen-
eralized extreme value distribution. Despite their differences, estimates for the effect
of an increase in the unemployment rate appear to be very similar across each of
the specifications. In each case, when unemployment is percentage point higher, the
expected completion time for projects is expected to be about 2% lower. Therefore,
distributional assumptions do not appear to drive the main results.
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Alternative Measures of Slack
As was mentioned in Section 4.3, there does not appear to be a consensus in the
literature regarding the most appropriate measure of slack. In this section, I report
estimates using a variety of measures that capture the concept of slack.
Table 4.8 reports estimates using six measures of slack. The first column reports
the main results for ease of comparison. The second and third columns follow Ramey
and Zubairy (2018)’s definition of slack. They define a threshold for slack as any
period where the national unemployment rate exceeds 6.5% and extreme slack as any
period where the national unemployment rate exceeds 8.0%.19 Estimates reported in
the second column suggest projects are completed 7% more quickly during periods
of slack while estimates reported in the third column suggest projects are completed
18.5% more quickly during periods of extreme slack. The large difference in estimated
coefficients suggests there may be some nonlinear effects of slack on project completion
times - with substantially larger effects during periods of extreme slack.
The fourth column of Table 4.8 reports estimates using an indicator for if the
economy is in a recession when a project is authorized. These results suggest projects
authorized to begin construction during NBER recessions are expected to be com-
pleted approximately 5% more quickly than projects authorized to begin construction
during expansions.
The fifth column of Table 4.8 reports estimates using the national output gap as
the measure of slack. Estimates suggest projects authorized during a time when there
is a one percentage point of real GDP larger output gap than otherwise are completed
1.32% more slowly than otherwise. Since negative output gaps are indicative of slack,
these estimates are consistent with the other measures discussed thus far.
The sixth column of Table 4.8 reports estimates using manufacturing capacity uti-
lization rates as the measure of slack. Estimates suggest projects authorized during a
19Ramey and Zubairy (2018) report estimates for the higher threshold in their robustness checks.
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time when there is a one percentage point higher capacity utilization rate in manufac-
turing than otherwise, projects are completed .882% more slowly than otherwise. As
with the output gap, smaller capacity utilization rates suggest slack, therefore these
estimates are consistent with the main results as well.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has explored a new channel by which government spending multipliers
can vary with the business cycle. I estimate an accelerated failure time (AFT) model
to analyze the effects of economic slack on project completion times using a dataset
containing more than 700,000 projects across 11 business cycles. Using the national
unemployment rate as my preferred measure of slack, I show that projects authorized
to begin construction during periods with unemployment rates mirroring those seen
during the Great Recession are completed 10.2% more quickly than they otherwise
would have if they were authorized during historically normal levels of unemploy-
ment.20 This translates to projects being completed nearly four months quicker than
they otherwise would have.
I examine whether this reduction is the result of intentional public policy interven-
tion or a response from the private sector. I argue that there is insufficient evidence
to suggest public officials change the composition of projects endogenously to increase
project completion times during periods of slack and conclude the more plausible ex-
planation is that firm responses are responsible for the reduced completion times. I
put forth several reasons why firm and labor decisions are consistent with my findings.
I estimate the effects of sub-national economic slack by estimating the AFT model
using state unemployment instead of national unemployment. These estimates sug-
gest that local labor market conditions matter, with a one percentage point increase
in state unemployment rates being associated with a 3% reduction in project com-
20Specifically, estimates imply that a 5% higher unemployment rate is associated with 10.2%
lower average completion times.
117
pletion times. That said, coefficient estimates are not large enough to suggest that
sub-national economic slack has a stronger effect on project completion times than
national economic slack, though comparisons between these two measures of aggre-
gation should be done cautiously.
This chapter expands on existing literature that strives to demonstrate why fis-
cal multipliers may vary across the business cycle. In contrast to many RBC and
New Keynesian models, the mechanism I discuss in this paper does not focus on the
role of private agent responses to increase government spending or the role of accom-
modative monetary policy. Instead, the focus is on the speed at which government
spending occurs and how this can shift more of the stimulative effects of government
expenditures from the medium and long run into the short run.
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4.9 Tables
Table 4.1: Data Description
Variable Name Units Observed
NBER Recession NA 1948q1-2016q2
Output Gap 100 ∗ (RealGDP−PotentialGDP )
RealGDP
1949q1-2016q2
Nat. Unemp. Rate Percent 1948q1-2016q2
State Unemp. Rate Percent 1976q1-2016q2
Capacity Util. Rate Percent 1976q1-2016q2
CompletionTime Days 1948q1-2016q2
FederalFunds Millions of 2009 dollars 1948q1-2016q2
StateFunds Millions of 2009 dollars 1948q1-2016q2
LocalFunds Millions of 2009 dollars 1948q1-2016q2
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean 5% 25% Median 75% 95%
NBER Recession 702063 0.150 0 0 0 0 1
Output Gap 697444 -1.034 -5.190 -2.662 -1.060 0.390 2.964
Natl. Unemp. Rate 702063 6.169 3.833 4.967 5.833 7.333 9.467
State Unemp. Rate 514413 6.418 3.433 4.833 6 7.633 10.70
Capacity Utl. Rate 702063 78.98 70.49 74.88 79.12 82.81 87.40
ln(TimeToComplete) 702063 6.732 5.489 6.248 6.748 7.265 8.021
Federal Funds 702063 1.964 0.0260 0.145 0.420 1.350 7.953
State Funds 702063 0.589 0 0.00794 0.0856 0.372 2.271
Local Funds 702063 0.0562 0 0 0 0 0.0795
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Table 4.3: Response of Completion Times to National Unemployment Rate Changes
dependent variable log of project completion time
Natl. Unemp. Rate -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0264∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.005)
Federal Funds 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0233∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
State Funds 0.00816∗∗ 0.00715∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Local Funds -0.00164 -0.00177
(0.003) (0.003)
Time (Trend) 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.00272∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 702063 702063
Estimates reported in the first column assume the baseline survival function is the same across all
projects. Estimates reported in the second column assume the baseline survival function varies by
state, but is the same within each state. Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .1, ** p < .05, ***
p < .01. Standard errors clustered quarter of authorization to begin construction. Dependent
variable is log of projection completion time. All funds are expressed in millions of real dollars.
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Table 4.4: Project Statistics During Low and High Unemployment
Full Sample Low Unemp. High Unemp.
Federal Funds 1.964 2.106 1.832
(7.354) (7.900) (6.802)
State Funds 0.589 0.694 0.491
(8.479) (7.918) (8.971)
Local Funds 0.0562 0.0493 0.0627
(2.811) (1.230) (3.724)
Rural 0.640 0.669 0.612
(0.480) (0.471) (0.487)
Multi-County Project 0.0353 0.0369 0.0339
(0.185) (0.189) (0.181)
Observations 702063 339032 363031
Means reported on top. Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. The threshold for the high
unemployment state is just over 5.7%, which corresponds to the mean national unemployment rate
between 1949 and 2016. All funds are reported as millions of dollars. Rural is the proportion of
projects where the majority of funds are expended in a rural area. Multi-County Project is the
proportion of projects that span multiple counties (typically statewide).
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Table 4.5: Project Statistics During Low and High Unemployment
Full Sample Low Unemp. High Unemp.
New Construction 0.0376 0.0480 0.0279
(0.190) (0.214) (0.165)
Replacement (No extra capacity) 0.100 0.101 0.100
(0.301) (0.301) (0.300)
Replacement (Extra capacity) 0.0123 0.0129 0.0117
(0.110) (0.113) (0.108)
Maintenance 0.0745 0.0679 0.0806
(0.263) (0.252) (0.272)
Other Enhancements 0.0386 0.0476 0.0302
(0.193) (0.213) (0.171)
Project Development 0.473 0.443 0.501
(0.499) (0.497) (0.500)
Other 0.188 0.173 0.203
(0.391) (0.378) (0.402)
Observations 702063 339032 363031
proportions reported on top. Standard deviations reported in parenthesis. The threshold for the
high unemployment state is just over 5.7%, which corresponds to the mean national unemployment
rate between 1949 and 2016.
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Table 4.6: FMIS Improvement Codes
Category FMIS Improvement Type FMIS Code obs
New Construction New Construction - Roadway 1 10,187
New Construction - Bridge 8 16,183
New Construction- Tunnel 50 1
Replacement Reconstruction 2 21,956
(No Added Capacity) Reconstruction 4 13,252
Bridge Replacement 9 8,933
Bridge Replacement 11 7,618
Bridge Rehabilitation 12 5,785
Bridge Rehabilitation 14 4,783
Special Bridge 40 8,206
Tunnel Replacement 51 1
Tunnel Rehabilitation 52 2
Replacement Reconstruction Added Capacity 3 7,535
(Added Capacity) Bridge Replacement 10 731
Bridge Rehabilitation 13 363
Maintenance Maintenance Resurfacing 5 33,805
Maintenance Restoration & Rehabilitation 6 12,927
Maintenance Relocation 7 5,556
Bridge Preventive Maintenance 47 347
Bridge Preventive Maintenance 48 4
Project Development Preliminary Engineering 15 79,983
Right of Way 16 15,596
Construction Engineering 17 220,562
Planning 18 28
Research 19 33
Utilities 43 15,957
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FMIS Improvement Codes (cont.)
Category FMIS Improvement Type FMIS Code Obs
Other Transit 23 1,117
Enhancements Ferry Boats 26 173
Facilities for Pedestrians and Bicycles 28 10,345
Acq. of Scenic Easements and Scenic or Historic Sites 29 111
Scenic or Historic Highway Programs 30 2,457
Landscaping and Other Scenic Beautification 31 11,553
Historic Preservation 32 1,147
Rehab. & Operation of Historic Buildings & Structure 33 654
Preservation of Abandoned Railway Corridors 34 140
Control and Removal of Outdoor Advertising 35 12
Archaeological Planning & Research 36 323
Mitigation of Water Pollution due to Highway Runoff 37 272
Establishment of Transportation Museums 39 87
Other Environmental Only 20 1,090
Safety 21 71,189
Rail/Hwy Crossing 22 16,061
Traffic Management/Engineering - HOV 24 3,284
Vehicle Weight Enforcement Program 25 174
Administration 27 1,241
Safety and Education for Peds/Bicyclists 38 454
Youth Conservation Service 41 24
Training 42 17,669
Other 44 19,545
Debt Service 45 202
Bridge Inspection and Related Training 49 64
Tunnel Inspection and Related Training 55 1
Other asset inspection 56 1
Safety Non-infrastructure 57 1
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Table 4.7: Response of Project Completion Times to State Unemployment Changes
dependent variable log of project completion time
State Unemp. Natl Unemp.
State Unemp. Rate -0.0299∗∗∗
(0.004)
Natl. Unemp. Rate -0.0513∗∗∗
(0.005)
Federal Funds 0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
State Funds 0.00274 0.00270
(0.002) (0.002)
Local Funds -0.00115 -0.00121
(0.003) (0.003)
Time (Trend) 0.000693∗∗∗ 0.000686∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6.971∗∗∗ 7.117∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.049)
Observations 514413 514413
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors clustered quarter
of authorization to begin construction. Dependent variable is log of projection completion
time.Both regressions are estimated with samples spanning from 1976 to 2016.
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Table 4.8: Alternative Measures of Slack
dependent variable log of project completion time
Nat. Unemp. Ramey Slack Ramey Severe Slack NBER Recession Output Gap Capital Util
Natl. Unemp. Rate -0.0204∗∗∗
(0.006)
Natl. Unemp > 6.5 -0.0704∗∗∗
(0.021)
Natl. Unemp > 8.0 -0.185∗∗∗
(0.034)
NBER Recession -0.0527∗
(0.030)
Output Gap 0.0132∗∗∗
(0.005)
Capacity Utl. Rate 0.00882∗∗∗
(0.002)
Federal Funds 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0252∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State Funds 0.00816∗∗ 0.00818∗∗ 0.00826∗∗ 0.00840∗∗ 0.00779∗∗ 0.00828∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Local Funds -0.00164 -0.00165 -0.00154 -0.00163 -0.00167 -0.00151
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Time (Trend) 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.00248∗∗∗ 0.00266∗∗∗ 0.00237∗∗∗ 0.00257∗∗∗ 0.00274∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6.616∗∗∗ 6.523∗∗∗ 6.505∗∗∗ 6.516∗∗∗ 6.499∗∗∗ 5.770∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.190)
ln(σ) -0.302∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.302∗∗∗ -0.301∗∗∗ -0.303∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 702063 702063 702063 702063 697444 702063
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors clustered quarter
of authorization to begin construction. Dependent variable is log of projection completion time.
The first column re-reports the main results. The second column corresponds to estimates where
slack is measured as a dummy variable equal to one if the national unemployment rate is at least
6.5% and zero otherwise. The third column corresponds to estimates where slack is measured as a
dummy variable equal to one if the national unemployment rate is 8.0% or higher and zero
otherwise. NBER Recession is an indicator variable equal to one if NBER declared the economy
was in recession at any point in the quarter that a project was authorized to begin construction.
Capital Util corresponds to estimates where the measure of slack is a series of capital utilization in
manufacturing firms. All funds are expressed in millions of real dollars.
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Table 4.9: Alternative Distributions
dependent variable log of project completion time
Log-Normal Exponent Weibull Gen. Gamma
Natl. Unemp. Rate -0.0204∗∗∗ -0.0220∗∗∗ -0.0213∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006)
Federal Funds 0.0252∗∗∗ 0.0308∗∗∗ 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
State Funds 0.00816∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0236∗∗∗ 0.0177∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Local Funds -0.00164 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0214∗∗∗ 0.00978
(0.003) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011)
Time (Trend) 0.00254∗∗∗ 0.00326∗∗∗ 0.00292∗∗∗ 0.00271∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 6.616∗∗∗ 6.804∗∗∗ 6.924∗∗∗ 6.681∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.047) (0.054) (0.044)
ln(σ) -0.302∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006)
ln(p) 0.345∗∗∗
(0.005)
κ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.017)
Observations 702063 702063 702063 702063
Standard errors in parenthesis. * p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors clustered quarter
of authorization to begin construction. Dependent variable is log of projection completion time.
All funds are expressed in millions of real dollars.
127
4.10 Figures
Figure 4.1:
Censoring by Authorization Cohort
(Percent of Projects Completed)
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Figure 4.2:
Number of Projects for New Structure Construction by Time
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Figure 4.3
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Hazard function approximated using a bandwidth of 250. The estimated hazard function is
generated from the full sample, but the hazard function is only shown up to 5,000 days, which
corresponds to approximately the 99th percentile of project completion times.
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Chapter 5 Conclusion
This dissertation has explored effects of public transportation infrastructure spending
that are not typically looked at by the existing literature. The second chapter focuses
on transportation grants on the income distribution. Specifically, the first chapter
examines the effect of these grants on income inequality. The second and third paper
focus on the short run aspects of infrastructure investment. The third chapter focuses
on the role of implementation lags in the ARRA on changes in employment, and
the fourth chapter suggests the construction times of infrastructure projects may
contribute to state dependent fiscal multipliers.
The second chapter shows that public infrastructure investment reduces within-
state pre-tax income inequality. These results highlight the fact that there is a het-
erogeneous effect of public infrastructure investment on income, which goes beyond
the average effect that much of the literature focuses on. By decomposing state-level
income into quintiles, I demonstrate that the reduction in income inequality is driven
by an increase in income from the bottom three quintiles of the income distribution,
and no strong evidence of gains among top income earners.
Using person-level data, I explore two major mechanisms capable of explaining
these results. First, low-skilled workers heterogeneously benefit from increases in fed-
eral transportation infrastructure grants. Whereas an increase in grants statistically
increases income for low-skilled workers, I find no evidence of gains in income for
high-skilled workers. These results are consistent with the fact that workers most
directly involved with the actual construction of highways tend to be low skilled.
Second, workers working in low-skilled industries heterogeneously benefit from an
increase in federal transportation infrastructure grants. As with low-skilled workers,
increases in grants increase income for those working in low-skilled industries, but not
higher-skilled industries. These estimates are consistent with the fact that low-skilled
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industries tend to rely more on physical infrastructure, and therefore may see the
greatest productivity gains from public investments in transportation infrastructure.
Previous literature has assessed the value of public infrastructure expenditures
primarily on the basis of its average effects on output, however policymakers may
have distributional preferences. To the extent that policymakers may seek a more
egalitarian income distribution, my results shows highway grants could be a tool
in accomplishing that goal. Additionally, distributional preferences for reducing in-
come inequality imply that current levels of highway grants may currently be under-
provided in a social welfare sense
The third chapter characterizes implementation lags and analyzes their role on
the short run stabilization effects of ARRA spending. I conduct the first analysis of
the effects of implementation lags on stabilization policy with transportation funds
using micro-level data. I find that in the very short run, the first year following
the signing of the ARRA, implementation lags have a large effect on changes in
employment. Whereas employment effects of ARRA spending for counties with short
implementation lags are positive three months out, they are actually negative for long
implementation lag counties. Gains in employment one year following the passage of
the ARRA are less than half as large for counties with long implementation lags
compared to counties with average implementation lag lengths. That said, the effect
of implementation lags appear to largely die out after the first year. Consequently,
even counties with long implementation lags appear to see gains im employment.
In exploring characteristics of implementation lags at the project level, I show that
implementation lags depend much less on the type of project than was suggested by
the push for so-called shovel-ready projects. Instead, implementation lags in the
ARRA appeared to largely depend on the initial wait between the signing of the law
and obligation of funds.
My results suggest that implementation lags are indeed a barrier to using public
infrastructure investment expenditures as a countercyclical policy tool. However, they
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suggest these barriers are not insurmountably large and the effect of expenditures still
have a modestly positive effect on employment in the short run, even in the face of
large implementation lags. To policymakers, my analysis of implementation lags
using project-level data suggests reducing the initial wait between the enactment of
stimulus packages and awarding projects is the key to reducing implementation lags.
Encouraging states to have continually have projects proposals that could be approved
during recessions would likely reduce implementation lags more than attempts in
the ARRA to change the composition of projects towards more quickly completed
projects.
The fourth chapter shows the construction phases of projects are shorter when
they are authorized to begin work during periods of slack. These estimates suggest
that government spending may be de-facto larger during recessionary periods, as
funds appropriated in the past are expended more quickly during periods of slack.
Consequently, these estimates suggest an alternate channel by which fiscal multipliers
can differ across the state of the economy.
There remains work to be done in all of the topics covered in this dissertation. I
have focused on the role of public investment in transportation infrastructure because
of its historical importance and size, but there are many components to government
investment. It remains to be seen if the distributional effects of transportation grants
are generalizable to other forms of government investment. For example, does the
construction of public housing lead to similar reductions in income inequality? What
about investments in research and development?
More work can be done into the mechanism driving the distributional effects found
in the second chapter. This is particularly relevant as technological change continues
to change the economy. Further research into the role of labor intensity on the
distributional effects of government investment may be important as automation in
the transportation industry continues to accelerate and the nature of transportation
changes.
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Further research into the countercyclical effects of transportation grants is also
warranted. In the third chapter, I show that so-called shovel-ready projects did
not appear to reduce implementation lags in the ARRA, but more research into the
types of policies that could effectively reduce implementation lags needs to be done.
One possibility for reducing implementation lags would be to emphasize block grants
rather than matching grants during recessions, as these grants could reduce the time
it takes for projects to be awarded. A helpful start would be to look further back
than the Great recession, and conduct similar types of analyses as I did in the third
chapter.
The fourth chapter highlighted the reduction of completion times of projects dur-
ing periods of slack, but more research needs to be done on why this is the case.
Future research focusing on firm-level responses to macroeconomic conditions would
provide helpful context for the results, and potentially inform policymakers of poten-
tial ways to improve government expenditures as a countercyclical policy tool. As
with the distributional effects of public investment in transportation infrastructure,
further research needs to be done to examine if the results of the fourth chapter
generalize to other forms of infrastructure spending.
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Appendix
A Chapter 1 Appendix
Appendix: Data
Statistics of Income
The key advantage of the SOI is it’s length, quality, and consistency. Whereas the
SOI has been recorded since 1918, other publicly available data source are not capable
of providing consistent estimates of state-level income inequality until the mid 1970’s
when the Current Population Survey (CPS) was expanded enough to cover all states.1
An important advantage of the SOI over the CPS is that the SOI is not top coded.
Because data are censored at the top for the (public use) CPS, it is unable to capture
variations at the very top of the income distribution. As Piketty (2017) as strongly
argues, such top coding hides important dynamics in total income inequality. For
example, if income is top coded at $250,000, there is no way to tell if average income
for those above this threshold is $300,000 or $1,000,00. Top coding is an important
reason for why users of the CPS tend to report partial inequality measures, like 90/10
ratios. These measures side-step the top-coding problem, but paint a less complete
picture of total income inequality.
That said, there are limitations to the SOI Series. The SOI uses pre-tax data,
which presents three obstacles. First, not everyone files taxes. The poor, in particular,
file at a much lower rate than other portions of the income distribution. Trends over
time in the proportion of people who do not file could lead to spurious changes in
measured income inequality. Fortunately, this does not seem to be a first order
concern. Figure 5.2 shows that the growth rate of individual tax returns has closely
tracked the growth rate of the United States population, implying the proportion of
1As Figure 5.1 illustrates, the state-level inequality series used in this paper are highly correlated
with the well known national analysis of Piketty and Saez (2003), especially for the post World War
II period. This is unsurprising as they use the same methodology.
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non-filers has not drastically changed over time.
A second obstacle is that inequality measured derived from SOI data miss im-
portant features of the tax code like the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Since
most of these programs redistribute wealth from the relatively more wealthy to the
relatively more poor, inequality measures in this paper likely overstate true income
inequality. However, using non-public CPS data, Burkhauser et al. (2012) find that
series of tax adjusted and tax un-adjusted Gini coefficients are very highly correlated
across time. Thus, while the level of pre-tax Gini coefficients used in this paper are
arguably too high, the dynamics do not appear substantially affected.
The last obstacle deals with constructing the Gini coefficient itself. Because of
practical limitations and privacy concerns, The SOI does not provide exact income
values for each filer. Rather, it constructs a series of non-overlapping income bins and
reports aggregate adjusted gross income (AGI) and number of filers per state in each
income bin. In order to construct a Gini coefficient, an income distribution must be
approximated using these bins, which leads to potential measurement error. There
is no evidence that the number of bins or the intervals they cover appear to change
non-randomly, so the measurement error is likely classical. Still, this does imply the
inequality measures suffer from greater statistical noise. I turn to this issue in greater
detail in the next subsection.
Construction of Statistics of Income Series
This section decomposes the Gini coefficient into an approximation of the CDF of the
income distribution in order to evaluate it along various percentile intervals.
As the main text described, the SOI consists of detailed tabulations of pre-tax
aggregate income by state. Income is reported in intervals that are cross sectionally
consistent but vary with time. That is, in a given year all states are evaluated along
the same number of bins and cut-off points, but both the number of bins and their
cut-offs vary by year. Figure 5.1 reports the number of intervals, as well as the upper
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cut-off, for the lowest and highest interval bins. For the years in which I have data,
the average number of intervals is 13.66 per year, though it ranges between 5 and 25
across the sample.
The remainder of this section follows one state in one year (Delaware, 1979) as a
walk through of the methodology. I follow this same process for each other state-year
observation. Figure 5.3 displays a copy of the SOI series for Delaware, 1979. Data for
earlier years had to be digitized, but later years were available from the IRS in excel
format. Figure 5.2 displays how the SOI data is formatted. The first three columns
of Figure 5.2 simply restate the information provided by the SOI. For example, the
third row of data reports the number of returns and adjusted gross income for the
$10,000-$15,000 interval. In 1979, 37,964 people reported (adjusted gross) incomes
between $10,000 and $15,000, totaling to a cumulative $474,625,000 AGI (in 1979
dollars).
The share of returns and share of AGI, reported in columns four and five, are
calculated by dividing each row by the total number of returns and AGI respectively.
Returns with AGI between $10,000 and $15,000 accounted for approximately 15%
of total tax returns (fourth column) and 11.34% of total AGI (column 5). The last
two columns create the cumulative share of returns and AGI respectively. The last
two columns give snapshots of the income distribution. For example, 22.38% of AGI
accrued to the poorest 56.29% of the (tax filing) population.
Clearly snapshots of the income distribution alone are insufficient and some form
of interpolation is required to approximate the income distribution.Cowell and Mehta
(1982) find that relatively few income bins, as few as five in his paper, can very closely
approximate total income inequality. I rely somewhat heavily on this finding, as the
number of income bins become quite small in the later portion of my sample (Figure
5.1). Cowell and Mehta (1982) additionally find that the type of interpolation method
used to compute total income inequality makes very little difference in the estimation
of the Gini coefficient. Consequently, sine more involved methods appear to add little
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value, they argue for simplicity and transparency.
I linearly interpolate between intervals to approximate the income distribution
and evaluate the cumulative density at each quintile endpoint (corresponding to the
20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, and 100th percentiles). Unsurprisingly, given Cowell and Mehta
(1982)’s results, estimates do not change substantially if a cubic spline interpolation
method is used instead. The two interpolation methods are highly correlated with
each other (within state correlation coefficient of .949). Frank does not provide es-
timates for shares accumulating to lower portions of the income distribution, but he
does provide estimates for the top 10%. My estimates are highly correlated with his
(within state correlation coefficient of .913).
Note that it would possible to more granularly evaluate the estimated cumulative
density of income (for example with deciles or percentiles). However, doing so risks
unacceptable exposure to measurement error in certain years because of relatively few
identifying data-points to interpolate on. This could potentially lead to estimates of
income accruing to portions of the income distribution for which there is not necessary
data. For example, there is no data point for the cumulative share accruing to the
30th to the 40th percentiles. Thus, decile estimates of the share of income accruing to
the 3rd and 4th deciles contain no additional information than simply estimating the
second quintile.
Table 5.3 reports values for the CDF and quintile shares for Delaware, 1979.
The top panel reports the cumulative density of income evaluated at the end of the
each quintile. The bottom panel reports share of (adjusted gross) income captured
specifically by that quintile. For example, the poorest 60% of income earners earned
and estimated 25.9% of AGI (See top panel). The majority of this (about 60%) went
to the third quintile (40th and 60th percentiles) of income earners captured 15.4% of
total AGI (see bottom panel).
For certain years and states, data was missing. In these cases I linearly interpolate
the shares going to each state i in a given year. For example, due to a clerical error,
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Delaware (1962) is missing from the official SOI photocopied manuscript. I had to
linearly interpolate the years 1982 to 1985 because data was not available during
these years.
Once I obtain the shares, I multiply the total AGI for each state-year by the share
of AGI for that income interval in order to approximate total AGI for each quintile.
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The Life-Cycle of FAHP Grants
This appendix describes the institutional details behind FAHP grants. FAHP grants
are congressionally determined. FAHP obtain their budget in two steps: authorization
and appropriation. Both steps require an act of Congress. In the first step, Congress
passes an authorization bill which authorizes a program or agency to exist and lays
out the provisions governing the mandates of the program and how much it intends to
allocate towards it. However, authorization bills do not actually allow these programs
to draw money from the Treasury. In order to do so, funds must be appropriated.
These appropriations bills determine the final size of the funds allocated toward each
program.2.
In each chamber of Congress, the Committee on Appropriations (HCoA and SCoA
hereafter for the House of representatives and Senate respectively) is tasked with
bringing authorization bills before the floor of their respective chambers. HCoA and
SCoA therefore have the ability to effectively block legislation pertaining not just to
FAHP, but a vast array of spending. Thus, HCoA and SCoA effectively hold Congress’
purse strings and its members are in a batter position to able to extract rents in the
form of spending and grants for their respective states.
Within each chamber, the chairperson of the committee wield even more power.
The chairperson has the responsibility to call legislation to the committee and bring
it to the floor. The chairperson is a member of all subcommittees on appropriations
and has the ability to effectively kill a bill by stalling it out. Since the chairperson is
responsible for bringing bills to a committee vote, they hold tremendous power. As
a result, projects favorable to the chairperson, even though they may not otherwise
2Most FAHP programs actually have contract authority, which essentially allows them to make
contracts (obligations) based on the provisions of an authorization bill, but they may not actually
expend these funds without an authorization bill.
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have received funding, are not uncommon. 3
I exclude the percent of representation by each state on the SCA because there
is very little variation from year to year since senators have long terms, each state
only has two senators, and composition of the committee does not often change.
Including it never changes the results meaningfully. However, the HCoA is arguably
more powerful because constitutionally all appropriations bills must originate in the
House of Representatives.
Once funds have been appropriated, FAHP is authorized to distribute the funds.
FAHP grants go through three major phases: apportionment, obligation, and outlays
(expenditures). In the first phase, funds are distributed to states. Specifically these
funds are made available to state Departments of Transportation (DoT) who can
then either directly use the funds or distribute them to local partner agencies within
the state. Distributions can either come in the form of either apportionments or
allocations. Apportionments are disbursed via statutory formulas, whereas allocations
are not. Nearly all earmarked spending is disbursed via allocations. I only include
apportionments in my analysis, thereby avoiding most of the politically motivated
grants.
In the second phase, funds are obligated by states. During this phase the state
DoTs select projects either directly or via local partner agencies, subject to FAHP
guidelines. Essentially, the federal government sets aside apportionments and desig-
nates them towards specific projects for the future payment of work. Once funds for
projects are obligated, work begins. By law, apportioned funds must be obligated
within four years, but in practice about 70% of apportioned funds are obligated within
3Some of these projects are quite glaring. One example is the ’Bridge to Nowhere’ which would
have connected Gravina Island, Alaska to Ketchikan, Alaska. Despite both towns having less than
10,000 inhabitants and a fully functioning ferry already connecting the two towns, the $400 million
project was initially funded. The primary champion of the bridge at the time was Senator Ted
Stevens, chair of the SoCA. The project was heavily criticized as being the epitome of pork-barrel
spending as it was massively expensive and seemed to provide very little economic benefit. Due to
public outrage, the bridge was never built, but many similar projects – euphemistically denoted as
’High Priority Projects’ have been completed in recent incarnations of authorization bills.
140
the first year Leduc and Wilson (2013a), and almost all of the remaining funds are
obligated the following year.
In the final phase, funds are outlaid (expended) to states as project costs occur.
FAHP grants are both reimbursable and matching, therefore states or local agencies
initially finance projects and the federal government pay for a certain share of the
costs after expenses have occurred. Table 5.5 gives further details on the federal share
for various programs in 2014. The federal share for most programs is 80%, but several
programs go as high as 100%. However, those programs are typically small. This final
phase is when expenses are recorded in GDP.
B Appendix: Inverse Distance Weights
The second most commonly used weights are inverse distance weights. This method of
weighing weighs by the geographic distance between some geographic centroid within
the spatial unit. In general inverse distance weights are defined as ωij = f(dij)
−1,
with f(dij) being a nondecreasing function of the distance between states i and j
(dij). In practice, most empirical papers define as a f(dij) linear function so that
ωij =
1
f(dij)
.
A common criticism of spatial models is that the choice of W is somewhat ar-
bitrary. That said, contiguity weights have several advantages over inverse distance
weights. First, the interpretation of first order contiguity matrices is straightforward
distorted less by later normalization. Second, inverse distance weights are prone to
inconsistent results from what amounts to a spatial unit root (see Elhorst (2012) for
a more complete discussion). Last, as N gets large, the number of necessary compu-
tations increases exponentially. This problem can be mitigated somewhat by use of
spare matrix algorithms, which can substantially reduce computing time for matrices
with many zeros. Thus, since contiguity matrices are more spare than inverse distance
matrices, they are more computationally efficient to estimate.
My results are mostly robust to using linear inverse distance weights instead of
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contiguity weights, though in some specifications, estimates do not converge well.
C Appendix Tables and Figures
Appendix Tables
Table 5.1: Number of Intervals by Year
Year(s) Number of Intervals Lowest Cut-Off Highest Cut-Off
1956 17 $0 $1,000,000
1957-1958 21 $0 $1,000,000
1959-1960 20 $1,000 $1,000,000
1961-1962 24 $1,000 $1,000,000
1963 25 $0 $1,000,000
1964-1965 19 $0 $1,000,000
1966 20 $0 $1,000,000
1967 18 $0 $200,000
1968-1969 22 $0 $1,000,000
1970-1975 24 $1,000 $1,000,000
1976-1978 18 $2,000 $1,000,000
1979-1981 12 $5,000 $1,000,000
1982-1985 NA NA NA
1986-1988 5 $10,000 $50,000
1989-1995 7 $15,000 $200,000
1996 7 $20,000 $200,000
1997-2001 12 $0 $1,000,000
2002 7 $20,000 $200,000
2003 6 $30,000 $200,000
2004-2009 5 $50,000 $200,000
2010-2011 9 $1 $1,000,000
2012-2013 10 $1 $1,000,000
The third column indicates the top dollar value for the lowest income
interval. The fourth column indicates the minimum dollar amount to be
in the top income bin. All dollar amounts are nominal.
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Table 5.2: Example of SOI Data: Delaware 1979 cont.
Income Number of AGI Share of Share of Cumulative Cumulative
Interval Returns (Thousands) Returns AGI Share of Returns Share of AGI
0 0
Under5k 57619 130210 0.2321 0.0311 0.2321 0.0311
5k-10k 44120 331866 0.1777 0.0793 0.4099 0.1104
10k-15k 37964 474625 0.1529 0.1134 0.5629 0.2238
15k-20k 28952 505373 0.1166 0.1207 0.6795 0.3446
20k-25k 24523 541262 0.0988 0.1293 0.7784 0.4740
25k-30k 21521 593179 0.0867 0.1417 0.8651 0.6158
30k-50k 25814 942685 0.1040 0.2253 0.9691 0.8411
50k-100k 6529 415679 0.0263 0.0993 0.9954 0.9404
100k-200k 859 112818 0.0034 0.0269 0.9989 0.9674
200k-500k 208 60559 0.0008 0.0144 0.9997 0.9818
500k-1m 33 22595 0.0001 0.0054 0.9998 0.9872
1m+ 28 53140 0.0001 0.0127 1 1
Total 248170 4183990
Table 5.3: Constructing Quintile Shares; Delaware 1979 Continued
Cumulative
Percentiles Percent of AGI
20 2.3
40 10.4
60 25.9
80 50.8
100 100.0
Quintiles
Quintile Quintile Share
Bottom 0.023
2nd 0.087
3rd 0.154
4th 0.249
Top 0.492
Shares do not sum to one because of rounding.
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Table 5.4: Data Sources for Main Results
Variable Data Manipulations Source
Inequality % Growth Rates Frank(2014)
Federal Apportionments Real logged per capita FHWA
State Transportation disbursements Real logged per capita FHWA
Senate Appr. Comm. Chair NA Federal Registrar
House Appr. Comm. Chair NA Federal Registrar
% House Appr. Comm. NA Congress Profiles, USHR
Table 5.5: Programs in FAHP: MAPS-21
Program Percent of Federal Share Description
Apportionments of Project Costs
National Highway 59.25% 80% Expand and maintain the National Highway System and
Performance Program connect strategically important highways and roads.
Surface Transportation 27.25% 80% Block grants to states for transportation programs,
program including non-highway programs.
Highway Safety 5.92% 90 % Reduce serious injuries and fatalities.
Improvement Program
Railway-Highway 0.58% 90% Reduce hazards at railway-highway crossings.
Crossings Program
Congestion Mitigation & 6.12% 80% Help states meet National Ambient Air Quality Standards
Air Quality Improvement for ozone, carbon monoxide, or particulate matter.
Program
Metropolitan Planning 0.84% 80% Expand and maintain access to highway principal and
Program minor arterials and roads in metropolitan areas.
MAP-21 denotes Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act. It covered fiscal years 2012-
2014. Values in this table are applicable to MAP-21 only. Programs and percent of total apportion-
ments varies by authorization bills, but the NHPP program consists of the bulk of funding for most
recent authorizations. This table only includes programs which are determined via apportionments,
thus excluding allocated funds (see Appendix A).
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Table 5.6: Flypaper effect, Levels, 0-10 lags
No Lags 1 Lag 2 Lags 3 Lags 4 Lags 5 Lags 6 Lags 7 Lags 8 Lags 9 Lags 10 Lags
Infrastructurei,t 0.437
∗∗∗ -0.0561 0.0291 -0.145 -0.170 -0.183 -0.167 -0.166 -0.185 -0.208 -0.252∗∗
(0.101) (0.116) (0.131) (0.140) (0.129) (0.141) (0.138) (0.133) (0.133) (0.127) (0.118)
Infrastructurei,t−1 0.583∗∗∗ 0.117∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.192∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.0648) (0.0785) (0.0769) (0.0823) (0.0833) (0.0858) (0.0756) (0.0832) (0.0760)
Infrastructurei,t−2 0.466∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗ 0.167∗∗ 0.0620 0.0775 0.0624 0.0618
(0.137) (0.0574) (0.112) (0.0775) (0.0762) (0.0695) (0.0781) (0.0793) (0.0819)
Infrastructurei,t−3 0.314∗∗ 0.117 0.393∗∗ 0.285∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.0974) (0.160) (0.119) (0.130) (0.131) (0.117) (0.119)
Infrastructurei,t−4 0.180∗∗ -0.0279 0.129 -0.127∗ -0.0745 -0.142∗ -0.0983
(0.0886) (0.0568) (0.0923) (0.0753) (0.0732) (0.0744) (0.0708)
Infrastructurei,t−5 0.167∗ -0.0659 0.172∗∗ 0.0559 0.174∗ 0.102
(0.0934) (0.0796) (0.0839) (0.0873) (0.0985) (0.0981)
Infrastructurei,t−6 0.229∗∗∗ -0.159∗∗ -0.0738 -0.177∗∗ -0.0660
(0.0837) (0.0645) (0.0927) (0.0783) (0.0732)
Infrastructurei,t−7 0.406∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗ 0.124 -0.00980
(0.0920) (0.0715) (0.107) (0.111)
Infrastructurei,t−8 0.272∗∗∗ 0.116∗ 0.146
(0.0816) (0.0601) (0.0895)
Infrastructurei,t−9 0.220∗∗ 0.150∗
(0.0872) (0.0834)
Infrastructurei,t−10 0.103
(0.0667)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 2784 2736 2688 2640 2592 2544 2496 2448 2400 2352 2304∑q
p=0 βp 0.437 0.527 0.613 0.656 0.691 0.732 0.769 0.802 0.823 0.805 0.780
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 1 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.026 0.067 0.130 0.203 0.267 0.243 0.570
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
Dependent variable log is real per capita state disbursements on highways. Infrastructure is log real per capita
FAHP apportionments in levels. Control variables included and described in text but not included for brevity.
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Table 5.7: Flypaper Effect, Log-Log Specification, 0 to 5 lags
Infrastructurei,t 0.180
∗∗∗ -0.00294 -0.0151 -0.0588 -0.0608 -0.0725
(0.0597) (0.0452) (0.0476) (0.0577) (0.0521) (0.0537)
Infrastructurei,t−1 0.210∗∗∗ 0.0253 0.0426 -0.00216 0.00512
(0.0458) (0.0210) (0.0273) (0.0236) (0.0221)
Infrastructurei,t−2 0.224∗∗∗ 0.0481∗ 0.0787∗∗ 0.0172
(0.0510) (0.0270) (0.0294) (0.0363)
Infrastructurei,t−3 0.219∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.0609) (0.0360) (0.0444)
Infrastructurei,t−4 0.109∗∗ 0.0205
(0.0456) (0.0351)
Infrastructurei,t−5 0.117∗∗
(0.0575)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2784 2736 2688 2640 2592 2544∑q
p=0 βp 0.180 0.207 0.234 0.251 0.259 0.270
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 0 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0 :
∑q
p=0 βp = 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
Dependent variable log is real per capita state disbursements on highways. Infrastructure is log real
per capita FAHP apportionments in levels. Control variables included and described in text but not
included for brevity.
Table 5.8: IV/GMM Quintile effects of doubling infrastructure apportionments
Bottom Quintile 2nd Quintile 3rd Quintile 4th Quintile Top Quintile
Incomei,t−1 0.6634∗∗∗ 0.8716∗∗∗ 0.8544∗∗∗ 0.8850∗∗∗ 0.9023∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)
Infrastructure 0.0640∗ 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0185∗∗∗ 0.0097∗ 0.0075∗
(0.033) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
Observations 2602 2688 2688 2688 2688
∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
Dependent variable log is real per capita state disbursements on highways. Infrastructure is log
real per capita FAHP apportionments in levels. Control variables included in regression but not
reported here. Estimated coefficients are derived using IV/GMM. Each column reports a different
regression. In each case, the lag dependent variable and infrastructure are instrumented for using
the second lag of the dependent variable and the spatial lag of infrastructure.
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Table 5.9: TaxSim Top Marginal Tax Rates
dependent variable: growth rate of the Gini coefficient
τ (Lag of Inequality) -0.004 (0.03)
β1 (Infrastructure) -0.126 (0.21)
Capital Gains -0.100 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.028 (0.05)
θ1 (W*Infrastructure) -0.438
∗ (0.24)
Capital Gains 0.055 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.013 (0.06)
ρ (W*Inequality) 0.630∗∗∗ (0.03)
Short Run Direct Effects
Infrastructure -0.247 (0.22)
Capital Gains -0.102 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.035 (0.05)
Short Run Indirect Effects
Infrastructure -1.279∗∗ (0.53)
Capital Gains -0.019 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.076 (0.05)
Short Run Total Effects
Infrastructure -1.525∗∗ (0.64)
Capital Gains -0.122∗∗∗ (0.03)
Top Tax Bracket -0.111∗∗∗ (0.02)
Long Run Direct Effects
Infrastructure -0.245 (0.22)
Capital Gains -0.102 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.034 (0.05)
Long Run Indirect Effects
Infrastructure -1.265∗∗ (0.53)
Capital Gains -0.019 (0.08)
Top Tax Bracket -0.075 (0.05)
Long Run Total Effects
Infrastructure -1.510∗∗ (0.64)
Capital Gains -0.121∗∗∗ (0.03)
Top Tax Bracket -0.110∗∗∗ (0.02)
Observations 1728
This table reports estimates where measures of progressivity are included as covariates. The depen-
dent variable is the percent growth rate of the Gini coefficient. It recreates Table 2.14, except it
reports the effects of taxation on the growth rate of the Gini coefficient. Infrastructure is the log
of per capita Federal Aid Highway apportionments. Standard errors are reported in parentheses,
clustered at the state level, and computed using 10,000 replications of the Monte Carlo simulation
procedure laid out in LeSage and Pace (2009). ∗ p < .1, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01.
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Appendix Figures
Figure 5.1
 
Figure 5.2: Tax Filers vs Population
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Figure 5.3: Example of SOI Data: Delaware 1979
 
Figure 5.4: Distribution of High vs low-skilled Workers
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y
8 10 12 14
ln(Income)
High Skill Low Skill
This table reports the cumulative density functions for low-skilled workers and high-skilled workers.
The sample of workers includes all workers between the ages of 25 and 75 that reported at working
at least 10 hours last week and made least $2,000 in total real income (2013 dollars). Low-skilled
workers are defined as workers who have completed no more than a high school diploma.
High-skilled workers are defined as workers who have completed at least four years of college.
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Figure 5.6
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This figure compares Federal highway outlays as a share of GDP (left axis) to national defense
outlays as a share of GDP. Federal highway outlays are sourced from the Office of Management
and Budget Historical Tables
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Figure 5.7
Figure 5.8
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Figure 5.9
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Data Glossary
Format: variable name - data description. [Used in Results] (Source) {Link, if
applicable}4
Gini - State-level Gini coefficients of income by state. Obtained from Frank (2014).
Frank uses the Statistics of Income series from the Internal Revenue Service to con-
struct his series. Data is available on his personal website.
[Table 2.3]
Frank (2014)
{http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html}
grGini - The log differennce of Gini.
[Table 2.3]
Frank (2014)
{http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html}
grTheil - Growth rate of the Theil Entropy Index of income by state. Obtained from
Frank (2014). Frank uses the Statistics of Income series from the Internal Revenue
Service to construct his series. Data is available on his personal website.
[Table 2.11]
Frank (2014)
{http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html}
grRMeanDev - Growth rate of the Relative Mean Deviation of income by state.
4For brevity I report ”Baseline” if results were used in the main results. Many of these variables
appear in other regressions as well, though. Sources listed are where I derived the data from. In
some cases that is not the original source. For example, Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a) use BEA
data in part of their analysis, but I report Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a), not the BEA as the
source. In some cases data comes from multiple links or locations within an agency. Links provided
either link to a specific instance of the data, or the parent web page where applicable.
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Obtained from Frank (2014). Frank uses the Statistics of Income series from the
Internal Revenue Service to construct his series. Data is available on his personal
website.
[Table 2.11]
Frank (2014)
{http://www.shsu.edu/eco_mwf/inequality.html}
CPI - Current Price Index. Used in construction of all ”real” variables.
[Baseline]
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis)
{https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/financial-and-economic-education/
cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-1913}
Popn - Total state population, annual average.
[Baseline]
(United States Census Bureau)
{http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/80s_st_totals.html}
grlnrStatePcapPincome - The first difference of the log of real per capita personal
income. Sourced from BEA’s interactive data tool for regional data, series SA1.
[Baseline]
(Bureau of Economic Analysis)
{https://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=1&
isuri=1}
rsf2Pcap - Real per capita total disbursements by states. Sourced from the Depart-
ment of Transportation’s Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Statistics series
which is published annually by their Office of Highway Policy Information. Total
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disbursements are reported in table SF2 and is defined by the sum of capital outlays,
maintenance, administration and research planning, highway law enforcement and
safety, interest, bond retirement, grants-in-aid to local governments. Capital outlays
and maintenance compose about two thirds of this total.
[Table 2.2]
(DOT-OHPI)
{https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm}.
lnrsf2Pcap - The natural logarithm of rsf2Pcap.
[Baseline]
(DOT-FHWA-OHPI)
{https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm}.
SenateAppropriationsChair - An indicator variable for state that the Chairper-
son of the Senate Committee on Appropriations represents. 1 means the state are
represented by the chairperson in a given year.
[Baseline]
(Government Publishing (Printing) Office)
{https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-110sdoc14/pdf/CDOC-110sdoc14.pdf}
HRCommitteeChair - An indicator variable for state that the Chairperson of the
Senate Committee on Appropriations represents. 1 means the state are represented
by the chairperson in a given year.
[Baseline]
(United States House of Representatives and Congressional Profiles)
{https://democrats-appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.
house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/House_Approps_Concise_History.pdf and http:
//history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/84th/; various years}
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PctHRAprCommittee - Percent of the House of Representatives Committee on
Appropriations occupied by members of a given state in a given year.
[Baseline]
(United States House of Representatives and Congressional Profiles)
{https://democrats-appropriations.house.gov/sites/democrats.appropriations.
house.gov/files/migrated/uploads/House_Approps_Concise_History.pdf and http:
//history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/84th/; various years}
rpcapFA4 total - Real per capita value of the total Federal Aid Highway Program
apportionments, prior to post apportionment set-asides, and before penalties, Table
FA-4. Programs vary by year.
[Table 2.2]
(DOT-FHWA-OHPI)
{https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/statistics.cfm}
lnrpcaptotalpmaNS2014 - Total value by state of DD-350 Military procurement,
available through the US department of Defense. This is the main measure of military
spending used in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a). To transform the data into log
real per capita terms I interpolate zeros.
[Table 2.15]
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a)
{http://www.columbia.edu/~en2198/papers/fiscal.pdf}
lnmilBroadNS2014 - The log per capita value of the broader measure of military
spending reported in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a). This measure includes mili-
tary compensation from the BEA. The data is transformed into log real per capita
terms.
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[Table 2.15]
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014a)
{http://www.columbia.edu/~en2198/papers/fiscal.pdf}
lnrpcapMilitarySpending - the log of real per capita military compensation, BEA.
Regional Data, Personal income by major component and Earnings by industry
(SA5,SA5H,SA5N).
[Table 2.15]
(Bureau of Economic Analysis)
{$https://www.bea.gov/itable/iTable.cfm?ReqID=70&step=1#reqid=70&step=1&
isuri=1$}
FedCapGain - The effective tax rate on an additional $1,000 of capital gains earned
by a household with an original income of $1,000,000. Created using NBER’s TaxSim
tool.
[Table 2.14]
(National Bureau of Economic Analysis) {http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/}
FedMargTaxTopBracket - The effective tax rate on an additional $1,000 of income
earned by a household with an original income of $1,000,000. Created using NBER’s
TaxSim tool.
[Table 2.14]
(National Bureau of Economic Analysis)
{http://users.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/}
lnAGIq1 - lnAGIq5 - Log estimates of aggregate gross income captured by each
quintile. Computed by logging the product of AGI by the estimated share of income
captured by that group. See Appendix A for more details.
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[Table 2.6]
(Internal Revenue Service - Statistics of Income)
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-statistics-of-income
lnrinctot - The natural log of real per capita total personal income (inctot). Data
was sourced from the CPS through IPUMS.
[Table 2.7 and 2.9]
(Current Population Survey)
{https://cps.ipums.org/cps/}
HS or Less - Definition of low-skilled worker used in the paper. Defined as a worker
who reports having an education no higher than high school graduation. Data was
sourced from the CPS through IPUMS. The variable is defined with CPS’ educ vari-
able. HS or Less is constructed as an indicator for all valid responses less than or
equal to educ code 73.
[Table 2.7]
(Current Population Survey)
{https://cps.ipums.org/cps/}
BAmore - Definition of high-skilled worker used in the paper. Defined as a worker
who reports having an education of at least four years of college. Data was sourced
from the CPS through IPUMS. The variable is defined with CPS’ educ variable.
BAmore is constructed as an indicator for all valid responses greater than or equal
to educ code 110.
[Table 2.7]
(Current Population Survey)
{https://cps.ipums.org/cps/}
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dlowskill3-dlowskill5 - And indicator variable equal to one if a person works in a
low-skilled sector. The number represents the aggregation of industries in the sectors.
Industry codes used are from the 1990 census concept of industries, given by CPS
code ind1990. Data was sourced from the CPS through IPUMS.
[Table 2.9]
(Current Population Survey)
{https://cps.ipums.org/cps/}
dhighskill3 - dhighskill5 - And indicator variable equal to one if a person works
in a high-skilled sector. The number represents the aggregation of industries in the
sectors. Industry codes used are from the 1990 census concept of industries, given by
CPS code ind1990. Data was sourced from the CPS through IPUMS.
[Table 2.9]
(Current Population Survey)
{https://cps.ipums.org/cps/}
E Chapter 2 Appendix
Recreating Wilson 2012
My empirical approach is based on Wilson (2012), but also differs from his approach
in several important ways. In this section, I highlight how these differences result
in different job multipliers. I begin by closely following the methodology of Wilson,
including using his data. With each step, I depart slightly from Wilson, until the
only difference between the main results and the results reported in this section
are the inclusion of implementation lags. Figures 5.10 to 5.14 report estimates of
job multipliers for various steps between Wilson’s methodology and mine. Table
5.10 reports the differences between these figures. The key methodological and data
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differences between estimates reported in this figure are: 1) My measure of spending
is the sum of all eventual DoT expenditures whereas Wilson reports estimates for
obligations up until a certain time for nearly all ARRA spending - not just the DoT. 2)
Wilson uses state-level QCEW employment whereas I aggregate county-level QCEW
employment. Estimates are most comparable to Wilson’s measure of obligations as
ARRA spending, as reported in his Figure 5. In all five figures I present in this paper,
the solid red line indicates the sampling period reported by Wilson.
Figure 5.10 reports estimates that come closest to replicating Wilson. Estimates
are fairly similar to what Wilson find - an initially positive effect that is statistically
positive and generally increasing. The magnitude of the job multiplier is larger,
though. Instead of an increase of about 5 jobs per $1 million to 10 jobs per $1
million, I find the effect increases from 5 jobs per $1 million to about 40 jobs per $1
million. Switching instruments (Figure 5.10) does not appear to meaningfully change
estimates. The primary difference comes from disaggregating from the state to the
county level. That said multipliers at the county-level may not be comparable to
state-level multipliers (Chandra and Thompson, 2000).
Table 5.10: From Wilson (2012) to this paper
Figure Method Instruments Dependent variable Controls
5.10 2SLS Wilson, State MBS, State Wilson, State
5.11 2SLS MBS, State MBS, State Wilson, State
5.12 2SLS MBS, State MBS, State MBS, State
5.13 2SLS MBS, County MBS, County MBS, County
5.14 CF MBS, County MBS, County MBS, County
Note: MBS refers to this paper. Wilson refers to Wilson (2012). State and County refer to the
unit of observation. MBS,State uses state aggregates of county data. 2SLS refers to two staged
least squares and CF refers to control function. Wilson’s state-level instruments include only his
DoT instruments. For the last two specifications, control variables are at the county level except
for tax benefits, which is sourced from Wilson and recorded at the state level for all specifications.
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Figure 5.12
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Figure 5.14
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Dropped Projects
Table 5.11: Dropped Projects
Reason dropped Number dropped
Multi-county project 594
Work start date missing 284
Illogical:Proceed before ARRA enacted 36
Illogical:Work Started before ARRA enacted 2
Illogical:Proceed date after work start date 288
Illogical:Work start date after work complete date 18
Illogical:Estimated completion date before ARRA enacted 2
Illogical:Award given before ARRA enacted 2
Illogical:Award given after proceed notice 452
Projects are dropped in order listed in the table. Some overlap exists between projects that are
dropped. Multi-county projects include statewide projects as well as non-statewide projects that
spanned across several counties.
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Two Stage Least Squares Estimates
The results presented in Section 4.4 rely on a control function (CF) approach. How-
ever, in this section I estimate the model using two stage-least squares (2SLS). The
instruments are the same as those used in (3.1), but first-stage expected values of the
instrumented variables are used instead of residuals from the first stage in estimating
the second stage.
Estimates are broadly similar to those presented in Section 3.4. The shape of the
response of the mean job multiplier (Figures 3.2 and 5.15) are comparable, though
the size of the multiplier is smaller when using 2SLS compared to the CF approach.
Estimates for β2 are very similar in both cases. Estimates for the interaction term
is negative in both cases, though there is no evidence of this effect attenuating with
time for the 2SLS estimates, as estimates using CF suggested. Because of the smaller
main effect, the estimated job multipliers are lower irrespective of the implementation
lags counties experienced. The similarity of estimated interaction terms result in
multipliers across different lag lengths that appear to have a similar pattern between
the CF and 2SLS approaches (Figures 3.7 and 5.20).
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Figure 5.15: Parameter Estimates for β1
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This figure corresponds to estimates of β1. Job multiplier represents the cumulative change in
employment per capita up to that time in response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per
capita, which corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ Lagi from Equation 3.1. Lag is demeaned, therefore this
figure represents the job multiplier at the average level of implementation lags. The solid line
represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Figure 5.16: Parameter Estimates for β2
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This figure represents the cumulative change in employment per capita in response to a one day
increase in the implementation lag of a counties’ largest project, at the mean level of spending.
This corresponds to β2 in equation 3.1. The solid line represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed
lines represent 90% confidence bands.
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Figure 5.17: Parameter Estimates for β3
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Figure 5.18: Job Multipliers - Long Lag Counties
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This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for high lag counties. High lag
counties are defined as counties with a 90 greater than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 5.15 and 5.17 report estimates for β1 and
β3 respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
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Figure 5.19: Job Multiplier - Short Lag Counties
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This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for low lag counties. High low
counties are defined as counties with a 90 smaller than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 − β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 5.15 and 5.17 report estimates for β1 and
β3 respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
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Figure 5.20: Comparing Job Multipliers
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Mean Lag Job Multiplier
Low Lag County Job Multiplier
This figure overlays coefficient estimates from Figures 5.15, 5.18, and 5.19. Confidence intervals are
reported in those figures, but not shown here for readability. The solid line corresponds to
estimates reported in Figure 3.2. Figures 5.18 and 5.19 are represented by the dotted and dashed
lines respectively.
Nonparametric Estimates
The validity of the instruments used in the model from Section 3.4 may strongly
depend on the linearity imposed in the first stage. Assuming this linearity may create
a non-trivial specification bias. Following Newey et al. (1999) and Das et al. (2003),
I estimate the first stage equations non-parametrically, thereby sidestepping possible
specification bias in the instruments. One critical difference between the above listed
papers and the results presented below, is that I only estimate the first-stage non-
parametrically. I do this in order to allow for comparison with the results in Section
3.4. Reported estimates in this section estimate the first stage using a local-linear
nonparametric kernel regression.5
Estimates are broadly similar to those using the traditional control function ap-
5As is common practice, I specify an Epanechnikov kernel density function.
170
proach. Estimates for the mean job multiplier (Figures 3.2 and 5.21) are very simi-
lar using both approaches. Parameter estimates for β2 are extremely small in both
specifications. Additionally, the differential effect of implementation lags on the em-
ployment effects of spending appear negative in most months. That said, estimates
of this differential effect appears larger in the non-parametric specification. Conse-
quently, the average effect of spending is positive for low-lag and mean-lag counties in
most months, but the same is not necessary true for high-lag counties. Additionally,
the effects of implementation lags do not appear to last longer in the non-parametric
specification than in the main results.
Figure 5.21: Parameter Estimates for β1
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This figure corresponds to estimates of β1. Job multiplier represents the cumulative change in
employment per capita up to that time in response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per
capita, which corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ Lagi from Equation 3.1. Lag is demeaned, therefore this
figure represents the job multiplier at the average level of implementation lags. The solid line
represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands. Confidence
bands constructed through 5,000 block residual bootstrap iterations.
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Figure 5.22: Parameter Estimates for β2
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This figure represents the cumulative change in employment per capita in response to a one day
increase in the implementation lag of a counties’ largest project, at the mean level of spending.
This corresponds to β2 in equation 3.1. The solid line represents the coefficient estimate. Dashed
lines represent 90% confidence bands. Confidence bands constructed through 5,000 block residual
bootstrap iterations.
Figure 5.23: Parameter Estimates for β3
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Figure 5.24: Job Multipliers - Long Lag Counties
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This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for high lag counties. High lag
counties are defined as counties with a 90 greater than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 + β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 5.21 and 5.23 report estimates for β1 and
β3 respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
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Figure 5.25: Job Multiplier - Short Lag Counties
-2
0
0
20
40
60
Jo
b 
M
ul
tip
lie
r
20
09
m1
20
09
m4
20
09
m7
20
09
m1
0
20
10
m1
20
10
m4
20
10
m7
20
10
m1
0
20
11
m1
20
11
m4
20
11
m7
20
11
m1
0
20
12
m1
20
12
m4
20
12
m7
20
12
m1
0
20
13
m1
This figure corresponds to the cumulative change in employment per capita up to that time in
response to a $1 million increase in ARRA spending per capita for low lag counties. High low
counties are defined as counties with a 90 smaller than average level of implementation lags. This
corresponds to β1 − β3 ∗ 90 from Equation 3.1. Figures 5.21 and 5.23 report estimates for β1 and
β3 respectively. The solid line represents estimates. Dashed lines represent 90% confidence bands.
Confidence bands constructed for each period using Wald tests of parameter estimates to test for
joint significance.
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Figure 5.26: Comparing Job Multipliers
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This figure overlays coefficient estimates from Figures 5.21, 5.24, and 5.25. Confidence intervals are
reported in those figures, but not shown here for readability. The solid line corresponds to
estimates reported in Figure 5.21. Figures 5.24 and 5.25 are represented by the dotted and dashed
lines respectively.
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F Chapter 3 Appendix
G Supplemental Figures
Table 5.12: Shortest and Longest Completion Times
(Completed Projects Only)
Rank County Name State Average Time
1 Oglala Lakota South Dakota 141
2 Poquoson Virginia 275
3 Loving Texas 310
4 Yoakum Texas 346
5 Dawson Texas 377
...
...
...
...
3134 Bronx New York 3156
3135 New York New York 3322
3136 Philadelphia Pennsylvania 3354
3137 Aleutians West Alaska 4039
3138 Suffolk Massachusetts 4318
Figure 5.27: Average Completion Times by Authorization Cohort
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Figure 5.28: Average Completion Times by State
(Completed Projects Only)
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Figure 5.29: Average Completion Times by County
(Completed Projects Only)
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